Determinants of Labour Supply at Older Ages: A Theoretical and Empirical Approach. by Kanabar, Ricky
Determinants of Labour Supply at Older
Ages: A Theoretical and Empirical Approach.
Ricky Kanabar
Doctor of Philosophy
University of York
Department of Economics and Related Studies
August 2014
Abstract
An ageing population is a common feature shared amongst developed economies. Increas-
ing longevity has signicant implications for scal expenditure, pensions and the welfare
state. Therefore, research investigating the determinants of labour supply at older ages is
of paramount importance.
To understand labour supply behaviour from a theoretical perspective, in chapter one we
turn to a lifecycle framework, in which not only labour supply but saving and consumption
behaviour are also modelled. By analytically solving the model, we are able to understand
its general properties and what implications these have for optimal within period decisions.
In chapter two we show how state pension deferral can be modelled within a general lifecycle
framework and the e¤ect it may have on labour supply. We demonstrate the size of this e¤ect
using a numerical simulation and also compare the generosity of the two deferral options
available under UK legislation.
To investigate the determinants of labour supply from an empirical perspective, we use
a duration approach to model a variety of standard and non-standard retirement paths.
In chapter three we pay attention to the way in which an individuals labour force his-
tory may a¤ect their retirement decision. In chapter four we determine which factors are
more likely to lead to an individual returning to work conditional on having retired, and
the typical characteristics of an unretirement job. In both chapters we show that; age,
pension wealth, education and spousal employment characteristics are important factors in
determining labour force transitions at older ages.
The nal two chapters are concerned with survey methodology. Chapter ve shows the
importance of longitudinal survey weights in appropriately controlling for attrition in the UK
Labour Force Survey (UKLFS). We demonstrate this by comparing estimated labour market
ows under existing and revised weights. Chapter six highlights the extent of seasonality in
UKLFS ows and shows that adjusting for seasonality provides an improved understanding
of the underlying dynamics in the UK labour market.
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Introduction
An ageing population has become a prominent characteristic amongst many
advanced economies which have simultaneously witnessed a decline in their fer-
tility rate (OECD, 2011a). Average life expectancy has increased by 6 years
in the OECD area between 1983 and 2008. A recent report (OECD, 2011b)
indicated 20% of all individuals in OECD countries were aged 65 and over in
2010. As of 2011, 1 in 6 individuals in the UK population is aged 65 and over
(ONS, 2013b). Population ageing has serious scal implications, State Pension
(SP) payments alone made up 48% of total benet expenditure in the UK be-
tween 2012-2013 (DWP, 2013). These statistics highlight important questions
for researchers to investigate: for example is one able to capture and under-
stand which factors inuences major lifecycle decisions such as when to retire?
Or when should an individual choose to take up their pension conditional on
being eligible to receive it? In order to formally answer these questions one
can turn to a theoretical lifecycle framework in which major economic deci-
sions such as retirement can be analysed (Friedman, 1957; Ben-Porath, 1967).
Important contributions have shown that the classic lifecycle framework can
be extended to allow for non-standard retirement paths and can also be tested
using empirical data (Rust, 1989; Berkoven and Stern, 1991 and Gustman and
Steinmeier, 2002). However, by their very nature these latter models tend to
be complex and as such it is often di¢ cult to understand the way in which par-
ticular economic and sociodemographic characteristics a¤ect economic decision
making.
An alternative approach to understand the determinants of labour sup-
ply at older ages is to use a combination of secondary data and econometric
methodology. Increasing longevity raises important questions regarding how
governments will manage to support an increasing number of individuals in
1
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retirement for longer. What kinds of policies does government need to have
in place to help stem or reverse the trend in early retirement? How can pol-
icymakers keep individuals in work past state pension age? Which factors
inuence the decision for a retired individual to return to paid work? During
the past few decades researchers have attempted to answer these questions, to
help policymakers understand the signicant changes in labour supply behav-
iour at older ages. The emergence of early retirement (Quinn, 1977; Bazzoli,
1985; Kohli, 1991; Meghir and Whitehouse, 1997; Blundell et al., 2002), par-
tial retirement (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1984a) and unretirement (Maestas,
2010) has led to new ideas about the precise denition of retirement over the
past half century (Costa, 1998). In light of this, more recent studies often
dene retirement based on hours worked in addition to self reported status
(Maestas, 2010). Developments in econometric methodology and an emphasis
on developing longitudinal household panel surveys means methods now exist
to shed light on these questions.
Non-response is one particular aspect of longitudinal household panel sur-
veys which a¤ect analysis and interpretation (Wooldridge 2002; Solon, Haider
and Wooldridge, 2013). Attrition is inherent in any survey attempting to fol-
low the same individual or household over time. The decision to leave a survey
is complex and likely to be related to a variety of sociodemographic and eco-
nomic characteristics such as employment status, age or tenure (van den Berg
and Lindeboom 1998; Nicoletti and Perrachi 2005; Jones et al., 2012). There-
fore how does one control for attrition in longitudinal weights used to estimate
labour market ows such as those from employment into retirement? One
method by which to do so is to use raking methods which provide a method to
adjust a survey sample for factors such as attrition or sample design in order
to improve the relation between the sample and population (Battaglia et al.,
2004). Subsequent estimated ows of population statistics then account for
the fact that particular respondents are more likely to respond than others.
Another important factor to consider in the context of a longitudinal house-
hold survey is seasonality. To what extent do seasonal factors a¤ect labour
market ows? How can one appropriately control for this when analysing an
economic time series? By simply analysing an unadjusted series researchers
may not truly understand the underlying behaviour of the time series. Sea-
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sonal and calendar e¤ects may include cultural and religious events, weather
patterns, trading days and administrative events such as school holidays (ONS,
2007). All of these can potentially a¤ect an economic time series (Findley et
al., 1998). One solution is to seasonally adjust data and determine its con-
stituent components; by doing so it is possible to estimate the underlying trend
component.
This thesis answers the questions posed above. It is comprised of three
sections: theory, empirics and data; each of which contains two chapters. The
next section highlights the contribution of each chapter.
0.1 Theory
0.1.1 Chapter One: Work and Play Pave the Way: The
Importance of Part TimeWork in a Lifecycle Model
In order to capture and understand important decisions over the lifecycle one
must turn to a structural model. Chapter one presents such a framework
in which major economic decisions such as; labour supply, consumption and
savings are analysed and makes use of a commonly assumed functional form
for the utility function (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2002).
Under the assumption of perfect foresight we rst ask whether it is possible
to solve such a model analytically. This is important if one is to understand
the general properties of the model and how these inuence economic decision
making over the lifecycle. Whilst richer models incorporate more features akin
to the real world such as the social security system or uncertainty (Rust, 1989;
Gustman and Steinmeier, 2002), these models require numerical methods to
solve the optimisation problem.
Given our particular interest in modelling the labour supply decision for a
particular period, we pay particular attention to the way in which future deci-
sions regarding labour supply, consumption and savings (do not) a¤ect within
period decisions. By way of an application we investigate this in the context of
the retirement decision, to determine whether the heterogeneity in retirement
paths such as partial retirement (a gradual reduction in working hours) and
unretirement (a transition from retirement back into paid employment) can be
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accommodated within our framework.
0.1.2 Chapter Two: To Defer or Not Defer: State Pen-
sion in a Lifecycle Model
Lifecycle models capture important economic decisions over the lifecycle. One
such decision is whether to defer receipt of State Pension (SP). In Chapter two
we investigate the SP deferral decision in the context of a lifecycle model and
how it may a¤ect labour supply, consumption and savings.
Legislation regarding SP deferral is particularly simple. It only require
that an individual has reached State Pension Age (SPA) and has made a
su¢ cient number of National Insurance (NI) contributions. Therefore the rst
question we pose in the context of a lifecycle model is under what conditions
is SP deferral optimal? With little research in this area our contribution is
important if one is to fully understand the implications of such a policy, and
why it should motivate individuals to defer receipt of their SP further; SP by
denition is deferred income from an earlier period.
The second question we pose is whether pension deferral a¤ects labour
supply behaviour. A recent Department of Work and Pensions report (DWP,
2008) showed that despite current legislation implying that the deferral and
labour supply decision are independent, in practice those who deferred tended
to remain in the labour market. Understanding whether deferral has an impact
on labour supply behaviour in the context of a lifecycle may help to shed some
light on why this is the case.
Related to the rst aim, assuming deferral is optimal we ask which of the
two options (deferred income or lump sum) available under current legislation
is preferred? Understanding what conditions must hold for a particular choice
to be desired helps policymakers grasp the full scal implications of deferral
policy. This is important when factors such as an individuals life expectancy
and rate of return a¤ect the optimal choice particularly in the face of increasing
longevity. In line with existing literature we show in most simulations the
deferred income option is more lucrative.
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0.2 Empirics
0.2.1 Chapter Three: Lifetime Labour Market Activity
and Retirement Decisions: Evidence from ELSA
The age at which to retire is arguably the most important labour supply deci-
sion to be made. In the rst of two empirical chapters, we focus on modelling
the retirement and early retirement decision. Both Chapters three and four
make use of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) dataset which
contains a representative sample of individuals aged 50 and over in England.
Using the duration approach of Jenkins (1997) the aim of Chapter three
is to understand which factors a¤ect the hazard of retirement and early re-
tirement of English men and women as they approach SPA. This is important
given that over the past few decades England like many countries has wit-
nessed a rapid increase in the proportion of individuals aged 65 and over in
the population (ONS, 2013b).
The exact timing of retirement behaviour depends on a variety of factors.
Maes (2013) and Nicholls (2010) highlight the importance of lifetime labour
market experiences such as periods of unemployment and inactivity and how
these raise the likelihood of pensioner poverty. Using retrospective employ-
ment history information available from the ELSA wave 3 life history survey
we investigate how lifetime labour market experiences a¤ect the hazard of
retirement.
Alongside employment history, income is an important factor in the retire-
ment decision. This is likely to be correlated with other lifetime sociodemo-
graphic factors such as education and pension wealth. In Chapter three we
investigate the e¤ect of income on retirement behaviour, and how it may di¤er
depending on position in the income distribution. Our results suggest the in-
formation set has a di¤erential impact on the hazard of retirement depending
on the quintile position in the income distribution.
The UK has witnessed a rise in the heterogeneity of retirement paths over
the past three decades particularly towards early retirement (Meghir & White-
house, 1997; Blundell, 2002). Such behaviour has a wide range of e¤ects on
current and future scal revenues and the welfare state, particularly given the
recent raft of changes to UK welfare programmes and complete overhaul of the
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SP system. These major changes in welfare and retirement policy are likely
to a¤ect labour supply behaviour, especially for those individuals approaching
SPA. Understanding the dynamics of retirement behaviour is important for
informing current and future policies in this area.
0.2.2 Chapter Four: Unretirement in England: An Em-
pirical Perspective
Chapter four models the unretirement decision for a group of retired English
men using the ELSA dataset. Unretirement is dened as a transition from
retirement to paid employment. We model the unretirement decision using
the duration approach of Jenkins (1997), to investigate the link between how
an individuals economic and sociodemographic characteristics are related to
the likelihood of returning to work.
In particular, previous research into modelling the retirement decision high-
lights the importance of savings facilitated by occupational and state pension
(Banks and Smith, 2006). In light of this we use detailed nancial informa-
tion available in ELSA to control for pension wealth, our results suggest it is
an important factor in determining whether unretirement takes place. This
has important policy implications and highlights the need for policymakers to
understand the a¤ect preretirement savings has on labour supply behaviour
post retirement. We also control for initial labour supply of the spouse, which
may a¤ect labour supply behaviour due to factors such as complementarities
in leisure (Cribb et al., 2013).
In order to prole the economic characteristics of unretirees we estimate the
preretirement annual salary for this group of individuals using the ELSA retro-
spective employment history data. Following Maestas (2010) we also document
information relating to the unretirement job in terms of the average annual
salary, weekly hours and job occupation. In doing so we are able to estab-
lish which preretirement characteristics are associated with unretirees. This is
important in formulating and understanding how potential policies may a¤ect
older workers in this group.
To the best of our knowledge there has been no previous research investigat-
ing the determinants of unretirement in England. With 1 in 6 individuals aged
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65 or over (ONS, 2013b) this pool of individuals (in addition to those who have
retired early) represent a source of potentially underutilised economic capacity.
0.3 Data
0.3.1 Chapter Five: Accounting for Attrition in the
two-quarter UK Labour Force Survey
The rst part of chapter ve investigates the sociodemographic and economic
characteristics correlated with attrition, and whether it is appropriately con-
trolled for in existing longitudinal weights estimated for the two-quarter UK
Labour Force Survey (UKLFS). Using sample data covering the period 2001-
2010 we derive longitudinal weights for the two-quarter longitudinal survey,
following the initial work by Clarke and Tate (1999). Since their study survey
response rates for the UKLFS have declined by around 25% (ONS, 2012a).
Therefore understanding which factors a¤ect the non-response decision and
whether they are identical to those in Clarke and Tate (1999) is crucial to
ensuring revised longitudinal weights appropriately capture survey attrition.
The second part of Chapter ve is a feasibility study to determine whether
it is possible to estimate longitudinal weights in an alternative raking engine:
Generalised Estimation System (GES), used more widely within the ONS and
Government Statistical Service (GSS). We formally investigate the quality of
the revised weights and compare them with those currently produced using
a Calibration on Margins (CALMAR) raking engine, following the work of
Clarke and Tate (1999).
The UKLFS is an important longitudinal household survey in the UK and
has an important role to play in providing a static and dynamic description of
UK labour force dynamics. It is therefore important for longitudinal weights
to appropriately control for attrition to ensure subsequent analysis reects the
true population.
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0.3.2 Chapter Six: Approaches to the Seasonal Adjust-
ment of Labour Market Flows
All time series are subject to seasonality that is to say part of the series is
attributable to calendar e¤ects. Chapter 6 investigates the extent of season-
ality in the UKLFS and conditional on its presence adjusts labour force ows
appropriately. Prior to this piece of research the ONS only released UKLFS
gross ows, which do not take into account calendar e¤ects.
In order to uncover the underlying trend component of UKLFS ows and
thus determine the extent and direction of seasonality we make use of X-12-
ARIMA (AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Average) software. The second
part of chapter six compares whether it is optimal to adjust the series directly
at the aggregate level for a given labour market ow at each quarter, or al-
ternatively adjust each sub-series individually. These are known as direct and
indirect adjustment respectively.
As the national statistical agency for the UK the ONS has a duty to provide
estimates of labour force ows with each quarterly release of the UKLFS. Part
of the work undertaken in chapter six involved designing a le system whereby
deriving seasonally adjusted labour force ows became a largely automated
process.
0.4 Summary
The rst four chapters of this thesis investigate the determinants of labour
supply at older ages in England. The rst two from a theoretical perspective
and the latter two from an empirical perspective. This is an important area of
research given the increase in life expectancy observed over the past fty years
and is forecast to rise further (ONS, 2011a; ONS, 2013c). To alleviate the po-
tential scal implications of an ageing population requires state intervention
through well designed policies to ensure a su¢ ciently exible labour market.
Policy responses to date have included bringing forwarded the planned rise in
the SPA and also the introduction of a single tier SP. Supply side initiatives
include reducing barriers to work for older workers such as abolition of legis-
lation allowing employers to retire individuals once they reach SPA. Research
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which focuses on understanding the determinants of labour supply behaviour
at older ages helps inform current and future policy aimed at this group of
individuals.
The nal section of the thesis examines two particular aspects of the UKLFS,
attrition and seasonality. Chapter ve illustrates how attrition may a¤ect esti-
mates of labour force ows including those into retirement. Chapter six shows
that the UKLFS exhibits seasonality, and hence the importance of being able
to estimate the trend component of a labour force series. As the main statis-
tics agency in the UK the ONS has a responsibility to ensure it releases high
quality data, so any subsequent analysis which is used to inform policymakers
accurately reects the population of interest. This is achieved by ensuring the
use of appropriate survey methods.
Chapter 1
Work and Play Pave the Way:
The Importance of Part Time
Work in a Lifecycle Model.
1.1 Introduction
In a lifecycle context individuals must determine their intertemporal labour
supply, consumption and savings. In any period an individual can choose
to have zero hours of work, full time hours or, with suitable assumptions
on labour demand, anything in between. Changes in participation pattern
between periods can correspond to major life events like leaving education
to enter employment, or retiring from the labour force. But there may also
be shorter term, repeated switches over time in participation, e.g. entering
part time work after the birth of a child. From the Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics (PSID) there is strong evidence of lifecycle e¤ects in labour force
participation, hours worked, and in assets. This is so for females but also for
males, even though they are less a¤ected by fertility issues.
Analysing intertemporal choices is di¢ cult because of the curse of dimen-
sionality which prevents closed form solution of many or even most examples.
If decision variables are subject to inequality constraints then it is even more
complex. A prime example is intertemporal labour supply where participation
can be at corners. Faced with this di¢ culty many researchers use numerical so-
lution/simulation methods to try to characterise the lifecycle prole of labour
10
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participation and associated decisions. For example Gustman & Steinmeier
(2002) and Blau (2012) use a lifecycle model with time additive discounted
preferences in which utility per period depends on a single consumption good
and leisure. The per period utility function is isoelastic in consumption and
quasilinear in leisure. Each period there is a time endowment which can be
allocated between paid work and leisure. There is a single one period nancial
asset in which the individual may borrow or save to any extent desired, a wage
rate per unit of work and perfect foresight.1 A crucial aspect is that in a lifecy-
cle context the optimal participation state now depends on current assets and
market conditions and also on all planned future participation states, which in
turn are determined by future market conditions and preferences. The decision
tree becomes formidable. For this reason there is a tendency to use simulation
methods, which can represent complicated problems but at the cost of being
dependent on numerical details of preferences, wage rates, etc.
The main contribution of this chapter is to derive the closed form solution
of this widely used model under the assumption of perfect foresight, which
is also commonly made in this literature. We show that the value function
at t has branches which are isoelastic in assets and other branches which are
linear in assets. Which branch is optimal at t (and hence period t optimal
decisions) depends in general on which branch is optimal at t + 1 and hence
on the entire future. If in any period of time t it is optimal to work part time
then at all earlier periods the value function is linear in assets. This then
implies that in any period prior to the last period in which part time work
is optimal, the labour participation decision depends only on the wage rates,
marginal utility of leisure and the elasticity of marginal utility of adjacent
periods. On the other hand in any period subsequent to the latest period of
part time work, labour supply is either zero or full time work and the decision
depends on the whole remaining future. Given the value function, the con-
sumption and savings functions follow. The combination of constant elasticity
of consumption and quasilinearity of leisure of current period utility leads to a
consumption function which is independent of wealth in periods for which the
future value function is linear in wealth, or a consumption function which is
linear in wealth when the future value function is isoelastic. Theoretically this
1The framework developed by Blau (2012) accounts for uncertainty.
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is quite intuitive but it also suggests a useful empirical strategy for estimating
parameters in a lifecycle framework jointly studying the consumption function
and intertemporal labour participation.
A useful device is to think of the optimal lifetime plan as being the union
of a succession of epochs (Beveridge, 1923). Within an epoch the individual
has a common participation state (full time, part time or zero work hours) and
moving from one epoch to another corresponds to a change in participation
status over time. We analyse the behaviour within and between epochs.
In this model we nd that the presence of an epoch of part-time work is
critical in breaking the curse of dimensionality. The role of part time work
has strong implications for the form of the value function, the labour force
participation decision and the marginal utility of leisure and wealth. These
in turn impact on values of optimal consumption and savings. In fact prior
to the nal epoch of part time work, only preference and market conditions
in adjacent periods matter in determining the participation decision, and so
prior to this nal part time epoch there is no curse of dimensionality. We
also nd that in any period of part time work (except if it occurs at periods
characterising a change in the labour force regime or the nal period), hours
of work and savings are indeterminate. The individual is indi¤erent between
lower current savings and higher leisure or higher current savings and lower
current leisure.
Within our model part time work has a di¤erent economic signicance to
corner labour participations of full time or zero work. If part time work is
optimal in a period the current period marginal utility of income (as dened
by the ratio of the current marginal utility of consumption to the current wage)
is equal to the expected marginal value of future wealth. Moreover if there are
two adjacent periods of optimal part time work then the change in the current
marginal utility of leisure and wage matches the change in the marginal value
of future wealth but the former is much easier to observe and model than
the latter. By contrast the corner solutions generate inequalities between the
current and future marginal values of income/wealth which are harder to use
empirically and less informative on how future values impact on current values
and decisions.
More generally the empirical importance of exible working practices, such
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as part time hours of work in recent decades has increased, particularly with
the steady rise of the female labour force participation rate (Fernandez, 2011).
Part time work (<35 hours per week) has become common practice in the
majority of labour markets, approximately one in ve workers in the US in
1999 were engaged in part time work, whilst in the Netherlands 38% (and 69%
of women) in the workforce are engaged in part time work (Houseman and
Osawa, 2003; Kalleberg, 2000). Part time work has also become increasingly
popular in smoothing the transition from full time work to full retirement, via
partial retirement or a bridge job and also in terms of unretirement jobs de-
ned as a transition from retirement back into paid employment (Gustman and
Steinmeier, 1984a; 1986). Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) and Blau (2012) in-
vestigate the labour participation of individuals, especially elderly individuals
in a lifecycle setting. The questions they investigate concern the response to
private and public pension provisions and also the return to work decision of
previously retired individuals.2
The plan of this chapter is as follows: Section 1.2 presents a static illus-
tration of key economic variables using the 2007 wave of the Panel Survey of
Income Dynamics (PSID). Sections 1.3 and 1.4 state the general and terminal
period form of the value function coming from choice of optimal labour par-
ticipation, consumption and savings at each period. Section 1.5 characterises
the labour market participation conditions which must hold within an epoch,
and the nature of optimal consumption, savings and hours of work. In Section
1.5 we show that prior to the nal epoch of part-time work (if there are any)
the value function is linear in assets whereas in the remaining later epochs it
is isoelastic in assets. Depending on how the utility of leisure and economic
variables like interest rates, wage rates and non-labour income vary over time,
the patterns and lengths of epochs through time may vary widely. In Section
1.6 we summarise the nature of the optimal path. In Section 1.7 we show what
our framework implies for a variety of non standard retirement paths, includ-
ing partial retirement and unretirement. Section 1.8 considers future work.
Section 1.9 concludes.
2For earlier studies which document unretirement or reverse ows see Rust (1989) and
Gustman and Steinmeier (1984, 1986).
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1.2 US Male lifecycle Labour Participation
Over the lifecycle individuals usually spend a period of time in education before
subsequently entering the labour market, the amount of education consumed
is likely to a¤ect the potential wage, length of time spent in the labour mar-
ket, and also the amount of income which can be saved or invested in the
form of assets generating future non-labour income. In addition to education,
heterogeneity in labour market behaviour may stem from a variety of sociode-
mographic, economic and institutional factors, causing individuals to di¤er in
lifecycle labour market participation. We document the lifecycle and cross
section characteristics of key economic variables such as labour supply, wages,
non-labour income and family assets for all head of household (HOH) males
by their highest education level using information from the 2007 PSID cross
year index.3
The PSID is a representative longitudinal survey of the US population
administered by the University of Michigan. The sample began in 1968 and
contained 30,000 households (McGonagle et al., 2012), the long sample period
lends itself to analysing key economic characteristics over the lifecycle. In order
to do this Figures 1.1-1.3 cross tabulate key variables of interest against weekly
hours spent in paid work. Therefore the patterns of labour supply consider
only those in work.4 Specically we consider how the stock of household asset
holding varies over the lifecycle. Assets are dened as the value of all car(s)
in the residence + value of all family members AMT balances + value of
all bonds/insurance but not including housing wealth.5 Another variable of
interest which is non-labour income which is dened as the ow of income the
HOH receives (per year) from dividend income + interest income and rental
income. For further details of sample construction and variable denitions see
Appendix 8.1.1.6
By analysing behaviour over the entire lifecycle we are ignoring potentially
3We include all family members who have subsequently left home. We do not present
results for females however they are very similar to that of males, with the exception of a
short dip in the hours prole due to maternity leave, results are available upon request.
4It is therefore likely we are ignoring strong selection e¤ects in operation over the lifecycle.
5We do not include individuals who report constituent asset component values in excess
of 2006 US $1 million.
6Note that these may not be identical samples. In each case we keep only men and create
age groups for each variable of interest, we then plot the mean value for each group.
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strong cohort e¤ects. Therefore some of the patterns described in Figures 1.1-
1.3 may well be magnied due to such e¤ects, for example the lifecycle earnings
and stock of assets of a 75 year old college educated white male interviewed
in 2006 are likely to be quite di¤erent to his 25 year old counterpart. It is
important to bear this in mind when interpreting Figures 1.1-1.3.
Figure 1.1 compares the hours spent in paid work per week versus family
assets. Similar to Erosa et al. (2010) we nd a hump shaped curve in the hours
worked over the lifecycle, college students tend to work lower hours initially
whilst they combine work and study at younger ages, and then engage in career
occupations which require higher average weekly hours in work compared to
their lesser educated counterparts. Interestingly, our ndings indicate a kink
in the hours worked (for those in work) in later life. Such heterogeneity in
the number of hours worked in later life, and more generally the fact that
non standard retirement paths have become commonplace in the US since the
1970s (Gustman and Steinmeier,1984a, 1984b; Rust, 1989; Maestas, 2010),
suggests individual responses and the precise denition of retirement which
traditionally involved leisure or perhaps voluntary work, should be adjusted
to include paid work post retirement. So called unretirement could be due
to preference factors (Maestas, 2010), in our model ceteris paribus a drop in
assets or fall in the marginal value of leisure would serve to the increase the
number of hours in work.
Figure 1.1 indicates for individuals with a college level of education that
as assets increase over the lifecycle, perhaps due to accumulation of savings
from labour income, the average number of hours spent in work declines. How-
ever it is worth noting that the same does not hold true for individuals with
below college level education. Hours worked is conditional on being in the
labour market. Therefore Figure 1.1 highlights the di¤erence in work intensity
conditional on being in work at older ages by educational attainment. Lower
educated males work more than their college educated counterparts perhaps
due to credit constraints. Figure 1.1 also highlights the average di¤erence in
family assets by educational group, at younger ages families where the male
HOH has a college education are slightly more wealthy than their high school
or below high school counterparts, and this di¤erence increases substantially
over the lifecycle.
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Figure 1.1: Family assets versus weekly hours in paid work 2006.
Figure 1.2 documents the hours spent in work for the HOH versus the
HOH annual non-labour income, by education level. We nd that on average
more educated individuals tend to start life with slightly higher annual non-
labour income which then increases substantially over the lifecycle, particularly
between the ages of 30 and 65. Those who are less educated tend to have a
atter growth in their non-labour income over the lifecycle, particularly those
with a low level of education. Our model predicts that ceteris paribus as
annual non-labour income increases, individuals are more likely to increase the
amount of leisure they consume. Indeed the shape of the curve representing the
average non-labour income for the 2007 cross section indicates that aside from
the career periods, hours and non-labour income tend to move in opposite
directions as the model predicts, particularly in later life where those with
below high school education tend, on average, to work more hours than their
more educated counterparts.
Figure 1.3 compares weekly hours spent in the labour force versus the aver-
age hourly wage rate, by education level. We nd that at younger ages there is
little di¤erence between the average reported hourly wage, irrespective of ed-
ucation level. However at each age the wage di¤erential increases, particularly
for those with a college education, and peaks when individuals are in their mid
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Figure 1.2: HOH annual non labour income versus weekly hours 2006.
forties after which point it remains relatively at. Those with the lowest wages
tend to work more hours, especially given their asset and non-labour income
is relatively low. It is interesting to note even for the college educated, in later
life as the average wage declines for those in work, average reported hours in
work increases. Economic theory suggests there are income and substitution
e¤ects which arise from say a rise in the wage rate, but here this couples with
intertemporal e¤ects. Within our model labour force participation level de-
pends either on a comparison of the current and future wage or an expression
denoting the contribution of the current wage to future value through raising
savings and assets available next period (depending on the initial asset level).
Therefore the relationship between participation and hours depends on the
individual leisure preferences and wage rate they can obtain.
In this section we have described a cross section snapshot of the key eco-
nomic variables, and also taken a lifecycle view on respondents average be-
haviour by education group. As one would expect, those with the highest
education level tend to fare better in life. We have abstracted from various
individual characteristics. For example individuals may be constrained in the
number of hours they can supply to the market if they have care responsibil-
ities, or health conditions. These types of e¤ects may a¤ect certain groups
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Figure 1.3: Hourly wage versus weekly hours in paid work 2006.
more than others. Nor have we plotted the debt characteristics by education
level which may well di¤er. Indeed it could be the case that those with a
higher earnings potential are less credit constrained, and more willing to carry
more debt today safe in the knowledge they will not default due to higher
earnings in later life. Regardless, it is clear there are marked di¤erences in
the economic characteristics of male workers by their educational group, and
in their lifecycle behaviour.7 So a model which is consistent with theory and
can yield explicit predictions of the lifecycle pattern of labour supply will be
empirically valuable. We develop this framework next.
1.3 The Framework and Value Function
A decision maker with known nite life T has a per period utility function
which is isoelastic in consumption and quasilinear in leisure so the lifecycle
7Given the main contribution of this paper is theoretical, and the purpose of the data is to
motivate the general pattern of lifecycle behaviour we do not construct a panel and observe
the characteristics of the same individuals through time. Also the long time horizon means
attrition has a large cumulative e¤ect in providing accurate measures of our key variables
of interest.
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preferences are given by
U = Tt 
t[
ct

+ htLt] (1.1)
where ct; Lt, ht are respectively consumption, leisure of period t and the mar-
ginal value of leisure of period t.8 T is the foreseen life and  is the discount
factor on preferences. There is a time endowment per period of 1 which can
be allocated to work or leisure each period. Thus 0  Lt  1: There is a
perfect capital market with a single one period nancial asset, the individual
can borrow or save but cannot die in debt. The budget constraint each period
is
At+1 + ct = atAt + yt + wt(1  Lt) (1.2)
where At is the stock of nancial assets at the start of the period, wt is the
wage rate per unit of work, at is the interest factor (1+ the interest rate) and
yt is non-labour income. The decision of the individual is then to choose a
time path of consumption, net savings and leisure so as to
max t
t[
ct

+ htLt] (1.3)
st At+1 + ct = atAt + yt + wt(1  Lt)
0  Lt  1
A0 given and AT = 0 (1.4)
We start by nding the analytical value function for this problem, from which
we can then deduce the consumption function, the labour participation status
at each date and hours worked when these are determinate (see below). A
main result is that at any time period t the value function characterising the
maximum payo¤ for the individual is the higher of an isoelastic and a linear
function:
8The utility function specied in equation 1.1 is isoelastic in consumption, this implies
there is constant relative risk aversion. That is to say an individuals risk aversion is inde-
pendent of his level of income. Leisure on the other hand is quasilinear because it is enters
in a multiplicative fashion and is not independent of income. In terms of the theory, such a
specication implies all income e¤ects operate via leisure.
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Proposition 1.1 The value function vt(At) at period t has the form
vt(At) = max[P
i
t +Mt(N
i
t +QtAt)
=;Rit + S
i
tAt] (1.5)
where the functions P it ; N
i
t ; R
i
t; S
i
t have alternative denitions according to cur-
rent and future values of the discount rate, wage rate, non-labour income and
value of leisure which are denoted by the variables ; w; y; h respectively. In
particular there are two alternative forms for P it ; N
i
t , i = 0; 1 and three al-
ternative forms for Rit; S
i
t ; i = 0; I; 1: We denote the accumulation of future
interest factors by Qt and denote the e¤ects of future interest rates and time
preference rates by Mt.9
Qt = rtQt+1 = 
T
t rs with QT+1 = 1; Qt = r
T+1 t if r is constant (1.6)
MT t = (ts=0
(t s)=(1 )Q=(1 )T s+1 ) with QT+1 = 1 (1.7)
This bears a family resemblance to Mertons (1971) seminal result that
within the HARA class, the value function has the same functional form as the
within period utility function. However it is more general given that within
our framework an individual has two decision variables per period (ct; Lt),
one of which is inequality constrained, and the within period utility combines
features of isoelasticity and quasilinearity. The linear branch of the value
function is intimately connected with periods or phases of part time work, and
involves di¤erent intertemporal tradeo¤s to periods in which the value function
is isoelastic.
There is a strong interpretation to the components of the value function. In
the isoelastic case, Nt reects the discounted value of future non-asset resources
(non-labour income plus value of the time endowment for periods of work),
discounted at the successive one period interest rates. Pt reects the discounted
value of the stream of future leisure value in future periods of zero work. In the
linear case Rt is a combination of (yt + wt)0s and discounted future marginal
rates of substitution (MRS) between leisure and consumption, St measures
the discounted utility of leisure relative to the wage of one period t.
9We formally derive M in appendix 8.1.2
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The key interest is in the optimal labour participation states over life and
the associated consumption and savings paths. We describe these by piec-
ing together di¤erent labour participation states, and note the forms of the
value function to derive an overall optimal path of consumption, savings and
leisure. We rst show some fundamental links between the branches of the
value function, and the optimal labour participation in any period.
Proposition 1.2 (i) If part time work is optimal at t then whatever the form
of the future value vt+1; the current value vt is linear in current wealth
(ii) If the future value vt+1 is linear in At+1 then the current value vt is
also linear in At whatever the nature of current labour participation
(iii) If the future value is isoelastic and optimal current participation is at
a corner then the current value is also isoelastic
To explain (i) the intuition is as follows. If at time t part time work is
optimal and the future value function vt+1 is linear in future assets then the
marginal utility of leisure at t,ht, must equate to the marginal value of the
wage wt in raising future value St+1: Hence htwt must equate to the marginal
value of future wealth. This means that when part time work is optimal at t
and the future value function is linear in assets, future market conditions and
leisure preferences do not a¤ect the current marginal value of assets at t. In
this sense once the value function for any period t+ 1 is linear in assets, then
all earlier periods will also have a linear value function. For all these earlier
periods the choice of participation status will only depend on adjacent time
period variables.
An important fact is that even if future value vt+1 is isoelastic in future
assets At+1, if optimal current participation involves part time work, then the
current value is linear in current assets At:This stems from the quasilinearity
of utility in leisure. If part time work is optimal when vt+1 is isoelastic, the
constant current marginal utility of leisure is equated to the future marginal
value of wealth multiplied by the current wage. So the future marginal value
of wealth is equated to ht
wt
: Since At+1 = rtAt + yt + wt(1   Lt) and the fu-
ture marginal value of wealth is a power function of At+1; when part time
work is optimal at t; current optimal leisure is a linear function of At: Opti-
mal consumption equates the current marginal utility of consumption to the
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appropriately discounted marginal value of future wealth and so is indepen-
dent of current wealth. Combining the leisure demand linear in wealth with
consumption and savings being independent of current wealth yields a linear
current value function. Hence starting from a future value which is isoelastic,
if optimal current participation involves part time work, then the current value
becomes linear in At.10
To explain (ii) if participation at period t is at a corner then within period
consumption ct is the only unknown a¤ecting next periods assets, At+1. If
we know the future value is linear in At+1 then equating the current marginal
utility of ct to the discounted marginal value of wealth At+1 gives an optimal
level of ct which is independent of current assets. Hence current assets At
enter current value vt only through their e¤ect on the future value vt+1 which
is linear in At it follows that vt is linear in At:
The intuition behind (iii) is as follows, suppose that at t the future value
vt+1 is isoelastic and optimal participation is at a corner, the current marginal
utility of consumption is equated to the marginal future value of savings, both
of which are isoelastic, in which case optimal consumption and savings condi-
tional on participation are linear in current assets. Since current utility and
the future value function are isoelastic respectively in consumption and assets
carried forward, given that At+1 is linear in current savings, this then implies
that the current value function is isoelastic in the starting assets At. Thus if
future value is isoelastic and current participation is at a corner, then current
value is isoelastic. The marginal value of wealth then varies with assets and
so depends on the entire future prole of optimal decisions, preferences and
market variables.11
There is a close connection between the branches of the value function and
the labour participation status. It is helpful to think of an epoch as a sequence
of adjacent time periods with the same choice of labour participation. Within
an epoch the value function, consumption and savings functions will have the
same form, but between epochs these shift between the branches of the value
10If the value function at t+ 1 is isoelastic and linear at t because at t part time work is
optimal, then at t leisure and savings are determinate (for example in the last period), but
if part time work is optimal at t and there is a linear value at t+1 then leisure and savings
are indeterminate.
11Proposition (i) and (ii) are derived in the text. We prove (iii) in Appendix 8.1.3.
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function. This device helps us piece together the di¤erent forms of lifetime
behaviour that may be optimal, starting from the terminal period.
1.4 The terminal period
In order to solve the individuals problem we start with the terminal period
and use backward induction. We assume there is no bequest motive in the
model, thus AT+1 = 0: Terminal period utility is given by:
uT =
(rAT + yT + wT (1  LT ))

+ hTLT (1.8)
Optimal leisure in the terminal period can be at a corner or interior. The
individual will consume zero leisure (i.e. work 24 hours) if the marginal utility
of leisure is below the wage rate multiplied by the marginal utility of con-
sumption. Alternatively the individual will spend all their time in leisure if
the marginal utility of leisure is above the wage rate multiplied by the mar-
ginal utility of consumption. If marginal utility of leisure lies between these
two extremes then the individual is at an interior solution.
The saving decision at T   1, is a choice variable and this in turn governs
the optimal choice of leisure at T . The critical opening asset positions which
govern the labour supply at T are:
A0T =
[( hT
wT
)1=( 1)   wT   yT ]
r
(1.9)
A1T =
h
( hT
wT
)1=( 1)   yT
i
r
(1.10)
If saving at T   1 results in AT < A0T at T the individual works full time
whereas if AT > A1T the individual is retired at T: Notice that the only di¤er-
ence is the wage rate entering negatively in A0T thus A
0
T < A
1
T .
12 Substituting
in optimal leisure the terminal period value functions can be described as fol-
lows:
12Derivations for terminal period assets and labour supply can be found in the appendix
8.1.4.
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Proposition 1.3 In the nal period T
(1) Optimally LT = 0 and the value function has the form
v0T =
(yT + wT + rTAT )


if
hT
wT
 (yT + wT + rTAT ) 1 (1.11)
(2) Optimally 0 < LT < 1 and the value function has the form
vIT = (
1

  1)(hT
wT
)1=( 1) + (
hT
wT
)(yT + rTAT + wT )
if wT + yT + rTAT > (
hT
wT
)1=( 1) > yT + rTAT (1.12)
(3) Optimally LT = 1 and the value function has the form
v1T =
(yT + rTAT )


+ hT if (
hT
wT
)1=( 1)  yT + rTAT (1.13)
In each of the three cases note the importance of the critical level of assets
carried forward relative to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and the wage rate in the current decision period. The intuition is that in
the nal period labour supply choices use just the one period comparison of
the real wage with the MRSh;w, since there is no future . From equations
1.11-1.13 it is clear assets enter the value function in either a power or linear
form depending on whether it is optimal for the individual to be at a corner
or interior respectively. The general form of the value function at period T is
given by:
vT = max
[P iT +MT (N
i
T +QTATt)


;RT + STAT ], i = 0; I; 1 (1.14)
where
P 1T = hT ; N
1
T = yT ;
P 0T = 0; N
2
T = yT + wT
QT = rT ;MT = 1
RT = hT (1 +
yT
wT
) + (
1

  1)(hT
wT
)=( 1); ST = rT
hT
wT
Here the superscript i refers to the two cases LT = 0 and LT = 1. This
1. Work and Play Pave the Way: The Importance of Part Time Work in a
Lifecycle Model. 25
Proposition gives us the nal position of the individual, working backwards
we can then analyse behaviour within the nal epoch terminating in viT : In
the next section we show the form and components of the value function for
particular types of epochs which can arise, depending on which one of the two
possible forms the value function takes in the future adjacent epoch.13
1.5 Epochs
We can nd the optimal lifetime path by piecing together the optimal sequence
of epochs. Within an epoch, for each period assets at the start of the period
must be at a level which makes continuing the current labour participation
status optimal, and, between epochs, assets at the start of the rst period of
the subsequent epoch determine the optimal change in participation behaviour
in that period and in the new epoch:
1.5.1 Epochs Preceding an Epoch with a Power Func-
tion Value Function
Suppose the epoch stretches from periods t2 to t1 1 so that t1 1 is the last pe-
riod within the epoch and the value function at t1 is vt1 =
P it1
+Mt1 (N
i
t1
+Qt1At1 )


; i =
0; I; 1. The function P it1 measures the value arising from discounted future
leisure time, whilst the function N it measure the appropriately discounted val-
ues of future non-nancial income.14
(i) Full Time Work t2 to t1   1
In this case during the epoch there is no leisure to cumulate in to values within
the epoch, so the only impact of leisure on the value function within the epoch
is through the discounted value of leisure which arises in future epochs. This
gives the term P 0s at each period s = t2::t1   1 prior to the last in the epoch:
On the other hand with full time work at every period within the epoch,
13We derive the value functions for each labour force state in the terminal period in
Appendix 8.1.4.
14We derive the expressions for value functions preceeding a power value function in
Appendix 8.1.5.
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nonnancial income within the epoch is wt + yt each period and the function
N0s cumulates this e¤ect through the epoch.
N0s = 
t1
=sQ+1(w + y ) +N
i
t1
; s = t2::t1   1 (1.15)
P 0s = 
t1 sP it1 ; s = t2::t1   1 (1.16)
Period to period within this epoch, full time work must be optimal. That is
the marginal value of current leisure must be no greater than the contribution
of the current wage to future value through raising savings and assets available
next period.
(
hs
ws
)1=( 1)  Bs[ys + ws + rsAs +N0s+1]; s = t2 + 1:::t1 2 (1.17)
where Bs =
(Qs+1Ms+1)
1=( 1)
1 +Qs+1(Qs+1Ms+1)1=( 1)
The term Bs shows the combined e¤ect of the discount and interest rate.
In the nal period of this epoch similarly it must be the case that
(
ht1 1
wt1 1
)1=( 1)  Bt1 1[yt1 1 + wt1 1 + rt1 1At1 1 +N it1 ]; i = 1; I (1.18)
where the subsequent epoch must display one of Lt1 = 1 or Lt1 interior.
(ii) Zero Work t2 to t1   1
In this case at every period within the epoch the individual is in full time
leisure, therefore the term P 1s cumulates the impacts of these leisures through
the epoch, discounting them at the rate of time preference. On the other hand
with zero work at every period within the epoch, nonnancial income within
the epoch is just non-labour income each period and the functionN1s cumulates
this through the epoch.
N1s = 
t1
=sQ+1y +N
i
t1
; s = t2::t1   1
P 1s = 
t1 1
=s 
t1 sh ; s = t2::t1   1
The marginal utility of leisure at any period within the epoch must exceed
the contribution of the wage to the future value both within and importantly
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beyond the epoch:
(
hs
ws
)1=( 1)  Bs[ys + ws + rsAs +N0s+1]; s = t2 + 1:::t1   2 (1.19)
and in the nal period of this epoch similarly it must be the case that
(
ht1 1
wt1 1
)1=( 1)  Bt1 1[yt1 1 + wt1 1 + rt1 1At1 1 +N it1 ]; i = I; 0 (1.20)
(iii) Part time Work t2 to t1   1
The value function at t1   1 becomes linear in assets:
vt1 1 = R
I
t1 1 + S
I
t1 1At1 1 (1.21)
with
SIt1 1 =
ht1 1
wt1 1
RIt1 1 =
ht1 1
wt1 1
(yt1 1 + wt1 1) +
ht1 1
Qt1wt1 1
N it1 + [Mt1

ht1 1
Mt1Qt1wt1 1
=( 1)
  ht1 1
Qt1wt1 1

ht1 1
Mt1Qt1wt1 1
1=( 1)
](1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1)
Coming backwards in time, if part time work is optimal in all periods back
to t2 then future market conditions and leisure preferences do not a¤ect the
current marginal value of assets at any period s within the epoch. The value
function is linear in assets at any t2  s  t1   1; vs = RIs + SIsAs with
SIs =
hs
ws
rs (1.22)
RIs =
hs
ws
(ws + ys) + R
I
s+1; s = t2::t1   2
= t1 2=s 
t1 1  (y + w ) + 
t1 1 sRIt1 1
Here Ss is an optimally set constant marginal value of future wealth,
equated to the ratio of the marginal value of leisure to the discounted wage.
With optimal part time work, the period s marginal utility of labour income
equates to the present value of the marginal value of future wealth. The term
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Rs evaluates the contribution to value of the stream of future full incomes,
discounting them at the time preference rate.
Given that the value function at t1 is a power function, for part time work
to be optimal at t1   1; the ratio of the marginal utility of leisure to the wage
wt1 1 at t1  1 (which is the marginal utility of current income in t1  1), must
exceed the marginal value of wealth at t1 evaluated at Lt1 1 = 0:
Bt1 1

(yt1 + wt1 + rt1At1) +N
1
t1+1

(Mt1)
1=( 1)Qt1
> (
ht1
wt1
)1=( 1)) (1.23)
and conversely the current marginal utility of income must be lower than the
marginal value of wealth evaluated at zero hours of work, Lt1 1 = 1 :
Bt1 1

(yt1 + wt1 + rt1At1) +N
1
t1+1

(Mt1)
1=( 1)Qt1
< (
ht1
wt1
)1=( 1)); i = 0; 1 (1.24)
Within the epoch at each period s the value function becomes linear as stated
in Proposition 1 , and then for part time work to be optimal at each period s
within the epoch requires
SIs+1 = rs+1ws
hs+1
ws+1
; s = t2::t1   2 (1.25)
From equation (1:22) within each period in the epoch the current marginal
utility of income is exactly equal to the marginal value of wealth which, in this
epoch, is independent of assets As+1: We next characterise epochs prior to an
epoch with a linear value function.
1.5.2 Epochs Preceding an Epoch with a Linear Value
Function
This epoch lasts from periods t2 to t1  1; the next adjacent epoch starts at t1
and has a linear value function:
vt1 = Rt1 + St1At1 (1.26)
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The epoch t2 to t1   1 could for example be either the rst period of
part time work or any period which is followed at some point by an epoch
of part time work.15 As noted the special feature of epochs which precede an
epoch with a linear value function, is the particularly simple expressions which
govern the critical levels of starting assets which determine current optimal
labour participation. They involve comparing the marginal utility of current
income as dened by the ratio of the marginal utility of current leisure to the
wage with the discounted value of the marginal value of future wealth. If the
current marginal utility of income is higher then it is optimal to work full
time, if lower then it is optimal not work at all, and if it is just equal part time
work is optimal. Since the marginal value of future wealth is independent of
assets and future income, the optimal labour participation depends only on
values of exogenous variables and is independent of current hours worked or
consumption. The value functions for the three possible states of labour force
participation and the critical asset condition can be summarised as follows:
(i) Full Time Work t2 to t1   1
In this case the value function at t1   1 is
vt1 1 = St1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1) + Rt1 + 
=( 1)S=( 1)t1 [
1

  1]
= S0t1 1At1 1 +R
0
t1 1 (1.27)
where the term S0t1 1 captures the discounted utility of leisure relative to
the wage of one period andR0t1 1 is a combination of discounted futureMRSh;w
between leisure and consumption.
with
S0t1 1 = St1rt1 1
R0t1 1 = St1(yt1 1 + wt1 1) + Rt1 + 
=( 1)S=( 1)t1 [
1

  1]
The critical asset condition which governs full time work to be optimal is
15We derive the expressions for value functions preceding a linear value function in ap-
pendix 8.1.5.
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particularly simple
St1 1 < St1
For full time work to be optimal for each period s within the epoch, the
marginal value of leisure must exceed the discounted marginal value of future
wealth multiplied by the wage, formally Ss < S0s+1; s = t2::t1   2: Optimal
within period consumption is independent of wealth, cs = 
1=( 1)S1=( 1)s : The
period s value function for a full time work epoch is:
vs = (rsAs + ys + ws   As+1)= + [S0s+1As+1 +R0s+1]; s = t2::t1   2
= S0sAs +R
0
s
with
R0s = 
t1 2
=s

(
hs
ws
)= 1)(1=  1) + hs + hs
ws
ys

+ Rs+1
S0s = 
t1 2
=s
hs
ws
rs (1.28)
The terms S0s and R
0
s denote the cumulative e¤ect of the combination of
future discounted utility of leisure relative to the wage, and discounted future
MRSh;w between leisure and consumption.
(ii) Zero Work t2 to t1   1
The value function at t1   1 is derived as
vt1 1 = ht1 1 + St1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1) + Rt1 + 
=( 1)S=( 1)t1 [
1

  1]
= S1t1 1At1 1 +R
1
t1 1 (1.29)
with
S1t1 1 = St1rt1 1
R1t1 1 = ht1 1 + St1yt1 1 + Rt1 + 
=( 1)S=( 1)t1 [
1

  1]
Notice that in this case R1t1 1 contains the marginal value of leisure ht1 1,
whilst in R0t1 1 the contribution of working in period t1 1 was St1wt1 1: The
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critical asset condition governing whether full time leisure is optimal is given
by:
St1 1 > St1
For each period s within the epoch the individual solves
max cs = + hsLs + (R
1
s+1 + S
1
s+1As+1) (1.30)
cs + As+1 = rAs + ys
For full time leisure to be optimal for each period s within the epoch, the
marginal value of leisure must exceed the discounted marginal value of future
wealth multiplied by the wage, formally Ss > S1s+1; s = t2::t1   2: Optimal
within period consumption is then a constant independent of assets or current
income: cs = 
1=( 1)S1=( 1)s : The period s value function for a linear zero
work epoch is dened as:
vs = hs + (rsAs + ys   As+1)= + [S1s+1As+1 +R1s+1]; s = t2::t1   2 (1.31)
= S1sAs +R
1
s
with
R1s = 
t1 2
=s

(
hs
ws
)= 1)(
1

  1) + hs + hs
ws
ys

+ Rs+1
S1s = 
t1 2
=s
hs
ws
rs (1.32)
The interpretation of S1s and R
1
s is analogous to denition noted in the
previous subsubsection, but for the case of zero work.
(iii) Part time Work t2 to t1   1
The value function for a switch into part time work at t1   1 is
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vt1 1 = St1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1) + Rt1 + 
=( 1)S=( 1)t1 [
1

  1]
= SIt 1At 1 +R
I
t 1 (1.33)
with
SIt1 1 = St1 (1.34)
RIt1 1 = St1(yt1 1 + wt1 1) + Rt1
The critical asset condition which must hold for part time work to be
optimal is given by
St1 1 = St1
That is, it must the case that the marginal value of income at t1   1
must grow at the exogenous discount rate delta multiplied by the t1 marginal
utility of income, as dened by the marginal rate of substitution of leisure
to the wage rate. Then for part time work to be optimal for each period s
within the epoch, this condition must hold Ss = SIs+1; s = t2::t1   2: Optimal
within period consumption is again independent of wealth and is given by
cs = 
1=( 1)S1=( 1)s : The period s value function for a linear part time work
epoch is:
vs = S
I
sAs +R
I
s; s = t2::t1   2
with
Ss = S
I
s+1
R1s =
hs
ws
(ws + ys) + R
1
s+1; s = t2::t1   2
= t1 2=s 
t1 1  (y + w ) + 
t1 1 sR1t1 1
The term Sis i = 0; I; 1 measures the marginal value of wealth at period
s. Starting from a linear value function at the end of the epoch, this is a
constant at each period within the epoch, and grows or falls at the rate r=.
That is, in all cases of labour participation which are determined by comparing
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the current and future marginal utility of income, labour supply and savings
adjusts optimally whilst consumption is independent of wealth. In this case
it is only at the end of the epoch when switching into the next epoch that
labour supply and savings are determinate. At all periods within the epoch
labour and savings are indeterminate. The terms Ris i = 0; I; 1 reect the
impacts of nonnancial income on value during the epoch, this can vary with
optimal participation status and is cumulated at the marginal value of wealth
discounted by the time preference rate.
1.6 The Nature of the Optimal Path
We have derived the conditions on market variables and on preferences which
determine the optimal participation status. From this it is possible to derive
the form of consumption, savings and labour supply. This is seen more clearly
in the Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4: Potential labour supply paths conditional on retiring in terminal
period.
In Figure 1.4 the dashed lines represent periods within an epoch where
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consumption is independent of wealth and the value function is linear in assets.
Whilst the solid lines represent periods where consumption and savings are
linear functions of assets and the value function is a power function. The
dashed lines consist of periods within epochs which precede (or in the limit
coincide with) the nal period of part time work. We can divide the dashed
lines into two subgroups: those with part time work where hours worked and
savings are indeterminate and those with full time or retirement where hours
worked is determinate and savings is a residual. The dashed periods have the
properties in the dashed box, the solid periods have the properties in the solid
box.
We know that prior to any epoch of part time employment, the value
function is linear, consumption is always independent of wealth and in epochs
of full time or zero work labour supply is of course constant. It is clear from
the diagram the majority of the paths do in fact involve a linear value function.
Savings in each period of epochs of full time or zero work before an epoch of
part time work is hence a residual which uctuates with the wage and non-
labour income. After the nal period (or equivalently epoch) of part time
work, consumption and savings are linear functions of current assets and the
value function is always a power function, the optimal labour participation
can involve either full time or zero work. An example of such a path is shown
on the furthermost right hand side of the diagram. Figure 1.4 highlights that
lifecycle paths such as these (characterised by the properties in the solid box)
are quite rare within our model.
1.7 Application of model to retirement paths
Mandatory retirement has historically marked the cessation of paid work (Lazear,
1986, 1979; Banks and Smith, 2006), which usually occurred when an individ-
ual reached the State Pension Age (SPA). In more recent times early retirement
has also been observed, whereby individuals retire before SPA for example be-
cause they can a¤ord to do so, or their private pension scheme allows them to
draw their pension earlier than SPA. Another phenomenon which has occurred
since the 1960s/1970s is that of partial retirement (Gustman and Steinmeier,
1984a, 1984b). This can be thought of as an individual either reducing the
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number of hours working in their career job, or if this was not possible then
changing job when they reach SPA.16 Partial retirement can be viewed as a
mechanism by which individuals can move gradually into full retirement and
adjust their lifestyle and habits more smoothly.
More recently non standard retirement paths have been investigated by
Maestas (2010); Petersson (2011); Larsen and Pederson (2013) and Schlosser
et al. (2012) in the form of unretirement, which is dened as a transition from
retirement to partial retirement, or even back in to full time work.17 Various
reasons have been noted in the literature which may explain this: unexpected
income or preference shocks, in particular it may turn out that the antici-
pated utility of leisure is actually lower than was expected, once it is actually
experienced. Maestas (2010) nds that unretirement is an anticipated event,
using expectations data, she nds that the majority of unretirees anticipated
unretiring prior to initial retirement.
Another possibility concerns the impact of pension schemes. Many pension
schemes even of the funded variety (which involve purchase of an annuity
from a personal pension fund) yield a stream of non-labour income yt that is
xed in nominal terms but not in real terms. An individual may choose to
retire at t having previously been in full or part time work because yt jumps
upwards when retirement coincides with eligibility for receipt of an income
stream from a pension. But if the income ow is not indexed fully, in real
terms the income stream starts falling. Then at some date s > t it could be
optimal to return to work since the fall in present and future non-labour income
reduces the marginal value of future wealth. Our framework can account for
the heterogeneity in retirement paths reported in the literature for example
(with t1 > t2):
(1) Full timet1  !Retiredt2
(2) Full timet1  !Part timet2  !Retiredt3
(3) Full timet1  !Retiredt2  !Full timet3
16This is due to the labour market regulation in the US.
17The exact denition of retirement is di¢ cult to pin down precisely, given that it could
be based on a self reported denition or on the number of hours reported in paid work.
Unretirement is not a new phenomenon, it was observed in the US during the 1980s and
was coined as reverse ow. See Gustman and Steinmeier (1984) and Rust (1989,1990).
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(4) Full timet1  !Retiredt2  !Part timet3 :
After the last period of part time work (if any such exists) participation
decisions depend on the whole future evolution of the h; w, y (as in cases
(1)-(3) above). But in case (4) for any t before the nal part time epoch
the participation decision at t depends only on comparing variables at t with
variables at t+ 1. Retirement paths (1) and (2) have been studied extensively
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 1984b 1986), within our framework these paths
and also path (3) will involve future market conditions and preferences. Only
path (4) has a simple structure and does not involve the future. We show the
implications of our general framework for each category.
1.7.1 Periods for which the whole future matters
Retirement paths in which the whole future matters involve full time work or
full retirement, due to the role of future non nancial wealth, N , in the critical
asset conditions. The critical level of assets in these cases have the general
form
h
w
? B(M;Q)(N i +Q(rA+ (w) + y) 1 (1.35)
Thus the more value an individual places on the marginal value of leisure
ceterus paribus, the less likely they are to work now. Higher opening and
current nancial wealth and future nonnancial wealth, serve to reduce the
desire to work. However future non nancial wealth can increase if either
future w or y increase or if the balance of r;  changes. Note that the future
marginal value of leisure does not a¤ect current participation but does a¤ect
the current value of the future.
To demonstrate the importance of the marginal value of leisure, suppose
an individual follows a retirement path dened by (1) above with complete
withdrawal from the labour market forever from that point on. Take two
individuals with identical w; y streams and starting assets but di¤erent h paths.
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Then to retire at T   2 needs:
hT
wT
> (yT + rAT )
 1 (1.36)
hT 1
wT 1
> (QT 1(yT 1 + rAT 1) + yT ) 1
hT 2
wT 2
> (QT 2(yT 2 + rAT 2) +QT 1QT 2yT 1 + yT ) 1
Therefore whilst the right hand side is the same for the 2 individuals, one may
retire at T   2 but the other may not only if hT 2 is suitably di¤erent, and
then subsequent assets may be di¤erent between them. A chronic health shock,
retirement of spouse or existence of grandchildren can all raise h permanently
into the future and lead to retirement.
Whilst retirement paths (1) and (2) have been investigated in some detail,
the retirement path in (3) features full unretirement. That is to say an indi-
vidual may nd it optimal to fully retire at t and then subsequently return to
full time work at t+ 1. For this unretirement to be optimal we must have
ht
wt
> Bt(Mt; Qt)(N
0
t+1 +Qt(rAt + yt))
 1 (1.37)
ht+1
wt+1
< Bt(Mt+1; Qt+1)(N
i
t+2 +Qt+1(rAt+1 + wt+1 + yt+1))
 1 (1.38)
ht
wt
> Bt(Mt; Qt)(N
i
t+2 +Qtyt +Qt(rAt + yt))
 1 (1.39)
where N0t+1 = N
i
t+2 +Qtyt
It is clear that the future plays an important role for non standard retire-
ment paths of this type. Indeed Maestas (2010) suggests that unretirement is a
planned event, individuals anticipate retiring and subsequently returning to the
labour force, and it is not due to an unexpected shock to income or wealth.18
Recent work demonstrating the empirical importance of unretirement in the
case of the US and England can be found in Gustman and Steinmeier (2002),
18Maestas (2010) also notes that retirees preretirement leisure expectations do not coincide
with the actual retirement experience, and this di¤erence may induce individuals to return
to the labour force.
1. Work and Play Pave the Way: The Importance of Part Time Work in a
Lifecycle Model. 38
Maestas and Li (2007), Maestas (2010) and Kanabar (2013).19 It is important
to note that in the majority of these studies (with the exception of Gustman
and Steinmeier, 2002) unretirement ows are dened such that they include
a transition from retirement to part time work, that is to say they follow a
retirement path dened by (4) above.20 As Gustman and Steinmeier (2002)
show full unretirement, i.e. retirement path (3) does occur, but is relatively
uncommon. In the US for example both Maestas (2010) and Gustman and
Steinmeier (2002) use HRS data and nd unretirement rates of 26% and 15%
respectively.21 The main reason for this di¤erence is due to the majority of the
ows going from retirement into part time work (retirement path (4)), which
the former paper includes in their denition of unretirement whilst the latter
does not.22
Our framework has clear implications for retirement policy. Take for ex-
ample paths (2), (3) and (4), despite the latter two of these retirement paths
featuring unretirement, the properties of the value function in each case are
quite di¤erent. In retirement path (3) optimal participation changes can only
be from corner to corner, if for example in the retirement phase t2 a policy was
announced which a¤ected future non-labour income equations (1.17) and (19)
show this would a¤ect participation at t2 by altering the size of N: An identical
policy would not a¤ect an individual following retirement path (2) or (4) prior
to the nal period of part time work, equations (1.28) and (1.32) show that the
conditions which determine the optimal labour force regime are not a¤ected by
current or future non-labour income. However equations (1.17), (1.19) , (1.28)
and (1.32) show any policy which a¤ected future wages, w, would impact on
current optimal labour supply decision irrespective of which retirement path
the individual was on.
19Recent papers include Schlosser et al. (2012) who consider unretirement in Canada.
Whilst Larsen and Pederson (2013) and Petersson (2011) consider the case of Denmark and
Sweden respectively.
20Note that a fraction of the individuals who follow a retirement path dened by (4),
subsequently go on to enter full time work.
21Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) pp.21 and pp.37. In their model they only consider two
labour force states, namely full time work and full time retirement.
22There are key di¤erences in the way these authors construct their samples, for example
Maestas (2010) uses the rst six waves of HRS whilst Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) use
the rst ve waves.
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1.7.2 Periods for which only adjacent periods matter
An example of a retirement path where the participation decision depends
only on adjacent period variables is highlighted in path (4) Full timet1  !
Retiredt2  ! Part timet3 . Appendix 8.1.5 derives the particularly simple
conditions governing optimal labour supply, prior to an epoch with a linear
value function. If we make the additional assumption that the MRSh;w is
constant at every period and grows at the (exogenous) discount rate ; in this
case the conditions governing labour force participation are
Lt = 1 if
ht
wt
> 
ht+1
wt+1
(1.40)
0 < Lt < 1 if
ht
wt
= 
ht+1
wt+1
Lt = 0 if
ht
wt
< 
ht+1
wt+1
Therefore within our framework not only can we model a variety of non stan-
dard retirement paths, in those cases where only adjacent periods matter (1.40)
shows the optimal conditions governing labour supply depend on only the
MRSh;w, in this case a constant and the discount rate. An individuals tastes
and preferences may display a marginal value of leisure that increases at older
ages, for example to spend more time with family or phase into full retirement
gradually and the optimal labour supply response would be to be (gradually)
transition into full retirement. Alternatively there are a variety of reasons
which may make it optimal for an individual to remain engaged in the labour
force permanently or even unretire, for example due to changes in their leisure
preferences (Maestas, 2010).
1.8 Future work
A central nding of chapter one is that a switch into part time work has
important implications for the form of the value function and consumption.
Calibrating our model with empirical data would allow one to test these theo-
retical predictions, and assess the models validity in explaining major economic
decisions over the lifecycle.
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The current framework in chapter one does not allow for uncertainty.
Richer models which allow for such a feature usually require numerical methods
to solve a more complicated problem (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2002). Future
work to extend the current framework and incorporate uncertainty would be
feasible however this would be at the cost of losing analytical solutions and a
complete understanding of the model.
1.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we have taken a common form of the utility function used in the
lifecycle literature, and found a number of its general properties. In particular,
we have shown that whilst previous papers have used computational methods
to nd a tractable solution, we are able to break the curse of dimensionality
through emphasising the role of part time work. After deriving the nature of
lifecycle epochs of consumption, savings and labour participation, we apply
our model to the increasing prevalence of non standard retirement paths. In
doing so we note (1) the increasing importance of exible working regulations
in order to ensure individuals can supply an optimal level of labour over the
lifecycle and (2) the framework captures several features of the 2007 cross
section PSID data.
To show this we derive the explicit functional form of the value func-
tion, which switches as di¤erent forms of labour participation become opti-
mal. These switches occur at critical values of current assets in relation to
future market and preference parameters. At such a switch generally the con-
sumption function switches between being a linear function of assets and being
independent of assets. Similarly savings switches between being a linear func-
tion of assets and being jointly indeterminate with hours worked. Knowing the
value function, we are able to characterise the entire lifecycle of an individual
through the use of epochs, in particular we show the way in which the future
can play an important role in the participation decision. This has implica-
tions on the forces which govern the within and intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and work, and also the marginal utility of wealth.
The framework excludes various potentially important e¤ects. We have
taken the individual as the decision making unit but most individuals live in
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families where the family decision rules, and also externalities in the prefer-
ences of di¤erent family members are important. For example partners may
coordinate retirement decisions due to a preference for shared leisure, or the
need for labour income from one family member may depend on the participa-
tion status of other family members. Even in a one period world the analysis
of family labour market participation decisions is not straightforward (Donni
& Moreau, 2007; Blundell et al., 2007). In a multiperiod world it is obviously
more complicated. We have neglected preference or budget constraint uncer-
tainty and all employment decisions are voluntary, anyone wanting to work
can nd a job and wages, non-labour income and interest rates are perfectly
foreseen. This is in common with many papers in the literature, although
its justication has to be on grounds of imposing su¢ cient simplicity to be
able to derive analytical solutions which will be valid in any data set. The
alternative would be to numerically determine the optimal lifetime path in the
context of a specic random process for preferences or elements of the budget
constraint. If the purpose is to determine qualitative properties of the optimal
path, analytical solution is much more useful.
Chapter 2
To Defer or Not Defer: State
Pension in a Lifecycle Model.
2.1 Introduction
Aging populations and longevity raise issues regarding labour force partici-
pation rates, savings and pensions especially amongst the elderly. These are
also important issues for government scal balance since tax receipts, state
pensions and work conditional benets obviously vary with labour and capital
incomes.
The aim of state pension systems is to alleviate poverty in old age (Bev-
eridge, 1942) and in this sense it is a long term government commitment.
Governments respond by encouraging later retirement and/or raising the age
of eligibility for receipt of a state pension. Eligibility for receipt of a UK state
pension only depends on age, although the amount received depends on lifetime
work and tax (national insurance contribution) history, and is independent of
current employment status.
The UK denes a statutory State Retirement Age (SRA) which serves two
purposes: working individuals must pay National Insurance (NI) contributions
at a percentage rate of their earnings until this age; it is also the age at which
an individual rst becomes eligible for receipt of a weekly state pension. The
amount of the pension depends generally on past national insurance contri-
butions (and so past earnings) although there is a guaranteed minimum state
pension. As of April 2010 any individual who reaches SRA on or after 6th
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April 2010, is eligible to receive a full state pension if they have made 30 years
of NI contributions, which replaces around 15% of the average labour income
in 2008 (Coleman at al, 2008).
The 2013 White Paper introduced an entire overhaul of social security in
the UK through the introduction of a at rate pension from 2017, and for new
retirees (post 2017) requires individuals to make 35 years of NI contributions.
As with the existing rules, individuals who make less contributions will see an
equivalent reduction in their state pension, whilst those individuals who make
less than 10 years contributions will not receive any state pension.1 The rst
date of eligibility for receipt of state pension will still only depend on age and
will be independent of current or future employment status. Until recently the
SRA had been 60 years for women and 65 for men but since 2012 there have
been plans to align them, by 2018 the female retirement age will be 65, equal
to that of males and by 2020 the SRA for both men and women will be 66.
Since its inception in 1948 individuals who are eligible to claim have had
the option to defer receipt of state pension, in exchange for an increased weekly
pension when they do subsequently decide to claim. 2 3 Initially upon ending
deferral individuals could claim a higher weekly income for their retirement
period, however since 2005 individuals also have the option to claim a lump
sum on their missed weekly payments (which earns interest above the Bank of
England base rate) and then continue to receive their usual weekly payment.
Since April 2010 the government has committed the State Pension (SP) to a
triple lock indexing policy, in doing so State Pensions are uprated in line with
whichever is highest of: (1) September-September Consumer Price Index (2)
average earnings or (3) 2:5%. For those who defer their pension, at the date of
undeferral the rate of return earned in the lump sum option means that past
indexed increases are accumulated in the lump sum. In addition all additional
ows of the basic weekly SP are uprated each year. On the other hand under
1Bozio et al. (2010) pp 13. For men born before April 1945 and females born before 1950,
UK State Pension legislation requires these individuals to make the equivalent of 44 years
and 39 years of full contributions respectively, in order to be eligible for the maximum State
Weekly Pension. For these individuals men must make at least 11 years of contributions
and females 10 years, in order to be eligible for any state pension at all.
2This is a one shot choice and an individual can only defer their pension once. The length
of defer initially had an upper bound however since 2005 this has been removed.
3The exposition of the history of the UK state pension presented here draws heavily on
Bozio et al. (2010).
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the deferred income option at the undeferral date, indexing only applies to the
initial amount of the SP the individual was due to receive before deferring.
The additional income earned per week has not been uprated since April 2010
(Thurley, 2010).4
The possibility of State Pension deferral has implications for the planned
savings and work pattern of individuals through changing their lifetime pat-
tern of non-labour income.5 What implications will deferral have for their
work and savings patterns? Can deferral induce individuals to stay on longer
in paid work? Disney and Smith (2002) formally analyse the e¤ect of the
abolition of the Earnings Rule (which e¤ectively placed a very high marginal
tax rate on individuals who wanted to claim their pension and continue work-
ing), and as a side issue also consider pension deferral. Their ndings suggest
that after abolition, male weekly hours (above SPA) rose by approximately 4
hours, whilst for women it rose by 2 hours. Disney and Smith (2002) do not
explicitly consider the e¤ects of pension deferral on labour supply. Farrar et al
(2012) compare the two deferral options available under current State Pension
legislation and conclude under most simulations that the incremental option
(additional weekly state pension) generally tended to more lucrative.
Here we formally analyse the joint deferral and intertemporal labour supply
and participation decisions in a lifecycle setting. We nd the deferral decision
is independent of preferences, wage rates or wealth. It is a purely nancial
decision: choose to defer if it raises the present value of non-labour income.
However the e¤ect of deferral on intertemporal labour supply does depend
on preferences, wage rates and wealth. In a general model we sketch the
qualitative e¤ects but to get analytical and empirically applicable results, we
then specify preferences. After deriving the analytical expression for the e¤ects
on reservation wages for di¤erent intertemporal labour participation patterns,
we calibrate these to compute the size of the impacts. The present deferral
scheme gives about a 2% increase in the reservation wage for full time work for
12 months of deferral. If an individual does defer, under the present system
he can take the later rewards as either a lump sum or as an increase in the
4This holds true since April 2010, prior to this, the additional income earned in the
deferred income option was also uprated annually under the same rules as the BSP.
5Strictly speaking state pension income is employment income deferred from an earlier
period.
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weekly payment. We analyse which option is optimal in the context of life
expectancy, length of deferral and interest rates.
In Section 2.2 we lay out a general framework which encompasses the e¤ects
of pension deferral on optimal labour supply through the role of the present
value of non-labour income. In Section 2.3 we show the e¤ects of regime
switches on the optimal labour supply, using a form of preferences used widely
in the literature. Section 2.4 compares the two deferral options available un-
der current UK State Pension legislation. Section 2.5 considers future work.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The model
With perfect capital markets and in a world of certainty, nancial wealth can
be transferred intertemporally by the consumer. So one would expect that the
benets of deferring a state pension will depend only on a comparison between
the implicit interest rate used in the government set terms of deferral and the
market interest rate. This is because individuals will only defer if it raises their
disposable wealth at the date of deferral, through raising the present value of
non-labour income in the form of pension receipts.6 For individuals who defer
we would expect optimal adjustment in consumption c, and leisure L as they
intertemporally smooth the marginal utility of consumption. There will be
wealth e¤ects on present and future labour supply and consumption. Disney
and Smith (2002) point out that there may be labour participation e¤ects of
changes in the pension rules, or more specically in the implicit wage income
an individual can earn in the absence of an earnings rule. If we add uncertainty
about other future income sources and especially about the remaining length
of life, the decision to defer or not is much less clear. Similarly individuals
who face borrowing constraints are less likely to defer when they have the
opportunity.
6One could instead focus the analysis on the NPV value, which could be argued to be
more realistic given that for an individual to defer their pension then by construction they
are not in receipt of it. Therefore in theory one could replace PV with NPV in the paper. It
is worth noting that formally this doesnt change the ndings of the paper with the exception
of some small changes in notation. All the ndings hold and the policy implications of state
pension deferral remain the same.
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To see how a decision to defer impacts on current and future labour supply
as individual leisure preferences and wage rates vary needs a formal framework.
We present this next. Individuals maximise a per period time additive concave
utility function which depends on a single consumption good, c, and leisure L
subject to their lifetime budget constraint:
max
cT 1;cT ;LT 1;LT
u(cT 1;LT 1) + u(cT ; LT ) (2.1)
st rcT 1 + cT = rAT 1 + ryT 1 + yT + rwT 1(1  LT 1) + wT (1  LT ) = x
(2.2)
0  Lt  1
Here r is the real interest factor, AT 1 is nancial assets at the start of the
penultimate period, yT 1; yT , wT 1,wT , LT 1 and LT denote non-labour in-
come, wages and leisure respectively in periods T   1 and T .7 There is a xed
time endowment each period of one unit of time which can be used either
for leisure or work. Non-labour income includes any pension that is actually
received in that period and so depends on the deferral decision.
Should an individual defer their pension from T   1 to T? This depends
on the present value of the stream of pension payments over the two periods
with and without deferral. The individual will choose the option which has the
higher present value. The pension ow available at T  1 is p per period. Thus
if the individual has non-pension,non-labour income of y0T 1; y
0
T then without
deferral they receive yT 1 = y0T 1 + p; yT = y
0
T + p. With deferral they receive
yT 1 = y0T 1; yT = y
0
T + rgp where rg is the implicit interest rate set by the
government in the terms of deferral.
If there is no uncertainty and no restrictions on borrowing or lending ex-
cept that individuals cannot die in debt, only the present value of non-labour
7The deferral decision is generally considered a decision an individual makes when they
rst become eligible for state pension. The framework considered here models this at the
individual level. However recent studies have shown evidence of co-ordination behaviour
between couples in terms of the date of retirement and their labour supply behaviour due
to factors such as joint complementarities in leisure (Schirle; 2008, Cribb et al. 2014). The
existing framework does not consider spousal preferences or a household budget constraint.
Given the empirical evidence suggesting the importance of these factors, future work should
consider extending the framework to incorporate these.
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income a¤ects the maximum value of lifecycle utility, and optimal labour mar-
ket decisions depend only on non-labour income through its present value.
The implicit interest rate factor rg is common to all individuals so variation
amongst individuals in the decision to defer must be due to variation in the
market interest rate available to individuals, and more generally to variation
in borrowing constraints or other capital market imperfections, or to omitted
issues like uncertainty over the length of life. The deferral decision only im-
pacts achievable lifecycle utility through a¤ecting the present value of wealth,
x, available from T   1 onwards. This is total of non-labour income at each
period t-1 and t. For simplicity we assume non-labour income at each pe-
riod has two subcomponents: non-pension income (y) and pension income p.
Non-labour income in t-1 earns a rate of return, r. Whether pension income is
received in t-1 depends on whether an individual chooses to defer their pension
or not. Deferral will be chosen i¤ it raises x = ryT 1 + yT . Without deferral
x = r(y0T 1+p)+y
0
T +p while with deferral x = ry
0
T 1+y
0
T +rgp: The individual
is better o¤ deferring i¤ (1 + r) < rg.
For an individual who does decide to defer, his lifecycle wealth increases
from the date of deferral. To explore the e¤ects of this on intertemporal labour
supply and consumption we have to go further with solving the maximisation
problem. Consumption each period must be interior:8
@uT 1
@cT 1
= r
@uT
@cT
(2.3)
rcT 1 + cT = x
For xed values of LT 1; LT this gives a semi-indirect utility v(LT 1; LT ; x)
which is increasing in all its arguments and also concave in the leisures of each
period (see Appendix 8.2.1). The remaining problem for the individual is to
choose optimal labour supply in each period:
max
LT ;LT 1
v(LT 1; LT ; x) st 0  Li  1
Our main focus is on the interaction between labour participation deci-
8Assuming that the marginal utility of consumption in any period becomes arbitrarily
high as consumption in that period becomes very small
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sions, saving and pension deferral so we focus on just full time and zero work
options for each time period.9 There are four possible congurations of labour
participation over the nal two periods of life: full time work in both periods,
zero work in both periods or full time work in one period and zero work in the
other.
Dene the lifecycle full incomes at the start of T   1 corresponding to each
lifetime pattern of labour participation (the subscripts refer to the amount of
leisure in each period so e.g. 01 corresponds to full time work at T   1 but
zero work at T ):
X11 = rAT 1 + ryT 1 + yT = Z
X00 = rAT 1 + ryT 1 + yT + rwT 1 + wT = Z + rwT 1 + wT
X01 = rAT 1 + ryT 1 + yT + rwT 1 = Z + rwT 1
X10 = rAT 1 + ryT 1 + yT + wT = Z + wT
We have a ranking of the full incomes X00 > X01 > X11; X00 > X10 > X11:
The possible payo¤s corresponding to these labour participation patterns
are then v(1; 1; X11); v(0; 1; X01); v(1; 0; X10) and v(0; 0; X00). Where Vx;x de-
scribes the value function corresponding to working the labour force regime
x; x where x; x  f0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0g. The value function depicts the maximal
utilities i.e. it is the utility function which has been solved for optimal con-
sumption, savings and labour supply. An individual chooses the value function
which gives them the highest level of utility and in this sense they can rank
alternative labour supply regimes.
Note that if v(1; 1; X11) > v(0; 1; X01); v(1; 0; X10) then v(1; 1; X11) >
v(0; 0; X00) from the monotonicity of v() in all its arguments.
The only di¤erences in the full incomes between participation patterns are
in the value of the time endowment which arises in periods of work and depends
on the wages of those periods. A suitable idea of the time prole of reservation
9If we included interior solutions for labour participation there would be 9 congurations.
The way of getting the "reservation wages" above would be similar eg suppose 0 < LT 1 < 1
and LT = 0: Let LT 1 solve
dv(LT 1; 0; x)
dLT 1
= 0 and then require
dv(LT 1; 0; x)
dLT
< 0
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wages between any two alternative proles of labour participation is a pair
wT 1; wT giving indi¤erence between the two patterns of labour participation.
So with Z = rAT 1 + ryT 1 + yT ; we can dene:
V11 = v(1; 1; Z) = v(1; 0; Z + w
11;10
T ) = V10
V01 = v(0; 1; Z + w
01;10
T 1 ) = v(1; 0; Z + w
01;10
T ) = V10
V11 = v(1; 1; Z) = v(0; 0; Z + rw
00;10
T 1 + w
00;10
T ) = V00
V11 = v(1; 1; Z) = v(1; 0; Z + w
11;01
T 1 ) = V01
) v(0; 0; Z + rwT 1 + w1110) < v(1; 0; Z + w1110)
In general there may not exist nite positive wages ensuring these indif-
ferences. But the general pattern of how lifecycle labour participation is de-
termined is clear. For the pattern ij to be optimal (i.e. participation state i
in period T   1 and j in T ) we require that Vij > Vkl for each other possible
participation prole kl: How the optimal participation prole varies with Z
and current wages depends on the form of the utility. There are some ba-
sic results just from monotonicity of v() in its arguments. Thus if V11 = V10
then V00 < V10: In general for a given Z and utility function, there will be
a region of high wages in both periods where it is optimal to work full time
in both periods (corresponding to V00 > V10; V01; V11). Similarly there will
be a region of low wages in both periods where it is not optimal to work in
either period (corresponding to V11 > V10; V01; V00). Finally there will be two
regions: one with high wages in T   1 but low wages in T (corresponding to
V01 > V10; V00; V11), where it is optimal to work full time in T  1 but not work
at all at T; and conversely a region of high wages at T but low wages at T   1
where it is optimal to stay out of the labour market at T   1 but work full
time at T (corresponding to V10 > V00; V01; V11):With given preferences, Z and
wage rates of each period, the optimal prole of labour participation over the
two periods is determined.
How will introduction of the deferral option a¤ect the optimal participation
prole? Deferral is only taken up if it raises the present value of non-labour in-
come including the pension stream. This change in wealth changes the demand
for leisure in each period. If leisure is a normal good, an increase in wealth
increases the demand for leisure in each period. So we would generally expect
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a drop in work hours in each period when an individual prefers to defer. If an
individual was planning full time work in each period in the absence of deferral
but chooses to defer, then if their wage rates were close to the reservation wage
in one of the periods (as computed above), with deferral his optimal prole
may switch into zero work in that period. Disney and Smith (2002) consider
the e¤ects of relaxation of the earnings rule on labour supply participation of
older workers in the UK. Their empirical results indicate that increasing gen-
erosity of work incentives, such as reducing the marginal tax rate on earnings
for older workers increases the number of hours worked. This suggests strong
income e¤ects are at work, whereas in our model deferral has a direct wealth
e¤ect and under standard assumptions would act to increase the amount of
leisure consumed.
To see the impact of pension deferral on lifecycle labour force participation
we need to know more about the wage regions corresponding to di¤erent labour
participation patterns and how these vary with Z. To determine this we have
to resort to a specication of preferences which allows us to explicitly compute
the labour participation areas and the ways in which they vary with Z: From
this we can predict which parts of the intertemporal wage rate distribution will
lead to a switch to zero hours of work in either or both of periods T   1; T on
introduction of the pension deferral option :We can then also see how deferral
will impact on consumption and savings in di¤erent parts of the wage rate
distribution.
2.3 Quasilinear utility
In this section we take a commonly used specication for the utility function
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 2010; Blau, 2012), in which consumption, c, is
isoelastic and labour, L, is quasilinear.10 We derive optimal saving and labour
supply regimes in each case. We nd the channels through which pension
deferral a¤ects optimal labour supply. In this specication, remaining lifetime
preferences are given by:
10Implying all income e¤ects operate through leisure.
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u(cT 1;LT 1) + u(cT ; LT ) =
CT 1

+ hT 1LT 1 + (
CT

+ hTLT ) (2.4)
Where  is the per period discount rate. In Appendix 8.2.2 we derive the
savings function AT as
AT =
xT 1   (r)1=( 1)(yT + wT (1  LT )
1 + r(r)1=( 1)
where xT 1 = rAT 1 + yT 1 + wT 1(1  LT 1).
The resulting value function is
v(K;wT 1; wT ) =
(K + rwT 1(1  LT 1)) + wT (1  LT ))

D+hT 1LT 1+hTLT
where
K = r(rAT 1 + yT 1) + yT ; D = ((r)=( 1) + )
The value function v, is isoelastic in disposable wealth at T   1 and linear in
present and future leisures. Quasilinearity in leisure given the wealth e¤ect of
pension deferral, means that the income e¤ects fall solely on participation.
The maximal utilities obtained from the lifecycle labour force regime (dene
by the subscript notation) are dened as
V00(K;wT 1; wT ) =
(K + rwT 1 + wT )

D
V01(K;wT 1) =
(K + rwT 1)

D + hT
V10(K;wT ) =
(K + wT )


D + hT 1
V11(K) =
K

D + hT 1 + hT
This allows us to dene six combinations of wages wiT 1; w
i
T i = 1::6 which
give indi¤erence between pairs of maximal utility levels. Conditions (1)-(6) are
derived from the (immediately) preceding value functions in the text. The way
this is done is a follows: For each Vx;x, where V is the value function and x; x
represents the optimal labour supply conguration there is a wage combination
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(or a single wage depending on the comparison in question) which makes an
individual just indi¤erent between the two labour supply congurations. The
way to solve for these wage combinations is to equate each value function with
every other (in a piecewise manner) and in each case solve for the wage. This
is done in Appendix 8.2.3 and 8.2.4.
(1)V00(K;w
1
T 1; wT ) = V01(K;w
1
T 1)
(2)V00(K;w
2
T 1; w
2
T ) = V10(K;w
2
T )
(3)V00(K;w
3
T 1; w
3
T ) = V11(K)
(4) V01(K;w
4
T 1) = V10(K;w
4
T )
(5) V01(K;w
5
T 1) = V11(K)
(6) V10(K;w
6
T ) = V11(K)
Appendix 8.2.3 and 8.2.4 show that the critical wage combinations are related
as depicted in Figure 2.1, and that all the intersections of regions exist at
nite positive wages. Figure 2.1 correspond to the reservation wages wiT 1; w
i
T
i = 1::6 giving indi¤erence between pairs of maximal utility levels. i.e. value
functions. The various pairwise comparisons are those given by expressions
(1)-(6). Appendix 8.2.3 and 8.2.4 show that in order to derive the indi¤erence
curves, one must equate a pair of value functions and solve for the wage (or
wages) in each case. These are then implicitly plotted in Figure 2.10 in order
to show how the indi¤erence curves behave over a dened wage region. Next,
by making direct comparisons between the di¤erent curves (in terms of which
o¤ers the highest utility results) the optimal labour supply region is dened
as per Figure 2.2.
Using monotonicity of the value function expressions in the wage rates, we
can deduce regions of the wage space in which di¤erent intertemporal labour
participation patterns are optimal as shown in Figure 2.2. The boundaries
between the regions in Figure 2.2 correspond to the relevant parts of the lines in
Figure 2.1: (1); (2) giving lower bounds on full time work, (5); (6) giving upper
bounds on the zero work region and 4 giving the division between working
either just in T   1 or in T:
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Figure 2.1: Reservation wages which give indi¤erence between pairs of maximal
utility levels.
w
w
45 2
1
6
3
T
T-1
Figure 2.2: Optimal lifecycle participation proles.
1,1 optimal
1,0 optimal
0,1 optimal
0,0 optimal
w
T-1
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2.3.1 The e¤ect of pension deferral on labour force par-
ticipation.
To examine the impact of pension deferral which raises the present value of
non-labour income on lifecycle labour participation, we show how Figure 2.2
changes with K: Appendix 8.2.5 shows that the e¤ect on the optimal labour
participation prole of an increase in K depends on whether the utility value
of leisure is higher in T   1 or T: In both cases the wage region with zero
work in both periods expands and that with full time work in both periods
contracts. But if the value of leisure is higher in period T than T  1; the wage
region with full time work only at T   1 expands at the expense of the wage
region with full time work only in T (as in Figure 2.3). Conversely if the value
of leisure is higher in T   1 than T; the wage region with full time work at T
expands at the expense of the wage region with full time work only in T   1
(as in Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.3: Increase in non labour income hT 1 < hT :
w
T
w
T-1
(Not workingNDt-1, Not workingNDt)
(Not workingDt-1, Not workingDt)
(WorkingNDt-1, WorkingNDt)
(WorkingDt-1, WorkingDt)
Legend
Regions defining
labour supply without
deferral:
Regions defining
labour supply with
deferral:
If the option to defer is suddenly introduced or taken up, or is made more
generous, the present value of non-labour income increases. We can deduce
the likely e¤ects on lifecycle participation proles. If leisure is more valuable
in period T   1; the increase in K will tend to reduce full time work in T   1:
A proportion of those individuals who were working full time in both periods
may switch to only working in period T and some of those who previously only
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Figure 2.4: Increase in non labour income hT 1 > hT :
w
T
w
T-1
(Not workingNDt-1, Not workingNDt)
(Not workingDt-1, Not workingDt)
(WorkingNDt-1, WorkingNDt)
(WorkingDt-1, WorkingDt)
Legend
Regions defining
labour supply without
deferral:
Regions defining
labour supply with
deferral:
worked in T   1 may switch to only working in T . But some who previously
only worked in T may switch into inactivity in both periods. Thus with leisure
more valuable in T   1; the increase in the value of the deferred pension
unambiguously reduces the number of full time workers in T   1, but may
raise or lower it in period T . If the value of leisure is higher in period T , the
opposite e¤ects occur: the number of full time workers in T unambiguously
falls while the number of full time workers in T   1 may fall or rise depending
on the distribution of the lifecycle wages wT 1; wt in the population.
The wealth change caused by deferral has participation e¤ects on individ-
uals close to the reservation wage in one period at least. However labour force
participation is una¤ected by the presence of pension deferral for those who
earn su¢ ciently above the relevant critical wage dening full time work. In
the next subsection we simulate the e¤ect of pension deferral implied by our
framework.
Stylised simulation: defer or not defer?
Having considered the theoretical e¤ects of pension deferral within our frame-
work, we turn to a numerical simulation. In order to calibrate our model we
use a mixture of assumed parameters available in the literature and those in-
ferred from secondary data. Following the work of Attanasio et al. (2008) we
set the relative risk parameter  to  0:5, we assume annual (non housing)
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wealth holding of $1500, weekly total non-labour income (for example the to-
tal of private and state pension) of $350 under no deferral and $365 under
deferral.11 12 We assume individuals work 40 hours per week, can earn an an-
nual rate of return of 3% in the free market and have a discount rate of 0:95.
We set the marginal value of leisure in the penultimate period and terminal
period of 0:006 and 0:00630 respectively (an increase of 5%).13 In doing so we
replicate the e¤ects of Figure 2.3 more clearly i.e. assuming hT 1 < hT as
shown Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Wage co-ordinates dening zero and full time work.
A
B
C
D
By deferring one period the required wages to be in a given labour supply
regime increase in each period. In the case of zero work this is shown by the
curves shifting from point A to point B, whereas for full time work the corre-
sponding loci shifts from point C to point D. Under the no deferral option the
11Isoelastic utility implies constant relative risk aversion.
12The lack of secondary data providing average weekly pension payments meant we had
to assume gures for weekly non labour income. Administrative data from the Annual
Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) show median gross earnings for employed individuals
in April 2013 was £ 517 per week (ONS, 2013). Hence under no deferral we assumed non
labour income (including employer and state pension) replaced 67% of weekly preretirement
gross labour income.
13This value generates an optimal labour income/asset ratio of about 30%, reservation
wages for zero work at a little above the UK minimum wage and for switching from part-
time to full time of about one and a half times the minimum wage.
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wage rate required to be in zero work at (T 1, T ) is ($7:25T 1,$7:45T ) respec-
tively, whilst under deferral it rises to ($7:34T 1,$7:54T ). Similarly for full
time work at (T 1; T ) the corresponding wage rates are ($11:75T 1;$10:95T ),
under deferral these increase to ($12:02T 1;$11:21T ). The e¤ect of pension
deferral therefore raises the full time reservation wage by around 1:5% assum-
ing the above parameters. In various simulations the average rise in the full
time reservation wage for a 12 month deferral is around 2%, the particular ex-
ample given has a zero work reservation wage close to the National Minimum
Wage (NMW). Implicitly in the calibration the change in reservation wage on
deferral is for deferral lasting one year. As the period of deferral increases
beyond this, the reservation wage di¤erence will rise. The relative slopes of
the participation regime boundaries and their shifts principally depends on
the di¤erence between the value of non-labour income by deferring and the
di¤erence in the marginal value of leisure in each period.
Empirical relevance of pension deferral The stylised simulation showed
that deferral is nancially benecial for all full time workers who earn more
than approximately$11 per hour. We pool four waves of data from the UKLFS
between the years 2008 and 2013 to determine the wage distributions (condi-
tional on being in work) for women aged between 60 and 65, and men aged
between 65 and 70.14 We restrict our sample to these age ranges as they cover
the state retirement age and hence the period when an individuals usually
makes the decision to defer their pension. It is important to note that the
decision to work and the deferral decision are independent (except for the im-
plications on income tax). Our nal sample consists of 483 individuals. Figures
2.6 and 2.7 depict their wages.
14We ensure there is no overlap in the surveys to ensure our sample does not contain any
repeated observations. We include individuals working below full time hours to boost sample
size, noting that the mean wage for full time and part time workers in this age category are
roughly equal.
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Figure 2.6: Female Wage Distribution: Ages 60-65 (2008-2013).
Figure 2.7: Male Wage Distribution: Ages 65-70 (2008-2013).
It is clear that a signicant proportion, around 40% of females and more
than 50% males in our sample earn more than $11 per hour, therefore deferral
policy is an important component of the labour supply decision for a large
proportion of older workers. Indeed a recent DWP report (2008) suggested
that individuals tend to coordinate their labour supply and deferral decision.
They found 79% of deliberate deferrers were in paid work and tended to main-
tain their preretirement hours, primarily full time, after deferral.15 Family
decisions were important so a partner continuing in work or uncertainty of life
expectation made deferral more likely, as did the desire to avoid liability for a
higher income tax rate. Given that state pension deferral is likely to become
increasingly important in the face of population ageing and longevity, then it
is of equal importance to analyse the choice between an increment in weekly
15In terms of our UKLFS sample, whilst we do not observe the deferral decision we do
observe hours worked. The median male individual worked 34.5 hours per week whilst for
females the gure is 24. The minimum and maximum weekly hours worked ranged from 3
to 68 for males and from 6.5 to 55 for females.
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state pension or a lump sum payment, we turn to this in the next section.
2.4 UK State Pension & Deferral
2.4.1 Which Deferral Option is Best?
In a multiperiod setting the decision becomes one of choosing both if to defer
and, if so, for how many periods. In this section we simulate the present value
of an individuals state pension pot at the date of undeferral, under both the
incremental and lump sum option for deferral over a varying number of years.
On reaching SRA an individual can choose whether to take up the state
pension or defer it from that date. They do not have to precommit to a
length of deferral but at any future date can ask for their pension to start
from then on.16 If an individual chooses to defer their pension, then current
rules mean that for every ve weeks an individual defers, their weekly State
Pension increases by 1%, this is equivalent to a 10.4% rate of return for each
full year of deferral. Alternatively an individual may also defer their State
Pension and receive a lump sum payment.17 18 If an individual chooses to
take the latter option, the lump sum they receive is the value of their past
deferred weekly pension payments accumulated at an interest rate of at least
2% above the Bank of England base rate.19 Depending on the life expectancy
of the individual there is no clear answer as to which option is more lucrative,
however given the increasing life expectancy observed in the past 30 years, it is
generally considered that the incremental option o¤ers a higher rate of return
(Farrar et al., 2012).
16This not true for the lump sum option, in which case the individual must defer for at
least 52 weeks.
17Extra State Pension and lump sum payment are both taxed. In addition if you choose
to defer then this will impact means tested benets, whereas if you choose to recieve a lump
sum, this will not a¤ect certain means tested benets.
18Since its inception there has been various changes to legilsation regarding how the rate
of return on the deferral option is formulated, and the introduction of the lump sum option
in 2006. For a more detailed description of these changes see Bozio et al (2010).
19In terms of pension deferral one of the biggest changes of the move to a single tier
pension is that the lump sum option will be scrapped and only the incremental option will
be available to those who defer (White Paper 2013). At the time of writing the actual
generosity of the incremental option is yet to be decided, however is believed to be in the
region of half its current generosity (FT, September 2013).
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At the point of reinstatement of a deferred pension S, the present value
of the extra weekly payment coming from the deferral is x(1 + 1:01 + 1:012 +
::1:01 )(1 + (1 + r) 1 + ::(1 + r)T S) where  is the number of months for
which the pension has been deferred between SRA and age at S; x is the
original weekly pension payable at SRA, r is a constant market interest rate
and T is the date of death. On the other hand the lump sum payable at S is
x(1 + 1 +  + (1 + )2 + ::(1 + ) ) where  is at least 2% above bank base
rate.
We plot the present value under each option in Figures 2.8 and 2.9. In
Figure 2.8 we vary the generosity of the incremental option, i.e. the length
of time it takes to earn a 1% increase in an individuals weekly state pension.
Whilst in Figure 2.9 we vary the length of the period from the date of undeferral
to death. It is these two factors which to a large extent dictate the Present
Value (PV) of the deferred pension. To show this we set all other parameter
values as follows: initial weekly state pension of $100, weekly interest rate on
lump sum option equal to 0:05
52
, post undeferral weekly net rate of return equal
to 0:02
52
and deferral period equal to two years.
(i) Varying rate of return on incremental option Figure 2.8 shows
the e¤ect of changing the rate of return or relative generosity, assuming an
individual lives for 15 years following the date of undeferral. The sloping
curve represents the deferred income option whilst the at curve corresponds
to the lump sum option.
The break even of point for the PV of the pension is at a rate of return
of about 1% for every 6.25 weeks deferred. Under existing rules the current
rate of return is a 1% increment for every 5 weeks deferred, and therefore in
this example it is worth approximately $3000 to the individual to choose the
deferred income option. However if the individual was credit constrained then
it could be the case that they require the lump sum to clear some debt, e.g.
an outstanding mortgage. Putting this into context, during the 1970s when
the contribution rate was approximately 1% for every 7-8 weeks deferred, and
individuals had a shorter life span (see Figure 2.10), the lump sum option
would have been more lucrative had it been available. A recent government
announcement to scrap the lump sum option and reduce the generosity of
2. To Defer or Not Defer: State Pension in a Lifecycle Model. 61
the incremental option by half would leave individuals worse o¤, however the
proposed rate of return on the incremental option is still in excess of the free
market rate.
Figure 2.8: Varying the contribution factor.
Notes: The X-axis measures the number of weeks (multiplied by 100) required for an
individual to defer their state pension in order for them to receive an additional £ 1 extra a
week upon undeferral.
(ii) Varying life span from undeferral date Figure 2.9 shows the
e¤ect of increasing longevity under the incremental option (green) and lump
sum option (red), assuming parameters of the current legislation.
Figure 2.9: Varying individuals life expectancy.
Notes: X-axis refers the duration (in weeks) of the deferral period.
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Intuitively, the PV for those who only live a short period after they undefer
are much better o¤ choosing the lump sum option. However it is clear that
the deferred income option is more lucrative provided an individual lives for
approximately 12 years or more after they undefer.
The O¢ ce for National Statistics (2011) published current and projected
life expectancy tables by gender in the UK covering the period 1985 to 2035.
Over this period it is quite clear life expectancy has increased substantially,
for both cohort and period groups. Period life expectancy refers to the life ex-
pectancy for those individuals in a given calendar year (ONS, 2011a). Hence in
2013 females are expected to live until 83 years of age on average. In contrast,
cohort life expectancy at birth is calculated using age-specic mortality rates
which allow for known or projected changes in mortality throughout a persons
life (ONS, 2011b). Which implies a female born in 2013 is expected to live
until 94 years of age.
Supposing an individual reaches their life expectancy, Figure 2.10 implies
the deferred income option is more lucrative for both current and future re-
tirees, so long as the relative generosity of this option is not changed.20
Figure 2.10: Cohort and period life expectancy men and women.
Source: ONS (2011a).
Farrar et al. (2012) compare the two undeferral options relative to not
deferring and investing at the market rate, in most policy simulations deferral
20Along with the introduction of the single tier pension, the White Paper (2013) also notes
potential changes to the relative generosity of the incremental income option. The Financial
Times reported the implied interest rate is likely to be half the current annual rate of 10.4%
(FT, September 2013).
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of any kind is preferred over non deferral.21 Similar to Disney and Smith (2002)
and our own model, Farrar et al. (2012) assume individuals face no borrowing
constraints. Deferral would not be optimal if individuals could not borrow
against their future income. Assuming individuals reach their life expectancy,
then the incremental option tended to o¤er a higher rate of return in most
simulated examples, the post-tax deferral state pension income stream. Ferrar
et al. (2012) show the 10:4% interest payment substantially exceeded the break
even interest rate required for the incremental and lump sum option to be of
equal PV.
Coleman et al (2008) analyse the characteristics of deferrers versus those
who claim state pension at SPA. Their results suggest deferrers are mainly
high earners who had good nancial knowledge of the deferral option (hence
the majority of them chose the deferred income option), and either they or
their partner tended to continue engaging with paid work post SPA. These
individuals reported they were nancially comfortable during the deferral pe-
riod. This suggests the employment and deferral decision may well be jointly
determined, and it is unlikely deferrers are from credit constrained households.
More recent data from waves four and ve from the English Longitudinal Study
of Ageing (ELSA), spanning the years 2008-2013 also contain information on
state pension deferral, despite small sample sizes those who do defer tend to
have worked in professional, managerial or skilled non manual occupations.
These individuals are more likely to choose the deferred income option, and
tend to defer their state pension for between 1 and 5 years.22
2.4.2 Prevalence of pension deferral
A recent Freedom of Information Request released by the DWP showed be-
tween September 2009-2010 approximately 66; 300 individuals deferred their
pension.23 Of this total roughly just over one third took the increment option,
whilst nearly half took the lump sum option, the remainder took a mixture of
21In their paper the authors worked in continous time and do not consider a formal model
of labour force participation.
22Occupation data is fed forward to wave one of ELSA from the Health Survey for England
data, from which the original ELSA sample is derived.
23Freedom of Information request catalogue number (2773/2011).
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the two.24 Of the total number of individuals eligible to claim their state pen-
sion, roughly 1 in 10 chose to defer their pension. Coleman et al (2008) using
administrative data surveyed individuals who were approaching or had reached
SPA, and found only a low level of respondents, 65%, knew of the option to
defer. This proportion only increased slightly after SPA. The main reasons
cited were due time constraints and it being the spouses responsibility, lack
of interest or condence in nancial matters. Therefore despite roughly 1 in
10 individuals deferring it is likely with increased awareness (one of the central
aims of the 2013 White Paper) this proportion will rise.25
2.5 Future work
Chapter two modelled the State Pension deferral decision. The current frame-
work is set within a two period model, to reect the decision process at SPA.
Whilst extending the framework to a multiperiod setting may seem appealing
and is certainly feasible, the elegance the current framework is that it is able
to capture the e¤ects of SP deferral with only two periods.
We considered the deferral decision and its impact on labour supply re-
stricting attention to corner solutions. The reason for this is to determine
whether there is a signicant change in labour force regimes in the presence of
the deferral option. It would be possible to allow for a greater variety of poten-
tial labour market combinations, such as considering interior solutions which
may give a more true reection of the type of labour force behaviour around
this particular phase in the lifecycle, however this would not alter our main
results.26 Indeed the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (June
2014) have announced legislation to make it compulsory for individuals to be
24FOI DWP (2011) pp.2 notes: New rules for deferral came into e¤ect in April 2005
and lump payments became available from April 2006. A person who deferred their State
Pension before April 2005 would qualify for increments for the period up to April 2005 and
may have a choice of either a lump sum payment or an increment for the period of deferral
from April 2005. This means some people may have both an increment and a lump sum
payment. The lump sum option is only available to those who have deferred continuously
for at least 12 months. The numbers do not include those who deferred for less than 12
months and opted for simple arrears instead of increments.
25Options to allow increased exibility of defering and undefering multiple times are also
being considered by the DWP (White Paper 2013).
26Banks and Smith (2006) note that partial retirement is not particularly common in the
UK relative to the US.
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allowed to request exible working hours which is likely to facilitate phased
retirement.
We have assumed older households do not face credit constraints, however
this may not strictly be true for all older households (Le Blanc et al., 2014).
The current framework assumes there are no credit constraints and capital
markets work e¢ ciently. Future research considers whether credit constraints
a¤ect the labour supply and/or deferral decision.
The fact we have considered corner solutions means there is the possibility
for individuals to move from retirement back into paid work, so called unre-
tirement (Maestas, 2010). We assume this is cost free, however it may be the
case for those out of the labour market it is more costly in terms of retraining
due to depreciation of human capital. In ongoing work we formally account
for this by introducing a switching cost for those individuals for whom it is
optimal to unretire.
As in chapter one we assume individuals have perfect foresight. It may
be possible to incorporate particular forms of uncertainty in our model which
may better reect the true decision making process.
2.6 Conclusion and policy implications
In this chapter we develop a lifecycle model to analyse the joint decision of
pension deferral and intertemporal labour supply. Contrary to the policy aim
of pension deferral which is to extend working lives, our theoretical model in-
dicates pension deferral acts to raise the reservation wage and reduce the like-
lihood of labour force participation. This is conditional on assuming leisure is
a normal good. Economic theory would imply a rise in the PV of wealth would
cause the individual to consume more leisure all else equal. The exact direction
in which labour force changes in a two period framework depends on the mar-
ginal value of leisure in each period and its change over time. There are clear
qualitative e¤ects, depending on wage prole, non-labour wealth and prefer-
ences, introduction of a pension deferral scheme can tilt labour participation
towards the present or future.
Our numerical simulation and empirical evidence suggest that the deferral
policy a¤ects a large proportion of the older working population. As a ball-
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park gure the option changes the reservation wages by about 2:5%. Similar
to Farrar et al. (2012) our results indicate (1) Pension deferral is optimal in
the absence of credit constraints and (2) Of the deferral options available, the
incremental income option is more lucrative. Combined with the results of
Coleman et al. (2008) the existing body of evidence suggests deferral take up
is concentrated amongst higher income groups and those who are more nan-
cially literate, both of which are likely to be positively correlated. Empirical
evidence suggests deferral and labour supply is treated as a joint decision,
despite legislation implying they are independent.
The recent UK announcement of a move to a single tier pension system will
have a number of nancial implications for those approaching retirement and
future generations (Crawford et al., 2013). This includes changes to the rules
governing pension deferral, the most signicant of which relate to the abolition
of the lump sum option and reduction in the generosity of the incremental
option (the implied annual interest rate on deferrals will halve from 10:4%
to 5:2%). Nonetheless at present one in ten retirees chooses to defer their
state pension; the institutional focus to extend working lives in the face of
increasing longevity means research into understanding the e¤ects of pension
deferral from a theoretical and policy viewpoint are of paramount importance.
Chapter 3
Lifetime Labour Market
Activity and Retirement
Decisions: Evidence from ELSA.
3.1 Introduction
A long line of research has attempted to address the determinants of retirement
(Quinn, 1977; Fields & Mitchell, 1982; Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999; Gustman
and Steinmeier, 2004).1 However relatively little attention has been paid to
the role of lifetime labour market experiences in relation to time spent in em-
ployment, unemployment and inactivity, and how it may a¤ect the retirement
decision.2 Lifetime labour market experiences have important implications for
retirement behaviour given that retirement income tends to be a function of
labour market income deferred from an earlier period.
The primary aim of this chapter is to understand the role of work life his-
1For a comprehensive review of modelling the retirement decision see Lazear (1986).
2The work of Nicholls (2010) and Miniciani et al. (1998) is closest to ours; however
the main focus of his paper is to determine the e¤ect of work life histories on pensioner
poverty i.e. for those already in retirement. Nicholls (2010) uses a multinomial framework
and therefore cannot ascertain any e¤ects of duration dependence, nor does he account for
unobserved heterogeneity. Miniciani et al. (1998) explicitly focus on the e¤ects of lifetime
unemployment and retirement using British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).
A non-exhaustive list of closely related work includes: Bardasi & Jenkins, (2002); Bozio,
Emmerson, ODea & Tetlow, (2010); Bozio, Emmerson, ODea & Tetlow, (2011); Bozio,
Emmerson & Tetlow, (2011); DeWilde, (2012).
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tories on the retirement and early retirement decision. We use panel data from
the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), which collects information
on a representative sample of English private households aged 50 and over to
estimate discrete time hazard models of retirement and early retirement. We
control for a range of sociodemographic and economic characteristics, includ-
ing data on pension wealth. In line with previous research we also control for
unobserved heterogeneity which may be present given the lifestage of our sam-
ple members and may a¤ect our estimation results (Meghir and Whitehouse,
1997; Nicolleti, 2006; Emmanouilidi and Kyriazidou, 2012). We investigate
di¤erences by income quintile and gender to show the di¤erential impact these
factors have in relation to (early) retirement.
Our results suggest episodes of unemployment and economic inactivity play
an important role in the retirement and early retirement decision. In most spec-
ications experiencing episodes out of the labour market tends to signicantly
lower the hazard of (early) retirement. Conditional on controlling for incidents
out of the labour market spending lower proportions of potential labour market
experience in employment tends to raise the hazard of retirement, particularly
for men. The way in which lifetime labour market history a¤ects retirement
tends to di¤er across the income distribution. In addition to labour market
history, the level of pension wealth an individual and their spouse has is also
an important factor in the retirement decision. However, the relationship is
not symmetric; our results indicate that the husbands pension wealth seems to
play a more signicant role in the wives retirement decision, whilst the same is
not true vice versa. Alongside pension wealth the type of pension held is also
important, we nd the hazard of retirement is lower for those contributing to
an employer or private pension. Finally, episodes of poor lifetime and baseline
health tend to raise the hazard of (early) retirement, particularly for men.
The rest of this chapter is set out as follows: Section 3.2 provides an
overview of the policy context; Section 3.3 reviews existing literature; Sec-
tion 3.4 describes our methods; Section 3.5 describes our data and provides
summary information regarding our sample; estimation results are presented
and discussed in Section 3.6, by gender and income position and then for the
specic case of early retirement; Section 3.7 considers policy implications of
our results; Section 3.8 considers future work and Section 3.9 concludes.
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3.2 Policy Context
Population ageing is an issue for the UK. The 2011 Census highlighted that
1 in 6 individuals in the UK is now aged above 65 (ONS, 2013b). Between
2002 and 2010 the number of additional years a male aged 65 should expect
to live increased from 16 to 18.03 years and similarly for women from 19.08 to
20.62 years (ONS, 2011b). One consequence of ageing (which can be primarily
attributable to advances in health technology and nutrition) is that individuals
can spend more time in retirement assuming they have su¢ cient wealth to
sustain their preferred level of consumption. However, adverse e¤ects of ageing
do exist and have been exacerbated by lower fertility rates. In the UK, the
fertility rate has fallen from 2.71 children per female in 1960 to 1.64 in 2002,
since which it has subsequently rose to 1.98 in 2010 (ONS, 2013c).3 This
is reected in the dependency ratio, dened as the number of working age
individuals divided by the number of those aged over State Pension Age (SPA).
In the UK this fraction is projected to rise from approximately 10
3
in 2010
to 10
3:5
by 2031 (ONS, 2010). These statistics show ageing is and will have
a signicant impact on individuals lives. Understanding the determinants
of (early) retirement in the UK is therefore of vital importance for central
government if they are to alleviate the scal implications of population ageing
in the future.
Retirement in the United Kingdom (UK) has traditionally been considered
as a discrete transition from a career job to full retirement at or before SPA
(Meghir and Whitehouse, 1997; Banks and Smith, 2006). Kohli (1991) sug-
gests the social norm for retirement in the UK is the cessation of paid work,
nonetheless much controversy surrounds the precise denition (Gustman and
Steinmeier, 2000; Smith, 2006). In part this is due to the fact that labour
market behaviour around retirementhas changed. Starting in the United
States (US) during the 1960s and 1970s, individuals began to gradually re-
duce the number of hours they worked in the labour market before retiring
fully. This gradual reduction (which required a job change at the time due
to social security rules) gave rise to the so called bridge jobor partial retire-
3Where total fertility rate is dened as: the average number of live children that a group
of women would bear if they experienced the age specic fertility rates of the calendar year
in question throughout their childbearing lifespan.
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ment. Population ageing and longevity are factors which are likely to alter the
labour market behaviour at older ages, and this has led to a change in the way
academics and policymakers view retirement.
In the UK, the 2010 British Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition gov-
ernment bought forward plans (outlined in the Pension Act 2011) to align
the SPA of women to that of men by November 2018. Government have also
legislated to bring forward plans to increase the SPA for all individuals to
67 years of age between 2026-2028, which had initially been timetabled to be
introduced between 2034-2036.4 The reason for such drastic measures is high-
lighted by recent ONS (2010) forecasts, which indicate the dependency ratio
(as dened earlier) is predicted to nearly double to 10
5
by 2051 if the SPA is left
unchanged. Whilst the eligibility age at which SP receipt is being increased,
the age at which individuals may begin to draw down an occupational or pri-
vate pension remains substantially below the SPA. Until April 2010 individuals
were eligible to claim their private pension at the age of 50, since which it has
been raised to 55 which still remains 10 years below SPA for males.
In an e¤ort to simultaneously reduce pensioner poverty and the scal bur-
den of ageing population, the 2010 British Conservative-Liberal Democrat
coalition government legislated an entire overhaul of the state pension sys-
tem to a single tier system set to come into force in 2017. One of the main
changes relates to an increase in the number of qualifying years(from 30 to
35) of national insurance contributions, in order for an individual to be eligible
for a full state pension. Depending on how episodes out of the labour market
impact the hazard of retirement will mean the forthcoming changes in retire-
ment legislation may potentially have adverse consequences. If time spent out
of the labour market due to unemployment and inactivity raises the hazard of
(early) retirement, then ceteris paribus the forthcoming changes to the state
pension system will have a detrimental e¤ect on retirement income and lead
to an increase welfare dependence and pensioner poverty in old age.5,6
4Information accessed via: https://www.gov.uk/changes-state-pension (04/06/2013).
5Maes (2013) shows that the absence of e¤ective active labour market policies in Belgium
(implying time out of the labour market lead to increased worklessness) increased the like-
lihood of being in old age poverty. The UK spends a signicantly smaller amount on active
labour market policies (as a proportion of GDP) relative to continental countries such as
Germany or the Netherlands (OECD, 2013).
6The 2010 UK coalition government has overhauled a range of existing active labour
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3.3 Literature review
As noted at the outset, relatively little research e¤ort has been focused on
understanding the a¤ects of lifetime labour market experience on labour sup-
ply behaviour at older ages. The focus of previous research has tended to
concentrate on the determinants of nancial position, namely poverty, in re-
tirement (Nicholls, 2010; Bozio et al. 2010, 2011). Banks and Smith (2006)
show that one method to reduce poverty at older ages is to increase coverage
of occupational pensions. However, until recently these have been tradition-
ally concentrated amongst professional occupations, which have in part led to
the increasing incidence of early retirement (Tanner, 1998; Blundell, Meghir &
Smith, 2002).7 The 2008 and 2010 Pension Acts aim to mitigate the e¤ect of
pensioner poverty by ensuring all employees have access to a workplace pen-
sion. This is unlikely to curtail the incentive to retire early given individuals
are eligible to claim workplace pensions at 55 years of age, well below the
current state retirement age.8
An alternative reason for an individual to experience poverty in retirement
is if they were forced to retire early. Dorn & Sousa-Poza (2010) nd one third of
UK early retirement episodes are involuntary, due to factors such as economic
recessions and strict employment protection legislation. The Equality Act
2010 includes legislation to ensure age based discrimination is not present in
the workplace, in order to reduce the extent of involuntary retirement.9 Whilst
this will help empower older people and reduce the scal burden of retirement
on the state, it may have detrimental consequences such as preventing younger
people enter or progress in the labour market, although empirical evidence
suggests this e¤ect is weak (Banks et al., 2010; Banks et al., 2010; European
Parliament, 2013). Indeed the Conservative British government of the 1980s
allowed older workers to retire early and receive benets under the Job Release
Scheme (JRS), in exchange for a guarantee that their job was lled by an
market policies, however early evidence of the new programmes is currently unavailable.
7An early investigation on the role of social security and early retirement in the US can
be found in Quinn (1977).
8Moreover given The Pension Act has only recently been introduced it is unlikely to a¤ect
the retirement behaviour of current cohorts approaching retirement.
9Evaluation on its e¤ectiveness is unavailable at the time of writing.
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unemployed individual who was commonly younger (Kohli et al., 1991).10
In the context of labour market experience of older workers and early re-
tirement, the recession of the 1980s was concentrated in particular primary sec-
tors such as manufacturing and mining.11 Nickell (1997) argues that over this
period labour market policies pushed individuals onto incapacity, long term
unemployment or sickness benets, particularly older workers in the manufac-
turing sector which through worklessness and schemes such as the JRS led to
increased levels of early retirement. This clearly a¤ects how attached individ-
uals would have felt to the labour market and by raising the likelihood of early
retirement, increases the chances of having inadequate nancial resources in
retirement. Blundell et al. (2002) nd evidence to support an increasing trend
in early retirement amongst British men in the UK; the proportion of males
employed aged 60-64 halved from 80% in 1968 to less than 40% by the end of
the 1990s.
Lower levels of labour force attachment during ones working life is also
likely to be related to nancial position in retirement. Maes (2013) using
Belgium administrative data nds working life poverty associated with being
on unemployment benets impacts future poverty in retirement. Addition-
ally early retirement incentives and a lack of active labour market policies
for unemployed older workers tended to increase the likelihood of experienc-
ing poverty at older ages. García-Pérez (2013) argues economic incentives
including the role of unemployment and pension incentives play an important
role in determining the retirement decision. His ndings suggest these fac-
tors should be accounted for whilst controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) model early retirement transitions for British
men using non-parametric and parametric models, allowing for state and du-
ration dependence whilst also accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. Their
work also controls for labour market history using measures of pension con-
10The JRS scheme initially targeted Assisted Areasdened as specic areas where un-
employment was more prevalent. Its expansion during the 1980s was partially in response to
macro factors such as the economic recession which led to structural changes in the British
labour market.
11Dorn & Sousa-Poza (2010) argue countries with a relatively inexible labour market
such as Northern European (and was true for the UK in the 1980s), tend to fare worse o¤
in economic recessions. It could be argued that there was a reduction in labour market
regulation and employment protection due to the relative fall in power of trade unions
under the Thatcher government (Nickell, 1997).
3. Lifetime Labour Market Activity and Retirement Decisions: Evidence from
ELSA. 73
tributions from linked administrative data. Our approach di¤ers in that we
consider early retirement and retirement past SPA separately for both men
and women. The labour force attachment of women has grown signicantly
in the past thirty years and warrants attention. Moreover our sample size is
more than double that of Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) and makes use of ve
waves of longitudinal data whereas they restrict attention to one cross section
of the Retirement and Retirement Plans data. Nonetheless, a common theme
in all these papers is that employment history is likely to play a crucial role in
the retirement decision.
3.4 Methods
We model the retirement decision using the duration approach of Jenkins
(1995) analogous to the strategy used in Jones et al. (2010). The ELSA
dataset provides information on respondents age, calendar month and year of
interview and calendar month and year of retirement. From this information
it is possible to derive accurate measures of the total time at riskuntil rst
retirement. Data has been reorganised to account for period at risk of event
in this case the age at which retirement takes place. This leads to an unbal-
anced panel setup and permits a complicated likelihood to be reduced to an
estimation for a binary outcome (Jones et al., 2010).
We specify a piecewise constant baseline hazard which is a step function
of the age of our stock sample of men and women.12 The reason the baseline
hazard is a step function of age is to account for the period at risk, i.e. we
assume individuals become at risk when they reach age 50. The baseline hazard
is assumed to be zero prior to this age. By dening the risk set in terms of
age it is also possible to account for the heterogeneity in age of exit from the
labour market, for example the incidence of early retirement has been well
documented in the UK (see for example Banks et al. 2006; Jones et al. 2010).
This leads to semi-parametric specication of the discrete time hazard
12We restrict attention to individuals who are in a certain age range and economic status
in their rst wave of observation. The reason for this is because in the context of the discrete
time model information prior to this initial age and economic status is not included in the
model (i.e. makes no contribution to the likelihood). In this sense we are imposing a degree
of homogeneity on the initial sample.
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model. Stephen Jenkins (1997) estimation routine pgmhaz8 facilitates esti-
mation of the Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) model, the discrete time counterpart
to a continuous proportional hazards model and its extension to account for
individual level unobserved heterogeneity summarised by a gamma mixture
distribution (Meyer, 1990). We partially mitigate the extent of unobserved
heterogeneity by controlling for a stock sample of individuals who are in (self)
employment at wave 1.13 Jones et al. (2012), Nicoletti and Rondinelli (2006)
and Jenkins (1995) note that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity leads to (a)
Over estimation of negative duration dependence, and (b) Under estimation
of the true e¤ects of positive relationships between regressor and duration.
Nicolleti and Rondinelli (2010) present Monte Carlo evidence which suggests
discrete time hazard models are robust to misspecication of the form of un-
observed heterogeneity in terms of estimates of duration dependence.14
Formally we are interested in the e¤ect of age and the set of covariates on
the instantaneous hazard of retirement, which is modelled as a proportional
hazard i.e. the e¤ect of a unit increase of a covariate e¤ects the hazard of
retirement independent of time. The presentation of the model presented below
draws heavily on Jenkins (1995).
The instantaneous proportional hazard of retirement for individual i at
time t is
i;t = 0(t)e
[X
0
i;t] (3.1)
Where 0(t) is the baseline hazard and X
0
i;t are our set of covariates with
associated coe¢ cient estimates . The discrete time hazard in the jth interval
is given by:
hj (Xi;j) = 1  ef e[X
0
i;j+ j ]g (3.2)
Where  j:
13We cross check individuals self-reported status with weekly earnings and number of
hours worked per week.
14We test for alternative forms of unobserved heterogeneity assuming parametric distrib-
uted errors (Prentice and Gloeckler 1978, Meyer 1990), and also a non-parametric distribu-
tion (Heckman and Singer, 1984).
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 j = log
fjZ
fj 1
0()d (3.3)
Is the logarithm of the interval of interest in our specication. In the case of
the extension assuming a gamma mixture distribution the proportional hazard
of retirement in the jth interval is given by:
i;t = 0(t)e
[X;i;t+log(i)] (3.4)
Where i is a is a Gamma distributed random variable with unit mean and
variance 2. The discrete time hazard in the jth interval is given by:
hj (Xi;j) = 1  ef e[X
0
i;j+ j+log(i)]g (3.5)
Where the hazard now directly incorporates the unobserved heterogeneity
term.
Sample attrition is a cause for concern and may be related to labour mar-
ket activity and health (Zabel, 1998; Ziliak & Knieser,1998).15 A relationship
between labour force participation and attrition will lead to estimate bias. We
nd no evidence of attrition bias using a variable addition test proposed by
Nijman and Verbeek (1992) which tests for any relationship between (early)
retirement and the pattern of survey response. There may also be potential
endogeneity between self reported health and retirement (Jones et al., 2010).
To minimise the potential for such bias it is possible to use alternative com-
posite measures of health to predict health status.16 Given our interest is the
e¤ect of lifetime variables on the retirement, and not the e¤ect of health shocks
we do not follow this approach, but instead control for baseline health using
self-reported measures and for lifetime measures of health from the age of 16
onwards available in the life history survey.
We also separately weight our data using the Inverse Probability Weighting
(IPW) method of Wooldridge (2002), to account for individuals pattern of sur-
15For an overview of potential sources of non response see Nicoletti and Peracchi (2005).
16Jones et al. (2009) estimate an ordered probit and regress health limitations on self-
reported health, the predictions from the ordered probit are used in the model of retirement.
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vey response.17 18 In estimating non-response weights we use a combination of
sociodemographic, economic and interview characteristics available in ELSA,
which are deliberately excluded in the covariate set used for modelling (early)
retirement. The strategy used in this Chapter (and Chapter 4) relies on as-
suming individuals are missing at random conditional on controlling for factors
which are likely to correlated to non-response i.e. selection on observables and
unobservables. Fitzgerald et al. (1998) note that for this approach to work
there exist variables which are available in the dataset which are deliberately
excluded from the information set used to predict the outcome of interest.
This is commonly referred to as the conditional independence assumption. By
assuming conditional independence then consistent estimates can be derived
using the inverse of the probability of observation. This is true even when
the excluded covariates (instruments) are not included in the model for the
outcome of interest, even if they are endogenous (Jones et al. 2010).
We assume non-response is a function of: accuracy of interviewee response
to work and pension questions; accuracy of interviewee response to income and
asset questions; household net nancial wealth; calendar quarter and year of
interview; whether has a long-standing illness and whether health will a¤ects
ability to work. We estimate a misspecication test (to detect omitted variable
bias), suitable for single equation non linear models, results suggest no evidence
of this form of misspecication 19
Denition of retirement We dene retirement as a self reported transition
from any labour force state to full retirement for which we have information
17Random e¤ects models cannot account for IPW, however in absence of any signicant
evidence of unobserved heterogeneity, we present results assuming a (preferred) complentary
log-log specication. Whilst this was possible for certain subsamples controlling for position
in the income distribution, it was not possible for the full samples.
18For the purposes of estimation we exclude individuals who have an IPW >20 due to
the sensitiveness of the hazard duration coe¢ cients of including these individuals. This only
drops 23 men and 12 women, or less than 2.5 percent of our total sample. Moreover, keeping
these individuals in our sample does not a¤ect the size and direction of the quantitative
estimates (with the exception of age coe¢ cients) signicantly.
19There was some evidence to suggest that for the case of men the model lacked predictive
power; this is due to the lack of appropriate variables available in ELSA which could be
convincingly excluded from our retirement equation and were suitable for the non response
equation. Net household nancial wealth was not statistically signicant in our preferred
retirement regression specication which included various measures of a households nancial
position such as pension wealth and income.
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regarding the month and year of retirement, conditional on being in employ-
ment at wave 1. We do not include transitions to partial retirement as we are
interested in complete detachment from the labour market. Similar to Jones
et al. (2010) we assume individuals make a single exit from the labour market
and do not allow for the possibility of unretirement. Figure 3.1 describes the
initial and potential economic status an individual can report themselves to
be in at each wave of ELSA. As noted above our stock sample in wave 1 is
explicitly comprised of individuals who are in (self) employment.
Figure 3.1: Initial and potential economic status.
Xi,t
Xj,t+1
Xj,t+2
Xj,t+3
Xj,t+4
t=1Wave 1 (2002/3)
Wave 2 (2004/5)
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Wave 4 (2008/9)
Wave 5 (2010/11)
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Where i is one of:
Employed or Self Employed
Where j is one of:
Employed
Self Employed
Unemployed
Partially Retired
Inactive
Retired
Permanently Sick or Disabled
Looking after Home or Family
Other
ELSA survey wave Economic status
The most common transition an individual makes is from (self) employ-
ment directly into retirement. For the male sample which comprises of 767
individuals (614 in employment and 153 in self employment) this route corre-
sponds to 316 out of a total 347 (91%) retirement episodes recorded. For our
female sample which contains 567 individuals (525 are in employment and 42
in self employment in wave 1) 265 out of a total 308 (86%) retirement episodes
were reported in a similar way.
3.5 Data
The sample used in this study is drawn from the English Longitudinal Study
of Ageing (ELSA). ELSA is a biennial longitudinal study aimed at investigat-
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ing changes in socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of individuals
aged 50 and over in England. The survey is a joint collaboration between the
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), University College London (UCL), National
Centre for Social Research (NCSR) and The University of Manchester. The
survey sample is drawn from the Health Survey for England (HSE), with indi-
viduals and their spouses being eligible to take part in the survey if they live in
private households in England, and were aged 50 and above on 1st March 2002.
The initial sample consisted of 11,391 core members, for a detailed description
of the data used in this chapter see Appendix 8.3.1.
We make use of waves 1-5 which cover the period 2001-2012.20 Our wave
1 stock sample consists of all (self) employed men aged between 50 and 64
(N=1818) and all (self) employed women aged between 50 and 59 (N=1,677).21
These numbers reect the number of observations in the core 1 dataset. These
are then merged with the wave 1 net nancial wealth variables dataset, pen-
sion wealth dataset. This nal wave 1 dataset is then merged with the same
information at waves 2-5. At each stage there is potential attrition, for ex-
ample when the wave 1 dataset is merged with the wave 2 core data only
2,315 individuals (1,556 males and 1,264 females) are present in both waves
of data. With each additional merge more individuals drop out of the sample,
this could be due to factors such as health or death. The sample is unbalanced
in that individuals are retained so long as they responded in at least waves
1 and 2. After the 5 datasets were merged and data was cleaned there were
787 eligible males and 567 females in the estimation sample. Appendix 8.3.2
contains summary statistics of our estimation sample.
3.5.1 Wave 3 life history data
In order to derive detailed information regarding periods of employment, un-
employment and inactivity we make extensive use of the ELSA wave 3 life
20Despite there existing an additional wave of data known as wave 0, from which the
original ELSA sample were constructed this wave of data contains little socioeconomic data
compared to wave 1 onwards.
21We exclude those individuals who are in paid employment beyond SPA, as they may be
considered systematically di¤erent from our stock sample in terms of their labour market
behaviour which is likely due to unobservable characteristics.
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history survey.22 This module uses a life history calendarto aid individuals
in accurately recalling a retrospective account of their labour market history
since leaving full time education. This includes the entry date to the labour
market and subsequently the job start and end date for each job which lasted
for a period of 6 months or more.23
The wave 3 life history data distinguishes between jobs that were full time,
part time or a mixture of the two and our measure of time spent in employ-
ment accounts for this.24 Using the life history survey we are able to construct
measures related to lifetime labour market activity. The rst measure is the
potential number of years in the labour force for a given individual this is de-
ned as: the calendar year an individual exited the labour market minus the
calendar year (s)he entered the labour market after leaving full time educa-
tion. The second measure is the actual number of years in paid employment,
dened as the sum of the duration of each individual paid job. From these two
measures it is possible to derive the proportion of the potential working life
spent in employment, dened as:
Actual number of years spent in paid employment
Potential number of years in paid employment
(3.6)
It is this proportion which is used in the modelling framework to summarise
the e¤ect of individuals lifetime employment history on (early) retirement.
Nicholls (2010) uses a similar method controlling for lifetime employment and
highlights issues related to the accuracy of such a measure due to survey design
and recall bias. Table 3.1 documents the proportion of potential working life
spent in employment by gender.
22The information pertaining to the lifetime labour market history was collected in a one-
o¤module in October 2007 immediately following eldwork of the mainstage wave 3 survey.
Therefore individuals had to appear at least (in addition to wave 1) in wave 2 and the wave
3 life history questionnaire. In practice this meant we had a balanced panel between wave 1,
2, 3 and the life history survey. Therefore potential attrition occurs at wave 4 and 5, where
66 (44 men and 22 women) and 108 (65 men and 43 women) individuals non-respond. We
control for this in various ways described in Section 3.4.
23Short term jobs dened as lasting at least three months were also recorded and accounted
for in analysis.
24If individuals respond a particular job was part time then we accounted for this as 0.5
FTE. If instead individuals responded that the job was a mixture of full time and part time
and did not give exact details when this was the case then we assume an equal split i.e. 0.75
FTE. Finally if individuals did give the dates for which they worked full time and part time
in a particular job, then these were recorded appropriately.
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Table 3.1: ELSA Wave 3 Life History Data: Proportion of working life spent
in employment.
Proportion of time spent Men (N) Women (N)
in employment
30-39.99 N/A 6
40-49.99 N/A 14
50-59.99 2 40
60-69.99 1 76
70-79.99 5 117
80-89.99 26 145
90-99.99 143 79
100 609 84
Total 787 567
Two features emerge from Table 3.1. The rst is that the majority of men
in our sample spent their entire potential labour market experience in employ-
ment. Second, it is clear the same does not hold true for females. For the par-
ticular cohort under consideration male labour market attachment is charac-
terised as being in continuous full time employment (Bozio, Emmerson, ODea
and Tetlow, 2010, 2011; Nicholls, 2010; DeWilde, 2012). Whereas female
labour attachment is observed to be more intermittent consistent with periods
spent out of the labour market possibly due to child bearing and home pro-
duction (Rosenweig and Wolpin,1980; Joshi,1998; Lundberg and Rose, 2000).
The life history le also contains information on an individuals circum-
stance between leaving school and entering their rst job, and also their eco-
nomic status between jobs.25 These potential circumstances are recorded in
Table 3.2.
We use this information in order to derive the number of counts an indi-
vidual has experienced out of the labour market in 2002 (baseline). Given the
design of the ELSA lifetime history le, we are only able to identify periods of
employment, unemployment or inactivity which are a minimum of 3 months
in length. ELSA contains only the start and end calendar year of each job,
therefore it is not possible to determine the length of job which is less than one
year (except it must have lasted at least 3 months). Hence in our model spec-
25Responses were recorded only if period out of labour market was at least three months
in length.
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Table 3.2: ELSA Wave 3 Life History Data: Transition states between jobs in
ELSA wave 3 life history survey.
State between jobs
1 unemployed & searching for a job
2 unemployed not searching for job
3 short term job (<3 months)
4 sick or disabled
5 looking after home or family
6 looking after sick/disabled relative/friend
7 retired
8 education/training
9 voluntary work
10 other - specify
Notes: Potential state between leaving school and rst job, and between all subsequent
jobs. Responses are recorded only if state lasted for minimum of three months.
ication we prefer to control for the incidence of unemployment and inactivity
episodes experienced up until 2002 (baseline). Table 3.3 describes the number
of episodes recorded out of the labour market by gender for our estimation
sample.
Table 3.3: ELSA Wave 3 Life History Data: Episodes of unemployment and
inactivity during working life.
Number of periods out of the labour market in 2002 Men Women
0 568 70
1 160 255
2 43 160
3 12 51
4 1 21
5 3 3
6 0 6
7 0 1
Table 3.3 highlights that for the majority of men who did experience any
episodes out of the labour market, it was most likely to only be one. Whereas
for female individuals most experienced at least one period out of the labour
market. Using year of birth and the retrospective work-life history it is possible
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to discern when these periods out of the labour market occurred. For men
this tended to be concentrated at younger ages in the lifecycle, around 16-30
years of age and declined gradually as individuals aged. Females exhibited
a similar pattern, however the incidence and prevalence was much higher not
only in the 16-30 and 31-40 group, but also the 41-50 group. This likely to be a
combination of periods out of the labour market due to maternity leave, caring
and domestic responsibilities, to be distinguished from episodes of involuntary
unemployment and inactivity.
Sociodemographic and economic variables
In addition to the lifetime labour market history we control for a wide range of
sociodemographic and economic characteristics available at wave 1 of ELSA.
These are listed in Table 3.4 and Appendix 8.3.3 in more detail.
The sociodemographic variables attempt to adequately control for back-
ground characteristics, which with the exception of health tend to be deter-
mined earlier on in the lifecycle.26 Similarly the economic variables inherently
capture individuals lifecycle behaviour towards the labour market, not only
through the lifetime employment, unemployment and inactivity measures, but
also through pension contributions. We supplement our information set with
detailed nancial variables using the ELSA wave 1 nancial derived variables
data provided by the IFS, in particular we control for the non-pension net
nancial wealth quintile in 2002. Net non-pension wealth is dened as the
sum of all wealth held by an individual (and, where applicable, their partner)
in nancial assets, property, other physical assets and the assets of any busi-
ness they own. It is measured net of any secured or unsecured debt including
mortgages (Crawford, Emmerson and Tetlow, 2010). By denition this mea-
sure of wealth does not include pension wealth. The quintiles are dened as
splitting the cross section at wave 1 into ve groups (of equal size and without
accounting for equivalisation) from poorest to richest. 27 We also make use of
detailed information from the wave 1 pension derived variables dataset, also
made available by the IFS.28 We control for the present value of total pension
26The majoirty of these variables were coded as dummy variables.
27For more information see Oldeld (2005).
28For more information on how these variables are derived see Banks et al. (2005).
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Table 3.4: Covariate information set used in retirement regression.
Sociodemographic variables
Marital status
Education level
Social class
Lifetime ill health (prior to the age of 50)
Self reported health
Housing tenure
Economic variables
Employment status of spouse
Presence of an employer pension
Presence of a private pension
Self employed pension
Financial planning horizon
Proportion of time spent in employment
Count of instances out of labour market
Log value household income
Log present value of individual total pension wealth
Log present value of spouses total pension wealth
Net non-pension wealth quintile
Notes: For each covairate, denition and description can be found in Appendix 8.3.3
Education level refers to highest level of attainment: Degree (minimum 16 years full time
education); Above A level below degree level (Between 14 and 15 years full time
education); A level (14 years full time education).
wealth in 2002, dened as the sum of the present value of private, occupational
and state pension payments.29
We control for the labour force participation status of the spouse, which
is likely to a¤ect the individuals own retirement decision (Schirle, 2008), and
also for the spouses pension wealth. Given the cohort under consideration it
is likely that in the case of females their husbands pension wealth is likely to
a¤ect their retirement decision, however it is unlikely this relationship holds
vice versa (Johnson, 2004).
29These are derived assuming individuals work until SPA.
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3.6 Results.
In this section we present plots of non-parametric survival curves which de-
scribe the proportion of individuals retiring at a particular age, depicted by
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 for men and women respectively. We go onto formally
present estimation results rst by gender and then also conditional upon quin-
tile position in the 2002 ELSA income distribution (for information on how
this was derived see Oldeld, 2009).
3.6.1 Survivor functions for full ELSA sample by gender
Figure 3.2: Male survivor curve full sample aged 60-64 in 2002.
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Figure 3.2 plots the survivor function dened as the probability of surviving
up to a given age for our sample of men.30 The sample used to plot Figure
3.2 is all men suitable for estimation purposes (N = 787) and similarly for
females (N = 587) in Figure 3.3. It is clear that the survival probability
decreases signicantly around SPA. What is also clear is that a signicant
proportion of the sample retired; by age 64, 30% of our sample had already
exited the labour market. Starting from age 60 (which coincides with the SPA
for females) the survival probability falls sharply until around age 66, after
which point it continues to decline at a slower rate.
30The vertical grey bars at each age denote 90% condence bands for the survivor function.
The survivor functions shown here are not actuarially adjusted, in order to allow for the
possibility of nonuniform retirements within an interval. If we assume this assumption does
not hold, Figures 3.2 and 3.3 change very little.
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A similar pattern emerges for women, the survival probability decreases
signicantly at or around SPA. Relative to men fewer women in our sample
retired early. At age 59 around 15% of our sample had retired early, from age
60 onwards the survival probability decreases signicantly at a constant rate
over the entire age range.31
Figure 3.3: Female survivor curve full sample aged 50-59 in 2002.
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The relationships described in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 are likely to be due to
a combination of factors. Institutional factors which are related to age govern
eligibility for occupational/state pension receipt. Socioeconomic factors such
as individuals marginal value of leisure, which is likely to be correlated with
that of their spouse mean retirement can be viewed a strategic game (Schirle,
2008; Disney, Ratcli¤e & Smith, 2010). This would explain the relatively
smaller proportion of early retirees in our female sample who continue to work
past SPA and coordinate their retirement decisions with their husbands. This
is seen in Figure 3.3 where the survival probability is declining or alternatively
the hazard of retirement is highest, between the ages of 60 and 65 which reects
the o¢ cial SPA of women and men in the UK for the majority of the sample
period.
31This may also be due to institutional factors, such as if the female spouse chose to pay
a reduced level of NI contributions, known as the half stampwhich did not contribute to
her Basic State Pension (BSP). In doing so would make her more reliant on her husbands
BSP for income during retirement, and hence may lead to her staying on in work until her
spouse was eligible to claim BSP.
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3.6.2 Estimation Results
Results for the male sample
Table 3.5 presents estimation results based on our preferred specication for
the full sample, assuming a parametric gamma mixture distribution suitably
summarises individual level unobserved heterogeneity.32 If instead of assuming
a parametric distribution such as gamma summarised individual level unob-
served heterogeneity and we instead believed unobservables were better char-
acterised by a non-parametric distribution composed of mass points then in
the context of a duration framework this would lead to the specication rst
proposed by Heckman and Singer (1984). Such a feature is advantageous in
that it leads to a exible parameterisation of heterogeneity however may lead
to issues of convergence (Jones et al., 2012).
If we assume two mass points (1,-1) and associated probabilities of (0.3,0.3)
then we also nd some evidence of unobserved heterogeneity (see appendix
8.3.6). On balance we nd little di¤erence in the quantitative and qualitative
estimates assuming a parametric approach such as proposed by Meyer (1990)
or non-parametric approach such as Heckman-Singer (1984); further the latter
requires a priori knowledge of the true number of mass points and associated
probabilities.
In light of the implications of Nicoletti and Rondinelli (2010), we choose
to model the retirement decision assuming a parametric distribution is cor-
rect. We test model specication (in terms of alternative specications of the
information set) using AIC/BIC tests in order to reect both exibility in
the duration dependence and a parsimonious information set. In addition we
test for omitted variable bias suitable for single equation non linear models
(Pregibon, 1980) and nd no evidence of this form of misspecication.
Estimates of the age gradient suggest the hazard of retirement increases
with age and peaks at SPA. Regarding the income and wealth variables; results
suggest ceterus paribus higher levels of log household income at wave 1 raised
32In order to estimate the model the panel is redened in order to have a single row for
each period at risk, for each individual. Hence the number denotes the number of person
years for each individual in the sample and hence is much larger than the total number of
actual retirement episodes (of the 887 male individuals in our estimation sample we observed
348 or 39.2% to retire over the sample period).
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the retirement hazard, whereas higher levels of log non-pension wealth had
no signicant e¤ect on the hazard hazard of retirement. In terms of pension
wealth our results suggest higher levels of log pension wealth are positively
related to the hazard of retirement, similarly those individuals who reported
contributing to an employer pension in 2002 are signicantly more likely to
retire (relative to those who only contributed to a state pension). This is likely
to be due to individuals with higher levels of pension wealth being concentrated
in professional occupations which were more likely to o¤er a Dened Benet
(DB) pension scheme. Whilst a males own pension wealth seemed to play a
role in his retirement decision, an alternative specication of the model below
was to include his spouses pension value, however this did not seem to have
a signicant e¤ect in raising his own hazard of retirement.
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Table 3.5: Male discrete time hazard model estimates (full sample).
Variable  () Pr > jZj
Age  54 0.02(0:01) 0.00
55Age 56 0.83(0:03) 0.00
57Age 58 0.89(0:28) 0.70
59Age 60 3.47(0:89) 0.00
61Age 62 5.06(1:37) 0.00
63Age64 10.18(3:04) 0.00
65Age66 52.48(20:73) 0.00
67Age72 42.39(22:99) 0.00
2nd Household non-pension wealth quintile 1.31(0:50) 0.48
3rd Household non-pension wealth quintile 1.05(0:42) 0.90
4th Household non-pension wealth quintile 1.08(0:44) 0.84
5th Household non-pension wealth quintile 1.08(0:45) 0.85
Log household income 1.27(0:13) 0.01
Log pension wealth 1.47(0:20) 0.00
1 episode out of labour market 0.81(0:21) 0.42
2+ episodes out of labour market 0.51(0:19) 0.07
50-84% of potential labour market experience in work 3.91(2:18) 0.01
85-99% of potential labour market experience in work 1.28(0:36) 0.38
Married 0.52(0:17) 0.04
Divorced 0.39(0:15) 0.01
Widowed 0.57(0:30) 0.28
Spouse in employment 1.12(0:16) 0.44
Degree 1.47(0:31) 0.07
Above A level/ Below degree level 0.97(0:19) 0.90
A level 0.93(0:23) 0.78
Baseline health: Fair 1.57(0:31) 0.02
Baseline health: Poor 4.54(2:54) 0.00
1 episode of poor health before age 50 1.06(0:13) 0.80
2 episodes of poor health before age 50 2.45(1:21) 0.07
3+ episodes of poor health before age 50 0.20(0:23) 0.16
Mortgage 0.93 (0:15) 0.63
Rent 0.72 (0:25) 0.34
Free rent 1.43 (0:93) 0.58
Employer pension 1.57 (0:33) 0.02
Private pension 0.92 (0:20) 0.69
Self employment pension 1.20 (1:31) 0.87
Professional or managerial occupation 0.85 (0:22) 0.54
Technical non manual or manual occupation 0.85 (0:20) 0.50
Long term nancial planning horizon 1.03 (0:20) 0.87
Medium term nancial planning horizon 1.94 (0:18) 0.75
Gamma variance 0.47 0.10
LR test of gamma variance = 0 3.05016 0.040365
Number of person-years observations33 47530
Number of non retirement episodes34 47182
Number of retirement episodes35 348
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The lifetime labour market variables relating to unemployment and inac-
tivity tend to a¤ect the hazard of retirement in a similar way have hence we
group these together. Relative to experiencing no episodes (of unemployment
or inactivity) out of the labour market, experiencing one episode reduces the
hazard of retirement by 19%, whereas experiencing two or more episodes re-
duces the hazard by 49%. However in the specication which includes spouses
pension wealth, the size of this e¤ect increases substantially (38% and 62% re-
spectively) and are statistically signicant. Periods out of the labour market
are likely to a¤ect the number of qualifying years an individual must spend
in employment in order to make su¢ cient national insurance contributions to
qualify for a full Basic State Pension (BSP). Prior to April 2010 in order for a
male to retire he must have made at least 44 years of NI contributions, in this
context one would expect that episodes of unemployment or inactivity would
tend to reduce the retirement hazard.
Conditional on controlling for episodes out of the labour market, Table
3.5 indicates those with a lower proportion of time spent in employment are
more likely to retire. Those individuals who have spent between 50% and 84%
of their potential time in employment are three times more likely to retire,
relative to those who spent all their potential life in employment. This could
be due to disengagement with the labour market leading to worklessness and
retirement, for example due to macro factors such as recessions specically
a¤ecting older workers (Dorn & Sousa-Poza, 2010), or lack of appropriate
active labour market policies (Maes, 2013). This is particularly true for the
ELSA sample which experienced economic downturns in the 1970s and 1980s,
the latter particularly a¤ected primary industry sectors with higher levels of
union coverage. More generally lower proportions of time spent in potential
in employment is more likely to lead to (early) retirement and poverty in
retirement (Maes, 2013; DeWilde, 2012). 36
Table 3.5 indicates episodes of poor baseline and lifetime health increases
the hazard of retirement of men. Relative to having good or excellent baseline
36An alternative specication which took into account the calender time in the individuals
lifecourse at which the event occured (broken down into broad age groups), could not be
used due to the relatively large number potential combinations and lack of variation in the
data. However for those groups which were estimated the size and direction of the e¤ect
was similar to the count measure.
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health, the retirement hazard for those individuals who had poor health was
four-fold higher. Similarly relative to experiencing no episodes of bad health
prior the age of 50, those who experienced two or more were more than twice
as likely to retire.
We include a comprehensive set of measures to control for sociodemographic
characteristics. Those with higher educational attainment tend to be more
likely to retire, relative to having CSE level or below qualications the hazard
of retirement is 26% higher for those with a degree. Those with a wife employed
in the labour market are no more likely to retire. However that is not say
spouses play no role in the retirement decision, if an individual reports being
married the hazard of retirement is lowered by 26% compared to those who are
single. In terms of housing tenure the hazard of retirement does not seem to
systematically di¤er between those who own their home outright, relative to
those who do not. Similarly there does not seem to be any systematic di¤erence
in the retirement hazard depending on the nancial planning horizon. Figure
3.4 denotes the probability of retirement at specic ages for individuals in our
sample (over the observation period).
Figure 3.4: Hazard of retirement for men aged between 53 and 72.
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Notes: Hazard estimated at the mean of each individuals covariates in our sample as-
suming a piecewise constant specication.
There are relatively few retirements observed in our sample for those in
their early 50s, this is reected in the estimated hazard coe¢ cient. However
the drop in probability at ages 55 and 56 is potentially an outlier and warrants
further investigation. It is clear the predicted hazard of retirement is very close
to or equal to one for ages 57-72. As individuals approach SPA the hazard
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of retirement increases signicantly as reected in the retirement hazards in
Table 3.4, which when combined with the individuals mean of their covariate
information set leads to a predicted retirement hazard at or very close to one.
Results for the female sample
Table 3.6 presents estimation results which account for unobserved hetero-
geneity. The specication assumes individual specic variation which follows
a gamma mixture distribution. In terms of the duration dependence the di-
rection and trend is as anticipated, as individuals approach SPA the hazard
of retirement increases however the estimated coe¢ cients are smaller in mag-
nitude than expected (this seems to be driven by those aged 60 and over, see
Section 3.6.4). A signicant proportion continue to work past SPA, perhaps
to coincide retirement with their spouse. This is reected in the female sur-
vivor function in Figure 3.5 and also in the hazard estimates of the duration
dependence in Table 3.6, which tend to increase as females age beyond their
own SPA.
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Table 3.6: Female discrete time hazard model estimates (full sample).
Variable  () Pr > jZj
Age53 0.00 (0:00) 0.00
54Age55 0.01 (0:01) 0.00
56Age57 0.02 (0:03) 0.01
58Age59 0.04 (0:07) 0.04
60Age61 0.25 (0:40) 0.39
62Age63 0.40 (0:65) 0.57
64Age65 1.05 (1:81) 0.99
66Age68 1.67 (3:26) 0.81
2nd Household non-pension wealth quintile 0.75 (0:34) 0.52
3rd Household non-pension wealth quintile 1.03 (0:48) 0.94
4th Household non-pension wealth quintile 0.73 (0:34) 0.50
5th Household non-pension wealth quintile 1.05 (0:49) 0.92
Log household income 1.00 (0:13) 0.98
Log pension wealth 1.02 (0:11) 0.79
1 episode out of labour market 0.39 (0:23) 0.10
2+ episodes out of labour market 0.36 (0:22) 0.09
20-49% of potential labour market experience in work 1.06 (0:67) 0.92
50-65% of potential labour market experience in work 0.97 (0:39) 0.94
65-80% of potential labour market experience in work 1.20 (0:43) 0.62
80-95% of potential labour market experience in work 1.24 (0:43) 0.54
Married 1.99 (1:10) 0.22
Divorced 1.06 (0:58) 0.91
Widowed 2.99 (2:02) 0.10
Spouse in employment 1.40 (0:31) 0.13
Degree 0.44 (0:16) 0.02
Above A level/ Below degree level 1.36 (0:43) 0.33
A level 1.06 (0:35) 0.84
Baseline health: Fair 1.86 (0:54) 0.03
Baseline health: Poor 0.79 (0:55) 0.74
1 episode of poor health before age 50 1.05 (0:31) 0.87
2 episodes of poor health before age 50 0.62 (0:35) 0.40
3+ episodes of poor health before age 50 2.33 (1:80) 0.27
Mortgage 0.87 (0:21) 0.56
Rent 6.77e-07 (0:01) 0.85
Free rent 0.79 (0:36) 0.62
Employer pension 1.33 (0:33) 0.24
Private pension 0.547 (0:22) 0.13
Self employment pension 6.49e-07 (7:11e  06) 0.19
Professional or managerial occupation 2.60 (1:48) 0.09
Technical non manual or manual occupation 1.57 (0:36) 0.05
Long term nancial planning horizon 0.92 (0:25) 0.75
Medium term nancial planning horizon 1.07 (0:26) 0.77
Gamma variance 1.37 0.59
LR test of gamma variance = 0 3.96 0.023163
Number of person-years observations 33970
Zero outcomes 33622
Non zero outcomes 348
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Household income nor quintile position in the non-pension wealth distribu-
tion, seem to play a signicant role in the retirement decision of women. This
is also true for log pension wealth these results are likely to be due to cohort
e¤ects for this particular group, who were not likely to be the main bread-
winner in the household (Hotz & Miller, 1988; Blundell et al., 2006). This
is supported in alternative specications which control for husbands pension
wealth, and indicate this covariate played a statistically signicant role in the
wives retirement decision (not shown).
Those females who contributed to an employer pension (which can be drawn
down prior to SPA) were more likely to retire however this a¤ect was not
statistically signicant. Whereas contributing to a private/personal pension
tended to lower the hazard of retirement even though the drawdown age is
similar to that of an employer pension.
Turning to lifetime labour market factors, conditional on controlling pro-
portion of time spent in employment periods out of the labour market tend to
reduce the hazard of retirement. Experiencing one episode out of the labour
market (relative to experiencing none), reduces the retirement hazard by 61
percent, whilst having two or more reduces the hazard by 64 percent. It is
likely a large proportion of our sample females took time out of the labour
market (in addition to reasons relating to inactivity and unemployment) due
to maternity leave, caring responsibilities and home production. In terms of
the proportion of time spent in employment relative to the base group (spend-
ing 95% or more the potential labour market time in employment), the hazard
of retirement is not signicantly higher for those who have spent less of their
potential labour market experience in employment. Again this is likely to be
due to cultural factors associated with this cohort of females, which would
mean that less time spent in employment is unlikely to a¤ect the retirement
decision of females.
In terms of female lifetime health those who experienced episodes of poor
health were more likely to retire however the e¤ect was statistically signicant.
There is some evidence that poorer baseline health was positively related to
the retirement hazard, compared to those with good or excellent health, the
hazard of retirement for those with fair health was nearly twice as high.
Finally background sociodemographic and educational characteristics seem
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to play some a role in the retirement decision for women. There is some evi-
dence of a gradient in education which suggests more highly educated females
are signicantly less likely to retire, having a degree lowers the hazard of re-
tirement by 57%, relative to having CSE or below. However those individuals
with a degree were on average younger in wave 1 and given our stock sample
only contained those in employment, in terms of incidence of retirement for
this group it was similar to those with lower educational attainment over the
sample period. Having a husband in employment raises the hazard of retire-
ment. More generally the presence of a (deceased) spouse acts to raise the
retirement hazard relative to being single. Similar to men housing tenure nor
nancial planning horizon play an important role in the retirement decision
for females. Figure 3.6 plots the probability of retirement using the model
estimates from Table 3.6 for our sample of females.
Figure 3.5: Hazard of retirement for women aged between 50 and 68.
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Notes: Hazard estimated at the mean of each individuals covariates in our sample as-
suming a piecewise constant specication.
Similar to the survivor function in Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5 shows a sharp
increase in the probability of retirement at female SPA and beyond.37 Females
may wish to work past SPA and coordinate their retirement with that of their
spouse due to complementarities in leisure. A recent IFS report (Cribb et
al., 2013) showed that the labour supply e¤ect of increasing the female SPA
in the UK by one year from 60 to 61, increased the female labour supply
by 7.2 percentage points and their husbands labour supply also rose, by 4.2
37For the purposes of estimating retirement probabilities in Figure 3.5, we assume the
value of the gamma variance is set equal to zero.
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percentage points.
3.6.3 Variation across the income distribution
In modelling retirement it is important to consider the potential heterogeneity
in retirement behaviour conditional upon position in the income distribution.
We split our sample based on the quintile position in the 2002 income distribu-
tion when all individuals are in employment, and highlight the main di¤erences
between the full sample and sub-sample estimation results. The cumulative
e¤ect of decisions made earlier in the lifecycle regarding education, employ-
ment, marital status and to some extent health will in turn inuence income
and wealth position by the time individuals are approaching retirement age
(Mirer, 1979). Therefore we run each of the main specications for two sub-
samples (by gender), the rst on the bottom three and the latter on the top
two income quintiles. Given we nd no evidence of unobserved heterogeneity
for either gender, Appendices 8.3.7-8.3.8 present estimates from our preferred
specication which assumes a Gaussian distributed error, and also controls for
attrition using IPW.38 In the male sample there are 195 individuals in the
bottom three quintiles, and 592 in the top two income quintiles, whilst for
women there number is 172 and 407 respectively. This highlights that those
individuals who were in the top two income quintiles in wave 1 were more
likely to remain in the sample, this underlines the importance of controlling
for non-random selection assuming IPW correctly control for retention.
Results for male sample
Bottom three income quintiles (Appendix 8.3.7) Relative to the full
sample the pattern and direction of duration dependence is the same for those
in the bottom three income quintiles. However the hazard of retirement is
higher for ages 60.39 For those in the bottom three income quintiles there does
seem to be evidence of a gradient in education (which on average is lower than
that of the top two income quintiles), those with lower levels of education are
38We do not control for non pension nancial wealth quintile in these specications given
the lack of variation in the data for particular subgroups, combined with the collinearity
between income and wealth quintile.
39These are likely to be sensitive to the relatively small sample size.
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more likely to retire.
There seems little evidence of a gradient in baseline health, however the
hazard of retirement (relative to being in good or excellent health) is higher
for those with fair or poor health. In terms of lifetime health similar to the
full sample experiencing more episodes of bad health prior to the age of 50
acts to raise the retirement hazard. There is a strong e¤ect on lowering the
retirement hazard for this group if they are married, divorced or widowed
(relative to being single). Whilst household income or individuals pension
wealth do not a¤ect the retirement decision in a signicant way, similar to
the full sample higher levels of these variables raise the hazard of retirement.
In contrast to the full sample those individuals who had an employer pension
were more likely to retire, the hazard was 62% higher relative to those who
had just a state pension.
Top two income quintiles (Appendix 8.3.8) For this subsample the pat-
tern and direction of duration dependence is very similar to the full sample,
however the coe¢ cient estimates are signicantly lower compared to the bot-
tom three income quintiles. There does not seem to be as stronger role for
poor health prior to the age of 50. However baseline health seems to a¤ect the
retirement hazard, relative to being in good or excellent health the hazard of
retirement for those individuals who are in poor health is three times higher.
Pension wealth and (to a lesser extent) household income have a signicant af-
fect on the retirement hazard for this group. Similar to the full sample episodes
out of the labour market lower the hazard of retirement, relative to the base
group the hazard of retirement for those who experience two or more episodes
out of the labour market is 50% lower. As to is the e¤ect of the proportion of
time spent in employment, those with lower levels are much more likely to re-
tire relative to those who spent all their potential time in employment. Similar
to the males in the bottom three quintiles those who are married or divorced
tend to be less likely to retire, relative to those who are single. Contributing
to an employer pension signicantly raised the hazard of retirement.
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Results for female sample
Bottom three income quintiles (Appendix 8.3.9) The pattern and di-
rection of the age coe¢ cient estimates on the hazard of retirement follow a
similar pattern to the full sample, however the estimates are smaller in mag-
nitude and more of the age dummies (particularly at ages 65 and above) are
signicant. Lower retirement hazards may reect the credit or nancial con-
straints faced by these individuals and this may lower the hazard of retirement.
The e¤ect of the lifetime labour market variables seem to a¤ect this par-
ticular group di¤erently to those of the full sample, namely, periods out of
the labour market due to unemployment or inactivity tend to increase the re-
tirement hazard. Relative to the experiencing no episodes out of the labour
market, the hazard of retirement for those females who experience one episode
or two or more is 96% and 79% higher respectively. Whilst in the main sample
there seemed to be little evidence of any gradient in the proportion of time
spent in employment, for those in the bottom three income quintiles those
who spend a lower proportion of their time in employment are less likely to
retire. Relative to spending 95% or more the potential labour market time
in employment, the hazard of retirement for those who spent between 20%
and 49% of their potential working life in employment is 79% lower. Similar
to the full sample poor baseline health raises the hazard of retirement, whilst
the qualitative e¤ect of lifetime health act in a similar way. In contrast to
the full sample higher levels of household income raised the retirement hazard,
whereas there is no clear e¤ect on the way in which baseline pension wealth
a¤ected the retirement decision.
Top two income quintiles (Appendix 8.3.10) In contrast to the bottom
three income quintiles episodes out of the labour market signicantly lower the
hazard of retirement. Relative to having no time out, having one or two more
episodes out of the labour markets reduces the hazard of retirement by around
one-half. Similarly whilst for the bottom three income quintiles spending a
lower fraction of potential time in employment tended to reduce the hazard of
retirement which may imply individuals could not a¤ord to retire, for those
in the top two income quintiles it acted to signicantly raise it (relative to
females with 95% or more potential labour market experience in employment).
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It may be that wealthier females in this cohort were the rst to be given the
opportunity to develop long term successful careers associated with strong
labour force attachment .The education variables support this view, relative
to having CSE level or below qualication, the retirement hazard for those
with a degree was 50% lower and statistically signicant. We also nd social
class e¤ects, these indicate ceterus paribus the hazard of retirement for those
who are in professional or technical occupations relative to those who are
unskilled is 171% and 58% higher respectively. A nal di¤erence between the
two groups is the way in which spousal employment a¤ects retirement. For
women in the bottom three income quintiles it acted to reduce the hazard of
retirement by around 40%, whereas for women with a spouse in employment
in the top two income quintiles it raises the hazard of retirement by 55%, one
possible explanation could be that the former group face credit constraints or
may simply be unable to a¤ord to retire.
3.6.4 Estimation results: Early retirements
In this section we consider the way in which sociodemographic and economic
characteristics (in particular lifetime labour market variables), a¤ect the haz-
ard of early retirement of men and women. We do not include separate esti-
mation results conditional on income quintile as we did for the full panel as
we do not have su¢ cient sample size (in terms of retirement episodes) for a
step function in the baseline hazard. However we do control for position in the
income quintile in the information set. In the case of early retirement there
is no signicant evidence of unobserved heterogeneity for the male sample,
whilst there is for the female sample. This warrants modelling the unobserved
error in the retirement equation di¤erently conditional on gender. In the case
of males similar to the subsample analysis by income quintile, we assume a
Gaussian distributed error and control for attrition bias using inverse proba-
bility weights. Whilst for women we assume a gamma mixture distribution to
summarise individual level unobserved heterogeneity.
Following Jones et al. (2010) we dene early retirement as a transition into
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self reported retirement prior to SPA (65 for men and 60 for women).40 41
The empirical prevalence of early retirement is substantial as shown in Figures
3.2 and 3.3, and underlines the important of investigating the determinants of
early retirement.
Men
The step function in age for the sample of early retired men is similar in trend
and direction to the full sample. Table 3.7 indicates there is no gradient in
the baseline income quintile position and the estimates were not statistically
signicant. Relative to the main sample both household income and pension
wealth play a stronger role in the retirement decision of men. Higher levels of
both these variables are positively related to the hazard of early retirement.
Those individuals who contribute to an employer pension are more likely to
retire early, relative to those who contribute to only a state pension. Employer
pension schemes do allow members to start drawing down on their pension well
before reaching SPA. The 2002 Pensions Green Paper proposed a rise in the
minimum eligibility age from 50 to 55 which came into e¤ect in April 2004,
however this is still ten years below the SPA of males (six for females).
40Individuals are right censored on reaching 65 (men) and 60 (women) and had not retired,
these individuals no longer contribute to the likelihood function.
41Given the female SPA was raised by one month from the current level (60 years of age)
in 2010, for each calender month born after April 1950 and the sample period covered up
until 2011. Whilst we do not have date of birth information, we can crudely approximate
year of birth, and nd we have 159 individuals in our sample who are born after 1950. For
these individuals the SPA would have been approximately 61/62 years of age, thus strictly
speaking early retirement would have included age 60/61 for these individuals. However we
estimate specications for with and without this sample and nd both quantitatively and
qualitatively the results are similar.
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Table 3.7: Male early retired estimation results.
Variable  () Pr > jZj
Age  54 0.15 (0:01) 0.00
55Age 56 0.80 (0:26) 0.00
57Age 58 0.66 (0:36) 0.44
59Age 60 3.25 (1:78) 0.03
61Age 62 5.64 (3:11) 0.00
63Age64 9.18 (4:93) 0.00
2nd Household non-pension wealth quintile 1.70 (0:80) 0.26
3rd Household non-pension wealth quintile 1.09 (0:51) 0.85
4th Household non-pension wealth quintile 0.77 (0:33) 0.54
5th Household non-pension wealth quintile 0.95 (0:48) 0.92
Log household income 1.92 (0:41) 0.00
Log pension wealth 1.34 (0:17) 0.02
1 episode out of labour market 0.78 (0:23) 0.39
2+ episodes out of labour market 0.56 (0:25) 0.18
50-84% of potential labour market experience in work 3.83 (2:08) 0.01
85-99% of potential labour market experience in work 1.06 (0:32) 0.83
Married 0.99 (0:40) 0.98
Divorced 0.92 (0:61) 0.91
Widowed 0.86 (0:58) 0.83
Spouse in employment 1.01 (0:19) 0.97
Degree 1.28 (0:45) 0.46
Above A level/ Below degree level 1.06 (0:40) 0.87
A level 1.45 (0:82) 0.51
Baseline health: Fair 1.03 (0:24) 0.89
Baseline health: Poor 3.99 (1:97) 0.00
1 episode of poor health before age 50 1.04 (0:25) 0.85
2 episodes of poor health before age 50 1.58 (0:82) 0.38
3+ episodes of poor health before age 50 omitted
Mortgage 0.86 (0:19) 0.49
Rent 0.60 (0:23) 0.18
Free rent 1.18 (0:81) 0.81
Employer pension 1.58 (0:49) 0.14
Private pension 0.68 (0:26) 0.30
Self employment pension 0.78 (0:91) 0.83
Professional or managerial occupation 0.94 (0:45) 0.90
Technical non manual or manual occupation 1.51 (0:51) 0.22
Long term nancial planning horizon 1.75 (0:43) 0.02
Medium term nancial planning horizon 1.36 (0:35) 0.24
Number of person-years observations 47272
Zero outcomes 47048
Non zero outcomes 224
Wald chi2(40) 2484.57
Pr > chi2 0.00
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The e¤ect of lifetime labour market variables is also similar in both direc-
tion and magnitude to the full sample, namely experiencing periods out of the
labour market due to unemployment or inactivity acts to reduce the hazard
of retirement. Conditional on this, an individual who spends between 50 and
84% of their potential lifetime career in employment, raises their hazard of
early retirement three-fold relative to an individual who did not experience
any episodes out of the labour market. In terms of the magnitude only poor
baseline health has a quantitatively comparable e¤ect.
Similar to the full sample health seems to play an important role. Relative
to reporting being in good or excellent health, the hazard of early retirement
was three-fold higher for those individuals who reported being in poor health.
In addition to baseline health, experiencing episodes of poor health during ones
lifetime also had a detrimental e¤ect on staying in the labour market. Relative
to experiencing no episodes of bad health, the hazard of early retirement for
those individuals who experienced two episodes of poor health prior to the age
of 50 was 57% higher relative to an individual who experienced none.
In terms of background sociodemographic characteristics the main di¤er-
ences (as compared to the full sample estimation results) relate to there being
no e¤ect of marital status on the hazard of early retirement. Additionally,
estimates from Table 3.7 suggest the hazard of early retirement is higher for
individuals who have a medium (between three and ve years) or long term
(more than ve years) nancial planning horizon relative to those with a short
term nancial planning horizon.
Women
The gradient in the hazard of early retirement increases as females age albeit
the coe¢ cient estimates are signicantly higher. Relative to the full sample es-
timation results Table 3.8 indicates there is no gradient in the baseline income
quintile position. Having a higher level of pension wealth lowers the hazard of
early retirement, whereas there does not seem to be a signicant role for house-
hold income. Similarly contributing to a private pension lowers the hazard of
early retirement however this was not statistically signicant at conventional
levels. In contrast to previous results an employer pension acted to raise the
hazard of retirement but again this e¤ect was not statistically signicant; this
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is likely to be related to eligibility ages on employer pensions which despite
having been raised in recent times remain signicantly lower than SPA (Green
paper, 2002).
Table 3.8: Female early retired estimation results
Variable  () Pr > jZj
Age53 0.03 (0:00) 0.00
54Age55 2.92 (0:02) 0.26
56Age57 13.02 (11:71) 0.00
58Age59 39.18(35:40) 0.00
2nd Household non-pension wealth quintile 0.94(0:73) 0.94
3rd Household non-pension wealth quintile 1.23(1:00) 0.80
4th Household non-pension wealth quintile 0.57(0:47) 0.50
5th Household non-pension wealth quintile 1.46(1:19) 0.64
Log household income 0.96(0:19) 0.83
Log pension wealth 0.73(0:09) 0.01
1 episode out of labour market 0.11(0:08) 0.00
2+ episodes out of labour market 0.09(0:07) 0.00
20-49% of potential labour market experience in work 1.61(1:53) 0.62
50-65% of potential labour market experience in work 0.51(0:36) 0.35
65-80% of potential labour market experience in work 1.28(0:77) 0.68
80-95% of potential labour market experience in work 1.12(0:65) 0.85
Married 1.02(0:81) 0.98
Divorced 0.47(0:39) 0.37
Widowed 1.12(1:11) 0.91
Spouse in employment 2.10(0:76) 0.04
Degree 0.47(0:26) 0.18
Above A level/ Below degree level 2.26(1:07) 0.08
A level 1.24(0:65) 0.68
Baseline health: Fair 1.71(0:74) 0.21
Baseline health: Poor 0.75(0:74) 0.76
1 episode of poor health before age 50 1.25(0:59) 0.63
2 episodes of poor health before age 50 0.06(0:09) 0.06
3+ episodes of poor health before age 50 2.84(3:19) 0.35
Mortgage 0.50(0:18) 0.05
Rent 3.67e 07(0:01) 0.68
Free rent 0.26(0:20) 0.08
Employer pension 1.67(0:61) 0.16
Private pension 0.57(0:34) 0.35
Self employment pension 6.87e-07(0:01) 0.91
Professional or managerial occupation 1.44(1:50) 0.72
Technical non manual or manual occupation 2.01(0:77) 0.07
Long term nancial planning horizon 0.46(0:20) 0.07
Medium term nancial planning horizon 0.53(0:21) 0.11
Number of person-years observations 33970
Zero outcomes 99
Non zero outcomes 33871
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Relative to having no time out of the labour market, experiencing an
episodes out of the labour market due to inactivity or unemployment reduces
the hazard of early retirement two-fold. This e¤ect is much stronger than
the estimation results implied from Table 3.4 for the full sample. Table 3.8
shows there was no signicant e¤ect in terms of lower levels of potential labour
market experience on the hazard of early retirement.
As in the case with the full sample, lower levels of baseline health tend to
raise the hazard of early retirement. In terms of lifetime health there is some
evidence that more episodes of bad health prior to the age of 50 tend to raise
the hazard of early retirement.
Turning to sociodemographic characteristics, our ndings suggest in the
case of early retirement that higher levels of education signicantly raise the
hazard of early retirement, as does having a spouse in employment. One di¤er-
ence is that the hazard of early retirement for those individuals with a mortgage
is 50% lower relative to those who own their house outright. This is intuitive,
individuals are likely to be in employment when they have a signicant debt
to repay. A nal di¤erence is that whilst having a medium or long term nan-
cial planning horizon did not a¤ect retirement in any clear direction for the
full sample, in the case of the early retirement it tends to lower the hazard by
around 60 65% relative to those with a short term nancial planning horizon.
Diagnostics Where possible we include model specic weights following the
method of Wooldridge (2002) to control for potential attrition bias (see Ap-
pendix 8.3.12).42 Appendix 8.3.11 supplements the specications in Tables 3.6
and 3.7 with a variable addition test (Nijman and Verbeek, 1992), and nds
no evidence of particular patterns of attrition biasing our estimates.
3.7 Discussion
The results in Chapter three suggest episodes of inactivity and unemployed
tend to reduce the hazard of retirement, given both of these act in the same
direction we combine their e¤ect. This indicates that individuals who exit the
42We trim our sample marginally by exlcuding 21 individuals who had an IPW of greater
than 20. However our results are robust to including them, the main di¤erence being that
the estimated coe¢ cients on the hazard were slightly larger in magnitude.
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labour market or at least experience periods where they are not employed are
less likely to retire than those who experience no interruptions in their labour
market attachment over the lifecycle. Bozio et al. (2010, 2011) and Nicholls
(2010) using the ELSA dataset (the former is linked with administrative Na-
tional Insurance record data) investigate how lower labour attachment to the
labour force using the life history data at wave 3 (and in the former case NI
contribution records) show that those with more intermittent employment his-
tories (experienced by episodes of inactivity and unemployment) were more
likely to experience poverty in retirement. One method by which an individ-
ual can escape poverty is through paid employment, thus it is an appropriate
response for older individual with an intermittent labour supply history to
remain attached to the labour market for longer to (1) increase their ow of
income (2) increase their stock of assets and (3) ensure they have made su¢ -
cient NI contributions in order to be eligible for a full state pension when they
reach SPA. Therefore our results are not in conict with studies which have
used the ELSA dataset to investigate living standards in retirement.
We show our main result holds after controlling for gender and position
in the income distribution. The quantitative e¤ect is large, particularly for
women which could be due to having to make up for missed national insurance
contributions occurred in years related to child bearing (Pienta, 1999). The
2013 White Paper (DWP, 2013) highlighted that part of the overhaul to a
single tier pension in the UK meant that for individuals to qualify for a full
BSP they had to complete 35 years of qualifying paid work, up from the
current 30. However the proposed system does account for childbearing years
whereas the current does not. The implications of our results would be that
assuming one of the main periods spent out of the labour force for females
is for child bearing/rearing, then ceteris paribus this should in future have
a smaller e¤ect on delaying retirement particularly amongst those who face
credit constraints.
Such a policy does not support the governments aim to extend working
lives of their citizens, however may be argued as being more equitable than
current legislation. In fact prior to the current system for those individuals
who retired before 6th April 2010, men were required to work 44 (and women
39) qualifying years, in order to make su¢ cient NI contributions in order
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to qualify for a full state pension. Therefore it is intuitive that the results
from our analysis suggest time out of the labour market lowered the hazard
of (early) retirement. The extent to which periods out of the labour market
due to child bearing a¤ect retirement behaviour in the future will also depend
on the fertility rate. Recent trends in the dependency ratio have shown an in-
crease in the fertility rate after a long period in decline, partly due to shifts in
the cultural expectations of women, evidenced by the increasing numbers of fe-
males entering higher education (Heckman & Killingsworth, 1986; Universities
UK, 2013).
In terms of employment e¤ects our results suggest that individuals who
spent particularly low levels of their potential lifetime labour supply in em-
ployment were more likely to retire (early). These results do not necessarily
conict with the measure of the number of counts out of the labour market,
as they should be interpreted as being conditional on the number of periods
spent out of the labour market.43 The e¤ects tend to be stronger for the early
retirement samples and amongst men. For this particular group, relative to
not spending any time out of the labour market those individuals who spent
between 50% and 84% of their potential lifetime in the labour market were
more than three times more likely to retire early. This is not unsurprising
given that this particular cohort of men would have experienced severe reces-
sionary periods, if one implication was that this lead to a sustained reduction
in employment through a reduction in hours or even job loss, this may have
increased the possibility of worklessness, long term unemployment or early re-
tirement. The recessions of the 1970s and 1980s (particularly the latter) led
to unemployment to be concentrated in unionised sectors, traditionally pri-
mary sectors such manufacturing. Scarring e¤ects from this recession include
increased worklessness and an increased number of men claiming long term
sickness and disability, which in turn led to early retirement (Nickell, 1997).
It is possible to identify when periods out of the labour market took place in
terms of calendar time, and the evidence from our sample data suggest the
majority of these took place over recessionary periods.
Despite the average proportion of time spent in employment for women
43It is also important to recall that we are not able to control for the exact length of time
out of the labour market but only the incidence.
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being 19% lower than men (98% vs 79%), the quantitative e¤ect for the full
sample suggests proportion of time spent in employment was not statistically
important in the retirement decision of females. However for the early retire-
ment sample the proportions do seem to have an e¤ect in terms of the size
of parameter coe¢ cients. Given the cohort, it is likely these women took a
more traditional role within the household. This is supported by specications
which control for spouses pension wealth which suggest that whilst the hus-
bands pension wealth a¤ects his partners retirement decision, the opposite is
not true. Given that female labour supply over the past 30 years has increased
dramatically, it is likely future generations of this particular cohort will not
exhibit the similar behaviour in terms of retirement. For example the relative
importance of malepension wealth within a couple will decline, this is al-
ready true for changes made to the role of male state pensions (Bozio et al.,
2010). Our results for the full sample controlling for position in the income
distribution suggest the e¤ect of lower proportions of potential labour market
experience in the labour force are not identical. For those in the bottom three
income quintiles lower proportions of lifetime employment tend to reduce the
hazard of retirement, whilst for the top two income quintiles it acts to raise it
substantially.
The fact that a substantial proportion of our sample retire early is quanti-
tatively important if governments are aiming to extend labour supply at older
ages. Our results suggest; lifetime labour market history, pension wealth and
pension type, household income and baseline and lifetime health are key deter-
minants of early retirement behaviour.44 Of these, better lifetime and baseline
health, and increased participation in the labour market will keep people in
work longer.45 There has been a raft of changes in legislation in an attempt to
extend working lives and improve labour market conditions for older individ-
uals in the UK working population. The 2008 Pensions Act aimed to increase
saving for retirement particularly amongst low and middle earners by automat-
44Jones et al. 2009 nd a similar result for health and pensions.
45Increasing longevity in particular the number of healthy years, reduces the burden on
the state through staying in paid employment longer (or at least having the option to) and
avoiding disability or incapacity benets. It also lowers associated costs from use of the
the National Health Service (NHS). The 2012 Health and Social Care Act (Department of
Health, 2012) outlines the most signicant changes to the NHS to date, however it is not clear
whether there will be increased support for improving the health of the older population.
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ically enrolling employees into workplace pensions, our results suggest those
who contributed to employer pensions were more likely to retire early, however
it should be noted that given the cohort it is likely these pension schemes,
particularly DB pensions (which are being phased out) were more likely to be
available to professional occupations.
Whilst it is important to increase participation in occupational and work-
place pensions to reduce the extent of pensioner poverty, in order to extend
working lives there should also be an increase in the minimum eligibility age
at which individuals can claim their occupational pensions. At present there
is a gap of ten years (six for females) between the date a male can claim his
occupational pension and their state pension. In terms of unemployment and
inactivity (excluding retirement) the UK Conservative-Liberal Democrat coali-
tion government is in the process of overhauling the welfare system, and moving
to a system of universal creditwhich incorporates all forms of potential (in
and out of work) benets. Early reviews of the e¤ectiveness Universal Credit
and longer term measures such as the auto enrolment into employer pensions
are not available at the time of writing. Doubtless these will inuence labour
supply behaviour at older ages.
3.8 Future work
Chapter three highlights the importance of lifetime labour market history on
the retirement and early retirement decision. The analysis used a represen-
tative sample of English men and women aged 50 and over derived from the
ELSA.
A limitation of the study is due to the design of the ELSA wave 3 life history
survey, which meant it has not been possible to determine the exact length of
time spent out of the labour market due to an episode of unemployment or
inactivity, which started and nished in the same calendar year. Neither can
we identify periods out of labour market which are less than three months
in duration. In future work this could be overcome by using more detailed
life history data available from either the National Child Development Survey
1958 (NCDS, 1958) cohort data, British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and
UK Household Longitudinal Survey (UKHLS) work history les.
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Chapter three only accounts for the economic status of the spouse. Theo-
retical models and empirical evidence (Schirle, 2008; Disney, Ratcli¤e & Smith,
2010; Gustman & Steinmeier, 2010; Cribb et al., 2013) suggest there is a degree
of coordination in the timing of a couples retirement decision, due to factors
such as complementarities in leisure. Therefore future work should incorpo-
rate more information relating to the spouse, in which case it may be more
appropriate to model the retirement decision within a joint framework such as
a bivariate probit or dynamic programming model.
3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we investigated the e¤ects of lifetime employment, unemploy-
ment and inactivity episodes on the hazard of retirement. We nd these fac-
tors a¤ect the hazard of (early) retirement for both men and women across the
income distribution albeit in di¤erent ways. The retirement decision is partic-
ularly complex and is one of the most important decisions in an individuals
life. Few papers have considered the role of lifetime experiences in relation to
labour market activity on the retirement decision. Our results show given the
nature of the economic problem it is appropriate to model the decision in a
dynamic framework. In addition to lifetime labour market factors our results
show the importance of pension type and pension wealth on the retirement
decision, particularly for men. Given the cohort sample respondents in ELSA
it is likely male pension wealth accounted for a signicant proportion of to-
tal household pension wealth. Finally we show evidence to suggest that good
lifetime and current health reduce the hazard of (early) retirement consistent
with previous ndings (Jones et al., 2010).
The type and level of pension wealth play an important role in the re-
tirement decision. Policy makers have introduced a raft measures to ensure
greater savings for retirement. The 2008 and 2010 Pensions Act aim to ensure
all employees are o¤ered a workplace pension, not just those in professional
occupations. However our results suggest that further increases to the mini-
mum eligibility age on occupational pensions should reduce the hazard of early
retirement, particularly for men. In addition to occupational pensions there
has also been an overhaul of the state pension to make it more simple. Gov-
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ernment argue it will ensure greater levels of income are made available for
eligible retirees, particularly women and the self employed. However recent re-
search by the IFS (Bozio et al., 2010) highlights these benets are diminished
in the long run particularly for those born after the calender year 1986.
Spending lower levels of potential labour market experience in employment
tends to increase the hazard of retirement, irrespective of gender. Policymakers
must ensure that well structured Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) are
in place in order to help these individuals return to work relatively swiftly.
The introduction of The Work Programme in 2011, the agship ALMP of the
coalition government applicable to the majority of the UK population has yet
to be formally evaluated. We show that episodes out of the labour market
tend to reduce the hazard of retirement, particularly for women. This may be
related to missed state pension contributions, preferences for work post child
rearing or credit constraints. Our results suggest lower lifetime employment
may not only have contemporaneous e¤ects but also longer term e¤ects which
a¤ect the timing of retirement.
Chapter 4
Unretirement in England: An
Empirical Perspective.
4.1 Introduction
Ageing populations are a common characteristic shared amongst advanced
economies around the world. Increasing longevity has placed additional pres-
sure on central governments resources and in particular the Welfare State.
The 2011 Census showed 16:4% of the population was aged 65 and over (ONS,
2012b).1 This is reected in the dependency ratio dened as the number of
individuals aged over State Pension Age (SPA) relative to the working popula-
tion aged between 16 and 65, which increased from 0:3 in 1971 and without any
change in retirement legislation is forecasted to reach 0:5 by 2050 (ONS, 2010).
Put another way, in 1971 there were roughly three individuals of working age
to every one pensioner, by 2050 this is forecast to reduce by one third. In
response to this and other factors which show the detrimental e¤ects of popu-
lation ageing, the UK government has increased the Normal State Retirement
Age (NSRA) for both men and women.2
Retirement in the UK has traditionally been considered as the cessation
1Figures based on data for England and Wales.
See O¢ ce for National Statistics website: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_-
270487.pdf pp. 2.
2At present men and women are eligible to claim their state pension when they turn 65
and 61 respectively, by April 2020 this will rise to 66 for both. The UK government has also
abolished the compulsory retirement age for both men and women.
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of a career job. However, over the past thirty years individuals have altered
their labour market behaviour as they approach retirement age, for example
through phased retirement (Honig and Hanoch 1985; Ruhm 1990 and Blau
1994). The latter two studies also found that retirees re-entered the labour
market i.e. unretired.3 Starting in the 1980s a host of studies from the US
have since noted such behaviour. Gustman and Steinmeier (1984a), using the
Retirement History Survey (RHS) highlight 16:6% of their sample exhibited
unretirement behaviour.4 Subsequently Berkovec and Stern (1991), using the
National Longitudinal Survey (NSL) report re-entry rates ranging from 6:3%
to 13:2% depending on age of rst retirement. Hardy, Hayward & Liu (1994),
using the same dataset restrict attention to those who are aged 55 and over
when they rst retire, and report an unretirement rate of 10:69%.5 Hardy
(1991), using a sample of nationally representative older workers in the US
state of Florida, observes labour force re-entry rates of 6:89%.6 A common
nding amongst these studies is that younger retirees were more likely to un-
retire.
More recently Maestas (2010), using a sample of men and women from
the Health Retirement Survey (HRS) shows that more than one quarter of
sample respondents who are in employment subsequently exhibit unretirement
behaviour.7 Her ndings show of the sample that unretired 80% expected to
work post retirement, and the main motivation to unretire was that retirement
did not conform to their a priori expectations, whilst the role of nancial
3Both studies reported an identical unretirement rate of 25% using the Social Security
Administration Retirement History Longitudinal Survey (RHLS).
4Ruhm (1990) notes the signicant di¤erence between his results and that of Gustman
and Steinmeier (1984) who also use the RHLS. Ruhm (1990) concludes the discrepancy
between their results (the rst study reports unretirement rates of 24.9%, whilst the latter
reports unretirement rates of 16.6%) is due to the time window of observation. Gustman and
Steinmeier (1984) only use one and two year windows to observe re-entry, whereas Ruhm
(1990) uses a ten year window and therefore increases the probability of observing an episode
of unretirement.
5Hayward et al. dene exposure intervalswhich relates to labour force experiences for
an individual for a single year, with a full set of accompanying covariates. The authors
observe 6263 intervals and observe 670 episodes of unretirement.
6Hardy (1991) nds that 11.7% of unretireesstated they initially retired involuntarily.
7This gure increases to 35% if analysis is restricted to those individuals who rst reported
being retired at age 53 or 54.
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shocks or inadequate nancial planning had a less signicant role.89 Congdon-
Hohman (2009) using the same dataset nds similar results and highlights the
importance of private health insurance and similar to the research presented
in this chapter, uses duration analysis to model the unretirement decision.10
In contrast to analysing unretirement amongst those who are initially em-
ployed, little research has focused on re-entry into the labour market condi-
tional on being in retirement. The few which do include Larsen and Pederson
(2013), who use Danish administrative register data to show that the probabil-
ity of being in paid work post normal retirement age in Denmark is higher for:
males who own their own home, have made higher pension contributions and
are better educated. Peterrsson (2011) investigates unretirement in Sweden
using register data, and similar to Larsen and Pedrson (2013) models unretire-
ment using a static framework. Peterrsson (2011), estimates an unretirement
rate in the region of 6% to 14% depending on the denition of unretirement
and found unretirement was more common amongst: younger retirees, men,
those with a spouse in the labour force and amongst individuals with a high
level of educational attainment. Similar to Maestas (2010), the study sug-
gested unretirement was a lifecycle decision and not (in general) a response to
negative nancial shocks.
In this paper we consider unretirement in England.11 In contrast to other
papers the aim of our research is to focus on the shape of the hazard func-
tion for a sample of retired men. We use a duration approach and account
for individual level unobserved heterogeneity, to investigate the relationship
8Maestas (2010) species a pre/post retirement multinomial logit for alternative retire-
ment paths and supplements her model with expectations data. Benítex-Silva and Dwyer
(2003) formally test whether the rational expectations hypothesis hold in the HRS sample,
and conclude that on average individuals do exhibit rationality, in particular with respect to
forming retirement expectation. Their ndings are similar to those found by Mastrogiacomo
(2003) for the case of the Netherlands.
9Cahill, Giandrea & Quinn (2010) also use the HRS to analyse unretirement rates for
those who in their baseline interview were in full time career jobs. They nd that 15% of
their sample exhibit an episode of unretirement.
10The role of private healthcare is likely to be less important in the case of England due
to universal state healthcare.
11Early work regarding the British retirement experience (which mentions unretirement)
can be found in Parker (1980), 11% of his sample respondents indicated they would consider
looking for work in the future. This is despite the fact that at the time prohibitively high
taper rates existed on earnings after reaching state retirement age and claiming a state
pension (Bozio et al., 2010).
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between time spent in retirement and the hazard of moving back into paid
work. We nd a number of interesting results; similar to Peterrsson (2011), re-
tired individuals with a spouse in the labour force are signicantly more likely
to subsequently return to paid work. Therefore, despite females not unretir-
ing themselves they play a role in the unretirement decision of their husband,
this is likely to be linked to complementarities in shared leisure preferences
(Schirle, 2008; Disney, Ratcli¤e & Smith, 2010). There is no clear pattern in
the hazard of unretirement, however it does tend to be higher in the rst 5-10
years following initial retirement after which it diminishes. This is particularly
important in terms of recognising a propensity to unretire; potential policies
which encourage a return to paid work may be less e¤ective if they are too
slow acting post initial retirement.12
We nd some evidence of individuals who retire earlywhich we dene as
60 or under, as being less likely to unretire. This likely to be due to relatively
generous nancial incentives available in early retirement schemes in particu-
lar professions. Indeed our results suggest strong pension wealth e¤ects, which
act to lower the hazard of unretirement. Similar to Maestas (2010) we nd
little evidence of unexpected changes in wealth and debt, in raising the hazard
of unretirement. Similarly we nd only weak evidence of social class e¤ects,
those who self report themselves to have been in a professional or manage-
rial occupation were marginally less likely to unretire than those who were
unskilled.
Education plays a role in the unretirement decision, those individuals with
an A level or higher are more likely to unretire. Finally, individuals with a
medium term (1-3 years) and long term nancial planning horizon (3+ years)
are also signicantly more likely to unretire. Therefore, on balance it seems
unretirement is more common amongst individuals who are relatively well
educated and did not retire early, suggesting it may be linked to a preference
for work.
Using lifetime labour market history information available in ELSA, it is
possible to determine preretirement characteristics of unretired individuals.
Estimates indicate that the average annual salary in the nal main job prior
12Maestas and Li (2007) refers to this as a burnout e¤ect. Individuals retire for a short
period after their main career job due to career burnout before subsequently returning to
work.
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to retirement for our sample of unretirees was approximately £ 38,919.13 (2007
prices). Unretirement jobs themselves are similar in character to partial retire-
ment jobs, both in terms of earnings and hours of work. Taken together with
the results above, this suggests unretirement is not due to nancial constraints
nor is it a consequence of having low income during working life. Instead it is
a type of behaviour associated with those individuals who were well educated
and had a relatively well paid job prior to retirement. Given the potential
untapped economic capacity of retired men in England, these results are of
importance to policymakers in their attempt to extend working lives or in this
case incentivise a return to work.
The rest of this chapter is set out as follows: Section 4.2 contains detailed
information regarding ELSA and how we dene unretirement. Section 4.3 out-
lines the regression specication and modelling approach. Section 4.4 presents
our estimation results and tests for robustness. Section 4.5 looks at charac-
teristics of unretirees and unretirement jobs in England. Section 4.6 considers
future work. Section 4.7 concludes and considers policy implications.
4.2 Data.
4.2.1 Sample and ELSA
For a description of the ELSA dataset readers should consult the Section 3.5
in chapter 3, Appendix 8.3.1 and Appendix 8.4.1. We use the rst four waves
of data which cover the period 2001-2009 and restrict attention to male wave
1 core respondents aged between 50 and 74, who report having a retirement
month and year.13 The main reason for excluding females from the analysis is
that for this cohort, female labour supply is characterised by sustained periods
out of the labour market due to child rearing and caring responsibilities. Pre-
liminary research showed the magnitude of unretirement for this cohort was
too low for any substantive analysis to be undertaken.
We impose these age and labour market restrictions to ensure a degree of
13Despite there existing an additional wave of data known as wave 0, from which the
original ELSA sample were constructed this wave of data contains little socioeconomic data
compared to wave 1 onwards.
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homogeneity in our stock sample.14 Our aim is to investigate the unretire-
ment behaviour of only fully retired men and therefore choose not to include
partially retired individuals at wave 1 as their underlying labour market behav-
iour maybe somewhat di¤erent, additionally only a very small sample of wave
1 ELSA respondents self report themselves being in this group. After plac-
ing these sample restrictions we achieved an unbalanced panel of 857 retired
individuals. We do not allow for re-entry once an individual non-responds in
a particular wave. Appendix 8.4.1 contains information pertaining to sample
construction and summary information.
We test for attrition bias due to non-response using a variable addition
test proposed by Nijman and Verbeek (1992). Separately we also weight our
data using model specic weights following the method of Inverse Probability
Weighting (IPW) proposed byWooldridge (2002). In the models for estimating
model specic non-response weights we use a combination of sociodemographic
and survey/interviewer information available in ELSA, which are not included
in the covariate set used for modelling unretirement.15 The reason for this is
because the strategy used in this chapter relies on assuming individuals are
missing at random conditional on controlling for factors which are likely to
correlated to non-response i.e. selection on observables and unobservables.
Fitzgerald et al. (1998) note that for this approach to work there exist vari-
ables which are available in the dataset which are deliberately excluded from
the information set used to predict the outcome of interest. This is commonly
referred to as the conditional independence assumption. By assuming condi-
tional independence then consistent estimates can be derived using the inverse
of the probability of observation. This is true even when the excluded covari-
ates (instruments) are not included in the model for the outcome of interest,
even if they are endogenous (Jones et al. 2012). We assume non-response is a
function of: accuracy of interviewee response to work and pension questions,
accuracy of interviewee response to income and asset questions, household
net nancial wealth, calendar quarter and year of interview, whether respon-
dent has a long-standing illness and whether respondent feels health will a¤ect
14We cross check individuals self-reported status with weekly earnings and number of
hours worked per week.
15Future work will amend the probit model specication used in the estimation of the
inverse probability weight to reduce the variance of the distribution of attrition weight.
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ability to work.16 Appendix 8.4.3 contains estimation results from the probit
models of non-response used to estimate the IPW.
4.2.2 Denition of unretirement
Our denition of unretirement relies on observing the re-entry date to the
labour market. At each wave of the ELSA sample members are asked the
month and year of re-entry, therefore using this we can compute an unretire-
ment date based on those individuals who give a valid response (conditional
on them being in retirement and having not yet unretired). Combining this
information with the month and year of initial retirement it is possible to com-
pute the exact length of time an individual has spent in retirement before they
return to work. Under this denition 9.21 percent of our unbalanced panel
(N = 857) exhibited unretirement behaviour.
An alternative denition could be based on the number of hours reported
working in paid employment, if an individual is in receipt of a pension, or
changes in the self reported economic status across waves. What is important
for these denitions is the opportunity set available to the individual in a
particular economic state. In England it is possible to retire and defer both
state and/or private pension payments, although this is relatively uncommon
(Coleman et al., 2008). The aim of this research is to focus on the duration
spent in retirement and this is underlined by choice to focus on month and
year of labour market re-entry in our denition of unretirement. Changes in
self reported measures are at best reported biennially and therefore potentially
inaccurate, we report these next for completeness. Table 4.1 gives an overview
of potential retirement paths which feature unretirement.17
16We estimate a mispecication test (to detect omitted variable bias), suitable for single
equation models such as our non-response probit models. Results suggest no evidence of
this form of mispecication, however there was some evidence to suggest that for the case
of men the model lacked predictive power, this is due to the lack of appropriate variables
available in ELSA which could be convincingly excluded from our retirement equation and
were suitable for the non response equation.
17The ELSA questionnaire does not di¤erentiate between part-time and full-time employ-
ment in the self reported labour force status. Therefore we use number of hours reported in
paid work per week in addition to the self reported status.
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Table 4.1: Hypothetical retirement paths featuring unretirement.
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Retired! Retired! Employed! Employed
Retired! Unemployed! Employed! Retired
Retired! Retired! Retired! Unemployed
4.2.3 Alternative measures of unretirement using ELSA
Self reported labour force status denition. An alternative denition of
unretirement would be to measure the changes in self reported labour market
status across waves from retired to employed. 18 Following this denition we
estimate an unretirement rate of 5:86% for our sample of unbalanced panel
men. Whilst this is lower than the denition based on job start dates it
is likely to be due to the di¢ culty in individuals perceptions of the precise
denition of retirement, individuals reporting themselves as retired may still
engage in some form of paid work, but still consider themselves as retired
perhaps because they are claiming a state pension or social norms related to
passing the state pension age (Kohli et al., 1991). Maestas (2010) using the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) using a similar denition estimates an
unretirement rate of 26%.19 The di¤erence in the prevalence of unretirement
in the US relative to the UK is striking, however the rates reported for the
UK rates are similar to those documented in the US using the Retirement and
Health Survey (RHS) from the 1970s and 1980s (Rust, 1987; Diamond and
Hausman, 1984; Gustman and Steinmeier 1984a,1986).
Due to the ELSA being a biennial study it is possible for individuals to
exhibit short-term unretirement between surveys. We found 18 respondents
exhibit such behaviour over the sample period including these episodes of unre-
tirement, raises the unretirement rate to around 8%. Maestas (2010) computes
18Survey respondents were asked their Labour Force Status (LFS) in each wave of ELSA.
Respondents are asked Which one of these, would you say best describes your current
situation?. Interviewers are only allowed to code one response from the following categories:
Retired, Employed, Self-employed, Unemployed, Spontaneous (semi retired), Permanently
sick or disabled, Looking after home or family, Other (specify).
19Maestas (2010) denes unretirement in two ways; the rst is based on self reported
economic status and hours worked, whilst the second is based on hours of work only. Maestas
(2010) includes both men and women, and uses only those individuals who are in employment
in wave 1.
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a similar statistic, and nds her unretirement rates increase from 26% to 31%,
similarly she concludes that the majority of these short term unretirements
report either zero or very low values of income and therefore given their triv-
ial nature we do not include them in analysis to overstate the importance of
unretirement(Maestas, 2010 pp.28).
Hours based denition We may also dene unretirement rates based on
wave by wave changes (from zero to positive) in the number of hours working
in paid employment per week. Maestas (2010) follows a similar approach, the
e¤ect of using an hours based denition raises the unretirement rate due to
unemployed individuals being included. Given our sample conditions on in-
dividuals to be in retirement at wave 1, very few individuals transition into
unemployment.20 This underpins the similarity in the unretirement rate esti-
mated using the self reported and hours based denition.21 Under the hours
based denition we report an unretirement rate of 3.27 percent.
Sensitivity analysis As a sensitivity measure we test each denition of un-
retirement using a binary framework to model the retirement decision similar
to Peterrsson (2011), Larsen and Pederson (2013) and Cahill et al. (2010).
We construct consecutive two-wave balanced panel logit models and nd es-
timation results are broadly similar irrespective of the denition used (not
reported). In light of this we choose to present results based on the labour
market re-entry date, given that under this denition it is possible to accu-
rately determine the duration e¤ect of being in retirement on the unretirement
hazard.
20We include individuals who move from self reported retirement to unemployment.
21Maestas (2010) follows a similar method. All the measures of unretirement outlined in
the chapter may underestimate the rate of unretirement if by returning to work this leads
to an increase in the probability of survey non-response: if an individual returns to work
they have reduced leisure time, this may negativly a¤ect the likelihood of responding to a
household survey, for recent evidence in the case of the BHPS see Uhrig (2008). We test for
the pattern of non response and nd that this does not bias our results.
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Work environment for older workers in England
Involuntary retirement Until April 2011 UK retirement legislation allowed
employers to force employees to retire once they became eligible to claim state
pension.22 The sample period for this chapter spans 2001-2009, therefore an
individual who wanted to continue to work past the State Retirement Age
(SRA) against the will of their employer would have to unretire by law. Dorn
and Sousa-Poza (2010) nd evidence which suggests involuntary retirement
increases the incidence of early retirement in selected EU countries, from their
Great Britain sample they found almost 70% of their respondents between the
age of 45 and 69 took involuntary early retirement. At each wave of ELSA
respondents were asked their main reason for taking (early) retirement, one
category is made redundant/dismissed/had no choice. Of the entire sample
this was applicable to 4:43% of individuals and 2:5% of the unretiredsample.
The reason cited most frequently was reaching retirement age, or in the case
they retired early, that they were o¤ered reasonable nancial terms. Therefore
whilst involuntary retirement did contribute to the ows into retirement, it
did not contribute to the same extent to unretirement.
The budget set. An individual is eligible to claim their State Pension once
they reach NSRA, which until 2011 was 65 for men and 60 for women. A recent
DWP report (Coleman et al., 2008) nds that the labour supply decision and
decision to claim SP are correlated. However exible working practices mean
that an individual can choose to claim their pension and also continue working,
they may also defer their pension and in return receive a considerable rate of
return. In the context of this chapter, the budget set of an unretiree is not
penalised by a high marginal tax rate for choosing to claim their State Pension
and continue working, in this sense there is an absence of nonlinearities in the
budget set.23
22This law held for both men and women, despite their default state retirement age dif-
fering.
23This has not always been the case. Between 1948 and 1989, if an individual wanted
to claim their state pension within ve years of retiring they had to terminate regular
employment. Specically, an individual was not allowed to claim state pension if they
worked more than 12 hours per week. Even if they worked less than this threshold, and
earned above a certain higher limit (similar to the Higher Earnings Limit), their state pension
was reduced accordingly. Between 1948-1958 the taper rate was 100%, between 1958 and
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4.3 Specication and Modelling approach
4.3.1 Covariate information set
ELSA contains a range of economic and sociodemographic variables which
are likely to a¤ect the hazard of unretirement, in guiding the specication
described in Table 4.2 we tested alternative specications using BIC/AIC.
Appendix 8.4.2 provides a formal description of how each of the variables in
Table 4.2 was coded for estimation purposes.
Health has also been shown to be an important determinant of labour
supply behaviour at older ages in the UK (Jones et al., 2010). We control for
whether the individual has private health insurance and also the number of
limiting illnesses.24 The former of these is also likely to serve as a proxy for
economic position; given the cost of private health insurance in England and
the fact that public healthcare is provided universally by the state.
We include sociodemographic characteristics such as whether an individual
is married and the labour force status of their spouse. Previous research has
noted the importance of the spousal e¤ects in the labour supply decision of the
partner, due to factors such as a preference for shared leisure (Disney et al.,
2010; Cribb et al., 2013). Schirle (2008) estimates 25% of the labour supply of
older UK married men can be explained by the labour force status of his wife.
Of the economic variables we include dummy variables to control for the
highest education level obtained.25 We also account for social job class relat-
ing to the type of job prior to initial retirement. Using an identical method
to Maestas (2010) we test whether a potential route for unretirement is due
1989 it was reduced to 50%, and increased to 100% for earnings over the HEL. This was seen
as very detrimental to work incentives for older people. In 1989 the earnings rules described
above were abolished. Pension income and earnings from employment whilst in retirement
are now taxed at a rate similar to that of the general working age population. For more
information see Bozio et al (2010).
24We do not include measures for self reported health, due to the routing of the wave 1
questionnaire which meant it was only asked of half the retired wave 1 ELSA sample.
25The education level and social class variables use imputed information from wave 1.
The social class is on a 7 point system in wave 1, from professional through the unskilled.
We do not include self reported health status because almost half of the nal sample for
estimation report their SRH to be not applicable, however we do cross tabulate self reported
health in wave 1 with our unretired sample. We nd a positive correlation, that is to say
unretirement episodes were concentrated amongst those reported they were in very good or
excellent health.
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to unexpected changes in wealth or debt. The Institute for Fiscal Studies
(IFS) derive a range of nancial derived variables available with each release
of ELSA. Using these it is possible to construct measures for unanticipated
shocks to debt and wealth, dened as a 25% change in the non housing net -
nancial wealth or non housing net nancial debt, in any two consecutive waves.
The stock sample contains individuals who are in retirement therefore the level
of pension wealth is likely to play a role in the labour market behaviour of re-
tired individuals (Disney, Ratcli¤e & Smith., 2010), our preferred specication
controls for baseline (2002) private and public pension wealth.26
4.3.2 Model specication
Existing research has focused on static or sequential methods such as a probit
or multinomial logit model to analyse the unretirement decision (Cahill et al.,
2010; Pettersson, 2011; Maestas, 2010). The focus of this chapter is to consider
the e¤ect of duration spent in retirement on the unretirement decision. A
natural way to consider this in the context of unretirement is within a discrete
time hazard framework.
Modelling unretirement in a duration framework allows one to establish
whether the decision to unretire is made immediately following initial retire-
ment i.e. to establish the speed at which individuals reoptimise their behav-
iour. Duration analysis goes beyond what is possible to infer from static or
sequential models in terms of when an individual becomes at risk.
Discrete time hazard model
Having both the retirement date and the return to paid employment informa-
tion we are able to identify the exact interval in which unretirement occurred,
conditional on being in retirement. We model unretirement using a discrete
time complementary log-log model. This is the Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) com-
plementary log-log model and its extension assuming a gamma mixture dis-
26Pension wealth is calculated such that we assume individuals retired at state pension
age. We choose pension wealth instead of pension income to allow for individuals who
may choose to defer their pension. For more information regarding the construction of the
pension wealth variables in ELSA see Banks et al (2005).
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Table 4.2: Covariate information set used in discrete time hazard model.
Sociodemographic variables
Married at wave 1
Whether rst retired between the age of 50 and 55
Whether rst retired between the age of 56 and 60
Spouse in employment at wave 1
Whether has private health insurance
Whether has a limiting illness
Education level
Economic variables
Unanticipated debt shock (IFS)
Unanticipated wealth shock (IFS)
Log of total pension wealth in 2002
Non-pension nancial wealth quintile in 2002
Income quintile 2002
Opportunity to work past retirement age
Whether respondent feels they do not have enough income
1 day -1 year (short term) nancial planning horizon (base group)
1-3 year (medium term) nancial planning horizon
3+ year (long term) nancial planning horizon
Self reported social class by preretirement job occupation
Notes: For each covairate, denition and description can be found in appendix 8.4.2
Education level refers to highest level of attainment: Degree (minimum 16 years full time
education); At least A level and below degree level (Between 13 and 15 years full time
education); CSE/ O level (Between 10 and 11 years full time education).
tributed error (Meyer, 1990).27 Nicoletti & Rondinelli (2006) show that by
allowing for unobserved heterogeneity and assuming a non-parametric baseline
hazard, this mitigates the e¤ects of potential bias in the duration dependence
and covariates. Additionally such a specication provides better validation for
the detection and true extent of unobserved heterogeneity relative to a tightly
constrained parametric model (Dolton and Van der Klaauw, 1995).
We test for the presence of individual level unobserved heterogeneity assum-
ing it is summarised by a gamma mixture distribution.28 We do not nd evi-
27This is the analogous discrete time version to the continuous proportional hazards model,
and is particularly suitable given the relatively low probability of observing an episode of
unretirement (Jenkins,1997).
28The starting values for the estimation of the vector of parameters  in model 2, are
taken from (1). The proportional hazard in this case is: i;t = 0(t)e[xi0;t+log(vi)]:Where vi
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dence of this type of unobserved heterogeneity and therefore choose to present
results for the preferred specication which assumes a Gaussian error term. We
estimate model specic weights using the method of IPW (Wooldridge, 2002)
to account for non observable non-response (Rubins, 1976), estimation results
for modelling the non-response decision can be found in Appendix 8.4.3.29
The central aim is to model the relationship between the survival time and
our information set. Jenkins (1997) and Stewart (1996) present a detailed
discussion of these estimators, we draw heavily on the exposition of Jenkins
(1997). In the discrete case the proportional hazard is given as:
i;t = 0(t)e
[x;i;t] (4.1)
Where 0(t) is the baseline hazard. The discrete time hazard in the jth
interval is given by:
hj (Xi;j) = 1  ef e[x
0
i;j+ j ]g (4.2)
Where:
 j = log
fjZ
fj 1
0()d (4.3)
We specify a non-parametric baseline hazard, which allows for complete
exibility in the hazard function (Jenkins, 1997). We reorganise our data such
that the unit of analysis is changed from the individual to the time at risk of
event (Jones et al., 2010). All estimation is carried out using Stephen Jenkins
Stata routine pgmhaz8.
is a random variable which follows a gamma distribution such that vi  (1; 2). The hazard
rate changes accordingly for more information see Jenkins (1997).
29We test our models of non response and nd there is no evidence of omitted variable bias,
however estimation results do suggest our specication lacks predictive power. This is due to
the relative sparcity of variables which can be convincingly exluded from the unretirement
equation and included in the non response equation.
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4.4 Estimation results
Non-parametric retirement survival curves
To infer more detail about the relationship between the time in retirement and
the return to paid work, Figure 4.1 plots non-parametric retirement survival
curves for the whole sample by age in wave 1 (2002). The unretirement hazard
is dened as the slope of minus the log survival curve (Maestas, 2010 pp.9 ).
The top left survival curve in Figure 4.1 indicates there is no clear spike in
the unretirement hazard, only weak evidence it is higher in the rst ten years
following initial retirement.30
The panel in the top right hand corner of Figure 4.1 is the survivor function
for those who unretire and those who do not (i.e. stay in retirement over the
sample period) for the whole sample irrespective of their age of rst retirement.
Therefore by construction the red line in the top right hand panel of Figure
4.1 show unretirement episodes. The other three panels restrict attention to
individuals who exhibit unretirement behaviour and investigate whether there
is a di¤erence in the hazard of unretirement by stratifying over particular
groups. Maestas (2010) nds a much steeper decline (particularly in the 2-
4 years following initial retirement) in the survivor functions estimated for
her sample of HRS respondents, highlighting that unretirement behaviour was
more common soon after initial retirement; in addition it was also clear she
observed a higher incidence of unretirement episodes. Our sample consisted
of 857 individuals of which 628 or 73% retired prior to state pension age,
suggesting signicant evidence of early retirement behaviour for this particular
cohort.31 Such is the extent of early retirement in England that the average
retirement age at wave 1 for our ELSA sample of retired men is 59.7 years.
Coincidentally this is very close to the o¢ cial SPA of females in the UK and
it is likely spousal e¤ects such as joint complementarities in leisure are in
operation (Cribb et al., 2013). It is also identical to the mean age of HRS
sample members used by Maestas (2010), however her sample only included
30By construction we assume the hazard between observed unretirement episodes is con-
stant.
31We derive this statistic using the information relating to month and year of retirement,
combined with in an individuals year of birth. Whilst every e¤ort has been made to ensure
this is accurate there may be some measurement error, for example due to recall error or
rounding.
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individuals who were in employment at wave 1. It is likely that there will be
a fundamental di¤erence in the labour market behaviour of a stock sample
of individuals in retirement, versus those initially in employment even within
the same country. Nonetheless it clear that given the mean retirement age in
this study is approximately equal to that of the HRS sample respondents in
Maestas (2010) that at present unretirement is much more common in the US
relative to the UK.
Figure 4.1: Kaplin-Meier survival curves of unretirement by age.
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Estimation results
Table 4.5 indicates there is no clear pattern in the duration dependence of
unretirement, as indicated by Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2.32 Coe¢ cient estimates
are slightly bigger in the 10 years following initial retirement after which point
they tend to diminish. Such a pattern is quite di¤erent to that reported in the
US, Maestas (2010) found that the majority of unretirement transitions were
made in the rst 2-4 years following initial retirement. Human capital theory
would suggest a swift return to work given that an individuals stock of skills
depreciates the longer they stay in retirement.
Turning to our economic and sociodemographic covariates, Table 4.5 sug-
gests there is little evidence of a social gradient in the hazard of unretirement.
32The fact that standard errors are large compared to coe¢ cient estimates on the duration
dummies is likely to be related to the relatively low number of unretirement transitions
observed in the data.
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Relative to the base group of unskilled or semi skilled, those individuals who
reported their social class to be either professional or managerial were no less
likely to unretire. One exception is individuals who reported themselves as
being skilled non-manual workers, who were nearly twice as likely to unretire.
Whilst the hazard of unretirement for those who reported being skilled manual
workers was 60% lower than that of the base group. Those individuals who
were allowed to work past retirement age were 10% less likely to unretire rela-
tive to those who were not. This is intuitive given that these individuals could
continue working until they decided to retire, and were not forced to retire
and then unretire as would have been the case under the retirement legislation
at the time. Table 4.5 highlights an education gradient. Specically those
individuals with a degree were 1.5 times more likely to unretire, relative to the
base group who held no qualications.
The early retirement indicators suggest the hazard of unretirement for those
individuals who rst retired prior to the age of 60 was not signicantly higher
than those who retired after this point. For those who retired between the
ages of 50-55 the unretirement hazard was 12% higher, whereas the hazard for
those who rst retired between the ages of 56-60 was 7% lower than the base
group. Therefore whilst younger retirees tended to be more likely to unretire
these e¤ects were not signicant at conventional levels.
The total of log private and public pension wealth measures the present
value of total pension wealth in 2002 (assuming individuals retired at SPA).
Our results indicate conditional on educational attainment those with higher
levels of total pension wealth are signicantly less likely to unretire. We also
control for the total non-pension nancial wealth in 2002, which indicates rel-
ative to the base group (being in the top quintile) the hazard of unretirement
is not signicantly di¤erent for those lower down the non-pension wealth dis-
tribution. Therefore whilst nancial wealth is important, it is pension wealth
which plays a signicant role in the labour supply behaviour of retired indi-
viduals.33
Turning to the covariates summarising nancial planning, Table 4.5 in-
dicates that unretirement is not related to having a short nancial planning
33Almost one third of our sample reported being in the top wealth quintile, therefore this
result may be due to a lack of variation in non-pension nancial wealth.
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horizon. Those individuals with a medium (3-5 years) or long term nancial
planning horizon (5 years+), are at least two times more likely to unretire
relative to the base group of short term (<3 years). We also include a measure
for whether a retiree felt they did not have enough income at the time of their
wave 1 interview. The hazard of unretirement was two-fold higher for those
who responded positively, combined with nancial planning results, suggests
that unretirement may be a foreseen event.
We also include measures which control for debt or wealth shocks. These
are binary variables which take the value one if an individual experiences a
25% change in the level of net debt or wealth they hold respectively, between
any two consecutive survey waves. Table 4.5 suggests that wealth shocks have
a negligible impact in reducing the hazard of unretirement, by around 6%
relative to those who do not report a shock. Similarly those individuals who
experienced an unexpected debt shock were no more likely to unretire. In
summary our results suggest that over the sample period there was no clear
pattern between nancial shocks and unretirement.
Those individuals who report being married were nearly 60% more likely
to unretire, however this e¤ect was not signicantly signicant. We do nd
some evidence for shared preferences amongst couples, the hazard of unretire-
ment was three-fold higher for a man who had a wife in employment when
they were initially in retirement, relative to those who did not (or were di-
vorced/single/widowed). This does suggest there is some role for preferences
for shared leisure amongst couples, or perhaps for social interaction possible
through paid employment.
Finally we control for limiting illnesses and nd having at least one limiting
illness (relative to having none) reduces the hazard of unretirement by 30%. It
is less likely these individuals will be able to return to work. We also control
for the presence of private health insurance which is likely to be correlated to
income or wealth, our results indicate the unretirement hazard is 39% higher
for those who have such insurance.
Test for attrition bias We test for attrition bias using a variable ad-
dition test rst proposed by Nijman and Verbeek (1992). This was carried
out by including a variable which corresponds to the number of survey waves
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an individual responded to, which is regressed along with the full information
set in the unretirement equation. We nd no evidence of this particular type
of attrition bias whilst the coe¢ cient estimates (not reported) changed only
marginally relative to those reported in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3: Discrete time hazard model with Gaussian frailty.
Time spent in retirement  ()
1 year 3.76
(3:85)
2 years 4.38
(4:29)
3 years 2.83
(2:82)
4 years 5.77*
(5:70)
5 years 5.86*
(6:07)
6 years 4.74
(5:05)
7 years 7.18**
(6:49)
8 years 4.83*
(4:51)
9 years 4.78
(4:77)
10 years 6.48*
(7:19)
11 years 2.59
(3:85)
12 years 4.82
(5:55)
13 years 9.64**
(10:62)
14 years 3.53
(4:07)
15 years 4.30
(6:09)
16 years 0.48
(0:64)
17 years 1.45
(1:68)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.4: Discrete time hazard model with Gaussian frailty (continued).
Financial and income variables  ()
Total pension wealth in 2002 0.51***
(0:05)
1st quintile: non-pension wealth in 2002 0.68
(0:52)
2nd quintile: non-pension wealth in 2002 0.65
(0:35)
3rd quintile: non-pension wealth in 2002 1.17
(0:49)
4th quintile: non-pension wealth in 2002 0.76
(0:31)
1-3 year (medium term) nancial planning horizon 2.31*
(1:21)
3 years+ (long term) nancial planning horizon 3.01**
(1:67)
Experienced a 25% unanticipated decrease in wealth 0.92
(0:28)
Experienced a 25% unanticipated increase in debt 0.99
(0:46)
Occupation dummies
Professional job occupation 0.84
(0:48)
Managerial job occupation 0.94
(0:44)
Skilled / nonmanual job occupation 1.98
(1:06)
Skilled / manual job occupation 0.51
(0:28)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.5: Discrete time hazard model with Gaussian frailty (continued).
Sociodemographic characteristics  ()
Whether has private health insurance 1.39
(0:55)
Opportunity to work past retirement age 0.91
(0:42)
First retired between the age of 50 and 55 1.13
(0:43)
First retired between the age of 56 and 60 0.93
(0:33)
Married at wave 1 1.67
(0:71)
Has a limiting illness 0.70
(0:20)
Respondent feels they do not have enough income 2.22
(1:24)
Spouse in employment at wave 1 3.08***
(1:09)
Education dummies
Holds a degree 2.55**
(1:21)
Below degree level but at least an A level 2.59
(0:96)
Holds an O-level or CSE 1.70
(0:68)
Number of person-year observations 9617
Number of failures 79
Wald chi2(45) 1459.95
Prob > chi2 0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Discussion. Our results indicate that there are a number of factors which
a¤ect the likelihood of a return to work. These include: relative income po-
sition; log pension wealth; nancial planning horizon; spouses employment
status and education. It is likely that these factors are related to one another,
for example those who are better educated tend on average to have higher life-
time earnings, and so are likely to have higher levels of pension wealth given
that by denition pension wealth (and income) is generally deferred income
from an earlier period (Card, 1999). Table 4.5 suggests the hazard of unre-
tirement is not higher or lower for individuals in specic occupations, despite
certain occupations having access to generous dened benet pension schemes,
which have in part led to the rise in early retirement (Smith, 2006; Jones et
al., 2010).
Figure 4.2 plots the predicted hazard of unretirement using the estimated
probabilities from the complementary log-log model. Similar to Figure 4.1,
Figure 4.2 indicates there is no clear pattern between length of time in retire-
ment and hazard of unretirement.
Figure 4.2: Predicted hazard of unretirement.
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Table 4.5 indicates retired men with a wife in the labour force are more
likely to return to work, suggesting a role for shared leisure preferences. Sim-
ilar ndings have been found in modelling the retirement and labour supply
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decision at older ages in the UK (Schirle, 2008; Cribb et al., 2013). Our results
indicate these complementarities in leisure extend into retirement for men with
a working spouse. The recent legislated increase in the SPA for females in the
context of our ndings suggests retired men may return to work if their spouse
is forcedto stay in the labour force for longer. Alternatively for those men
already in work it may be the case they delay retirement (Cribb et al., 2013).
Given that nearly 10% of our sample exhibit unretirement behaviour, it is
important to establish the characteristics of an unretirement job. The types
of jobs these individuals are engaged in have implications for potential future
labour market policies which act to incentivise unretirement. Equally, supply
side factors such as whether only certain retirees can access unretirement jobs
because they depend on having the appropriate skill setalso has implications
for policymakers. Part of the legacy of the nancial crisis has been a rise in the
number of unemployed individuals, including a rising trend in the number of
young individuals Not Employed in Education or Training (so called NEET),
and also unemployed graduates (ONS, 2013d). In the context of unretirement,
if NEETs are competing with unretirees for the same job then this could
have adverse implications for either group. ELSA records job characteristic
information; in the next section we use this to investigate the characteristics
of unretirement jobs in more detail.
4.5 Characteristics of unretirement jobs
Similar to Maestas (2010) we nd unretirement jobs are very similar in char-
acter to partial retirement jobs. The median number of hours worked per
week is around 16 and earn an average monthly income of $700 per month
or $8500 per annum.34 The majority of individuals who unretire self report
themselves to be in the top three deciles of the social class ladder, and in terms
of job activity report being in sedentary jobs, with a small proportion engag-
ing themselves with work which involves standing or some physical aspect. In
terms of preretirement occupation characteristics, a signicant proportion of
the unretired sample contained individuals who reported being in supervisory
34Figures are estimated based on gross incomes from main employment and net of tax
for secondary jobs. ELSA does not contain information regarding gross income gures for
secondary jobs.
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or managerial professions. Taken together with the estimation results from
Section 4.4, this indicates unretirement jobs are concentrated amongst those
who are better educated, higher up the income distribution and tend to have
a longer term nancial planning horizon. This could feed into demand and
supply side factors, for example employers are only willing to hire retired indi-
viduals who embody a su¢ ciently high skill set or it is these individuals who
have a preference for returning to work post retirement.
Final preretirement salary The life history survey carried out at wave
3 (2007) of the ELSA survey, contains detailed information regarding each
job in an individuals life. Using this information it is possible to estimate
average annual salary income in the nal preretirement job, for our sample of
unretired individuals. 35 36 We estimate this gure to be £ 38,919.13 (2007
prices).This supports our earlier observation that unretirement jobs are not
generally sought by those who were on low income prior to retirement, but
those who (given the cohort) were likely to be in established occupations.
Comparing pretirement versus postretirement labour market income for our
sample of unretirees shows that unretirement jobs replace around just over 20%
of the individuals preretirement annual salary income. As a comparison, State
Pension replaces around 15% of the average labour income in 2008 (Coleman
et al, 2008). 37
4.5.1 Voluntary work
Our estimates suggest the prevalence of unretirement is similar to that ob-
served in Sweden and Denmark, and signicantly lower than that reported
in the US. This does not mean older English men completely separate from
the labour market when they retire. ELSA contains information regarding
the frequency of voluntary work undertaken per month. A recent report by
35It is not possible to determine the occupation of the nal career job.
36The majority of our sample (circa 98%+ were paid in New English currency (decimal-
isation took place on the 15th February 1972), for our sample of unretired individuals only
one individual was paid in Old English money for this reasons we do not include them for
this section of analysis. We adjust nal career incomes to 2007 prices (the year of the wave
3 history survey), using the Bank of England Ination calculator.
37Conditional on unretiring we nd no correlation between preretirement income and time
spent in retirement.
4. Unretirement in England: An Empirical Perspective. 135
nfpSynergy (2011) estimated around 30% of individuals aged between 50 and
65 did informal or formal volunteering at least once a month. Based on our
sample of men we nd that approximately 23% of those individuals who report
being in full retirement, undertake voluntary work at least twice a month.38
Therefore retired individuals do maintain some attachment to the labour force
albeit at the voluntary level.
4.6 Future work
Chapter four models the unretirement decision for a sample of retired men us-
ing data from ELSA. The main reason for excluding females from the analysis
is that for this cohort, female labour supply is characterised by sustained pe-
riods out of the labour market due to child rearing and caring responsibilities.
Preliminary research showed the magnitude of unretirement for this cohort
was too low for any substantive analysis to be undertaken.
However since the 1970s female labour supply has increased signicantly
in developed economies including the UK, and is now much more akin to that
of men (Chevalier and Viitanen, 2002). Therefore future research should carry
out a similar investigation for younger cohorts of females using future waves of
ELSA, this would improve our understanding of whether it is the same factors
which inuence male and female unretirement behaviour.
Whilst the current work focuses on retired men, future work should repli-
cate the study using a sample of individuals initially observed to be in em-
ployment, and to study their labour supply behaviour as they approach SPA
and thus would be akin to the work of Maestas (2010). In this case the sample
of individuals will represent a younger cohort compared to our retired sam-
ple. It is likely that this group of individuals will experience policies aimed
at extending working lives. It is important to note the magnitude of future
unretirement ows will in part depend on (a) The abolishment of legislation
allowing employers to force workers to retire at SPA and (b) The legislated
increases in the SPA itself.
38We take the average response based over the four waves of data. There is no information
available about the number of hours worked in the voluntary sector in the ELSA data.
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4.7 Conclusion and policy implications
Using a longitudinal panel survey of older individuals in England we estimate
nearly one in ten of our sample members exhibit unretirement behaviour. We
model the unretirement decision and investigate the determinants of such be-
haviour in a duration framework. Our results indicate there is no clear pattern
in the duration dependence of the hazard of unretirement. However we show
there are a number of important factors which act to raise the hazard of retire-
ment: (1) Having a wife in the labour force, (2) Having at least an A-level, (3)
Having a medium or long term nancial planning horizon, (4) Being in the top
quintile of the 2002 income distribution and (5) Having lower levels of total
pension wealth.
Similar to results reported for the US individuals who report having a longer
term nancial planning horizon are more likely to unretire. Combined with
the previous results this suggests that unretirement is likely to be related to
lifestyle and preference factors. It unlikely to be linked with being in low paid
employment prior to retirement; nor is it due to poor nancial planning which
tends to be associated with individuals who have lower educational attainment
and are also concentrated further down the wealth distribution (Dow and Jin,
2013).
Our results suggest both demand and supply side forces are at work. On
the supply side our results indicate individuals who have at least an A-level
education are more likely to unretire, for example due to preferences for work.
Given the changing structure of the labour market in all advanced economies
over the past thirty years, higher educated individuals are more likely to secure
paid employment. On the demand side employers seek individuals who can
demonstrate they are skilled and have extensive labour market experience,
which cannot be substituted for by younger less skilled individuals.
Our results have important implications for retired English men who are
considering re-entry into the labour force. Our research suggests that the op-
portunity to unretire may not be equal across older individuals. Low skilled
retired workers face greater barriers to work relative to their high skilled coun-
terparts. This may go some way in explaining the di¤erence in unretirement
rates observed in England relative to the US, given that average educational
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attainment in the US is higher than that in the UK. However it is also im-
portant to note that the studies from the US have concentrated on younger
cohorts who are initially in employment. There are also important di¤erences
in labour market regulation in these countries, and also signicant di¤erences
in institutional factors such as the provision of healthcare. These factors make
it not only easier but more important for individuals in the US to be in em-
ployment.
Ceterus paribus the results found in this chapter combined with the fact
that future cohorts approaching SPA will have on average higher educational
attainment, imply unretirement will become more likely in the future. However
recent changes to UK retirement legislation which came into e¤ect in 2011
mean employers can no longer lay o¤ individuals because they have reached
SPA. Changes such as these are likely to a¤ect retirement planning. Individuals
who have strong preferences for work no longer need to unretire instead they
may reduce their hours and continue to work. Flexible retirement options are
becoming increasingly common in advanced economies such as the UK. This
will a¤ect the magnitude of future unretirement ows and will also alter the
level of labour market activity amongst older workers in the UK, which until
recently has been in decline.
Chapter 5
Accounting for Attrition in the
two-quarter UK Labour Force
Survey.
5.1 Introduction
Attrition is inherent in surveys which follow the same individuals or house-
holds over time; attrition may be related to economic, sociodemographic or
survey characteristics (Falaris and Peters, 1998; Wooldridge, 2002; Nicoletti
and Perrachi, 2005; Jones et al., 2012). The consequences of attrition are that
it may cause severe bias in estimators and therefore inferences drawn from
subsequent analysis will be incorrect. Longitudinal survey weights are one
way to overcome this bias, such weights account for the original population
of interest whilst controlling for factors known to a¤ect non-response in each
subsequent wave of data. One method to produce longitudinal weights is using
automatic iterative raking software such methods are based on the following
idea: adjust the sample so it is more reective of the underlying population it
is being drawn from and at the same time take account of the survey design
specic to the survey in question, in this case the United Kingdom Labour
Force Survey (UKLFS).1
1An alternative strategy is to use IPW to predict the likelihood of non-response in a
subsequent wave. This strategy is not adopted in this piece of research, given that all
longitudinal surveys carried out by the ONS use a raking macro, and the ONS (and GSS
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The work of Clarke and Tate (1999) led to the current specication of
the two-quarter longitudinal weights used in the UKLFS, which is estimated
using the SAS raking macro CALMAR. However survey response rates have
declined substantially since their investigation (see Section 5.2). This chapter
investigates whether the factors which a¤ected response rates as established by
Clarke and Tate (1999) still hold in 2012. We also estimate revised longitudinal
weights using an alternative raking engine called Generalised Estimation Sys-
tem (GES), in order to align the survey methodology used in the two-quarter
longitudinal dataset to that in the quarterly cross section UKLFS and the
Government Statistical Service (GSS) more widely.2
We show: marital status, initial interview outcome and initial economic
state, in addition to the factors already controlled for in the current longi-
tudinal weights, are also correlated with non-response. These ndings are
incorporated in a revised calibration specication using GES. Using a range of
diagnostic tests we compare the revised longitudinal weights to those currently
estimated using CALMAR. Our tentative results show the revised specication
is preferred.
The rest of this chapter is set out as follows, Section 5.2 describes particular
features of the UKLFS and the recent trend in response rates. Section 5.3
analyses the discrepancy between the cross section and longitudinal estimates
in more detail. Section 5.4 analyses estimation results from models of non-
response. Section 5.5 is concerned with estimating longitudinal weights under
the revised specication and comparing them to existing longitudinal weights.
Section 5.6 discusses the results from Section 5.5 in the context of previous
work carried out by the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP). Section
5.7 highlights acknowledgements and future work. Section 5.8 concludes.
more) widely wish to align survey methodology within and between departments.
2The author is grateful for nancial support from the ESRC in order to undertake this
research. A special thanks to Dr. Nuovella Williams at the O¢ ce for National Statistics for
assistance with estimation of the proposed weights, and Katie Stuart for research assistance.
The author would also like to thank Nicholas Palmer, Dr. Gareth James, Greg Dixon and
Matthew Greenaway for helpful comments and suggestions.
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5.2 Data
The UK Labour Force Survey (UKLFS) is a quarterly survey of private house-
holds in the UK. THE UKLFS typically interviews 35; 000 households each
quarter, and is primarily concerned with tracking labour market circumstances
of individuals residing in private households in the UK. In this respect the
main motivation for the UKLFS is to develop, manage, evaluate and report
on labour market policies (ONS, 2011c). The LFS is compiled and managed
by the Social Surveys division of the ONS in Great Britain and by the Central
Survey Unit of the Department of Finance and Personnel in Northern Ireland
on behalf of the Department of Enterprise, Trade & Investment (DETINI). It
has been in a quarterly format since 1992.
A distinguishing feature of the UKLFS is that it follows households for ve
quarters after which they are rotated out. Therefore at any given quarter 20%
of the sample is new to the survey. In addition to the cross section survey
the ONS produces two-quarter and ve quarter longitudinal datasets, in order
to track ows between di¤erent labour market states over time. The focus of
this chapter is to investigate whether the longitudinal weights supplied with
the two-quarter longitudinal dataset adequately control for survey drop-out
or attrition.3 The ows between di¤erent economic states measured by the
two-quarter UKLFS are summarised in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Labour Force Flows.
Unemployment Inactivity
Employment
Flow=
3During 2008 ONS conducted some initial investigation work for the ve quarter sample,
and GES in some instances produced negative and extreme weights. Therefore at present
the longitudinal weights for the 5-quarter sample are estimates using CALMAR.
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5.2.1 Response Rates
The ONS investigates quality assurance with each release of cross section data,
including reporting the achieved response rate (ONS, 2012a).4 Figures 5.2 and
5.3 show response rates have steadily declined over the sample period between
June-August 1999 and April- June 2012. It is worth noting that the quarterly
UKLFS changed from being based on seasonal quarter to calender quarters. If
this changed a¤ected the response rate of UKLFS respondents then this e¤ect
is also reected in the general trends depicted in the diagrams. However it is
clear that the decline in response rates occurred before the introduction of the
APS in 2004 and that the gradient of the decline did not seem to change from
2004 onwards. Figure 5.2 shows the achieved number of household interviews
declined from approximately 55; 000  60; 000 to 35; 000  45; 000.
Figure 5.2: Repsonse rate by household interviews 1999-2012.
Source: ONS (2012).
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 highlight a steep decline in household and individual
response rates in 2010, which represent two major changes in the design of
the UKLFS. The rst e¤ected the way multiple households were interviewed
at the same address, prior to 2010 when an interviewer visited an address
with multiple households they were all interviewed, however in 2010 this was
changed to interviewing one household at random. The second was the way in
which individuals who were aged 75 and over were sampled, if all individuals
4The ONS at present does not routinely produce detailed information regarding non-
response for the 2-quarter LFS using longitudinal methods. The quality assurance document
focuses on reponse rates at a given quarter and analyses reponse rates for a particular wave.
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Figure 5.3: Repsonse rate person interviews 1999-2012.
Source: ONS (2012).
in the household were aged 75 and over then these individuals were no longer
followed in subsequent waves as their economic status tended to be inactive in
all quarters. However if there were individuals who were younger than 75 in
the household then the household would be followed. The 75+ group had a
very high group response rate given they tended to be at home and available
for interview, hence this in part led to the decline noted in Figures 5.2 and 5.3
above. Given the longitudinal les only contain individuals who are 15-69 this
group does not directly a¤ect the longitudinal weights.
Nonetheless Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show even prior to these changes there
was a 25% decline in response rates between June-August 1999 and October-
December 2009. It is likely di¤erential non-response amongst particular sub-
groups was attributable to the decline and this should be accounted for the in
the specication of longitudinal weights. It is also suggests there is merit in
investigating the determinants of non-response since the work of Clarke and
Tate (1999), which only used UKLFS data from the calendar year 1997.
5.3 Raking macros and their use in the UKLFS
The UKLFS has been designed in such a way that it aims to be representative
of the target population. However it may by the case that di¤erences arise and
certain segments of the target population are under-represented whilst others
are over-represented. This can be due to a number of reasons, for example,
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non-response or sampling uctuations. Raking methods are one way in which
it is possible to make the sample more reective of the underlying population it
is being drawn from. This is done by adjusting base/initial weights (so called
G weight) of cases in the sample such that the marginal totals of the adjusted
weights (F weights) conform to specied characteristics with the corresponding
totals for the population (Izrael, Hoaglin and Battaglia, 2004).
The raking/weighting engine used to construct the weighted estimates for
the cross section quarterly UKLFS is GES, a SAS macro developed by Sta-
tistics Canada. At present the longitudinal weights estimated for the two-
quarter dataset is carried out by CALMAR also a SAS macro developed by
the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (Insee). Both GES
and CALMAR are based on the principle of adjusting base weights to sum
to population (control) totals. In 2008 as part of the updating and aligning
of methods used across di¤erent government departments the ONS changed
from using CALMAR to GES. GES is also a software package designed for the
calibration of weights but the way it does this is di¤erent to CALMAR, the
latter sets the weights to sum to calibration totals for each partition (shown in
Table 5.1) in turn and does this iteratively until the weights sum to all popu-
lation totals in all the partitions; whereas GES calibrates to all the partitions
simultaneously and is viewed as being more statistically robust, e¢ cient and
produces good variance estimates (ONS, 2011c pp.65). One nal di¤erence is
that GES minimises the distance between prior and nal weights using a linear
distance function.5 The intuition here is the same as before: raking takes the
initial weight from the sample and adjusts it to known population totals in
order to make the sample more representative of the target population.
As noted raking requires known population totals (controls) to sum to.
The Demography Department at ONS do not have population totals for each
auxiliary variable used in our preferred calibration specication highlighted in
section 5.6. They do however have population totals using the 2001 Census by
age, gender and region. These are then revised each year until the next Census
data is available.6 We use the ONS person weight (PWT11) in the rst stage
5CALMAR and GES produce similar estimates so long as the estimated G weight is not
bounded as each raking engine does this di¤erently.
6At the time of writing the 2011 Census information was unavailable; moreover Scotland
had yet to undertake their version of the 2011 Census.
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of the estimation in order to establish population totals to sum to (for controls
where no available totals exist) when undertaking the weighting procedure.
The exact way in which longitudinal weights are estimated (in both GES and
CALMAR) is described below:
1. Take any cross section UKLFS data (apply sample restrictions ensuring
to drop individuals aged <15 and >70+ in both quarters).
2. Set macro to pick up auxiliary variables.
3. Estimate GB and NI population.
4. Merge with consecutive quarter of data.
5. Keep only the balanced sample.
6. Check for empty cells (cells which are in the population but not in the
sample).
7. Estimate initial design weight.
8. Adjustment needs to be made for multi household adjustment (change
in the UKLFS made in 2010).
9. Keep the partition variable auxiliary totals (this is done for each category
in the partition variable so for example in our revised partition 2 we
controlled for age*sex*region which had 308 categories) and the initial
design weight.
10. Setup the partition and auxiliary variables in the correct manner.
11. Call in the raking macro GES/CALMAR.
12. Compute G and F weights.
13. Check diagnostic measures.
14. Check to make sure our sample is the same as that used in the Survey
Sample Design (SSD) Department, who are responsible for estimation of
the current two-quarter longitudinal weights and labour force ows data.
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The current specication of the longitudinal weights was carried out in
1999 (Clarke and Tate, 1999) and thus prior to the move to GES (for the
cross section UKLFS) which took place in 2008. Whilst the raking engine
for the two datasets is di¤erent so too is the calibration specication (the
population controls). For the quarterly cross section the calibration partitions
are: Age, Gender and Region in various combinations. Whilst for the current
longitudinal specication there are extra partitions to account for attrition due
to tenure and economic activity.7 8 In principle the cross section estimates
should be equal the longitudinal net ows for each state at any given quarter,
however due to di¤erences in the raking engine and partition variables there
exists a discrepancy, the extent of which can be seen in Section 5.4.
As highlighted in the previous section, the raking engine used to carry out
the weighting of the cross section and longitudinal datasets is no longer the
same. Until 2008 the raking software CALMAR was used on licence from
the French National Statistical Institute (Insee). This uses a logit function
to minimise the distance between the initial base weight derived from the
sample and nal (adjusted) weight which has been adjusted to sum to known
population totals.9
The G weight is dened as the modication factor  which when multiplied
by the initial design weight
 
N
n

equals the nal F weight and reduces the
calibration error to zero.10 At present in both the two-quarter and ve quarter
longitudinal datasets G weights are bounded whereas in the cross section they
are not.11 This is due to constraints placed on the data by partitions in the
calibration specication, which cannot accommodate non-empty cells or those
with a very low cell count (in order to avoid extreme weights being estimated).
This is less likely in the quarterly cross section due to the greater sample size
and fewer number of partitions. The partitions used in the current cross section
and longitudinal specication are detailed in Table 5.1.
7This is due to account for the surey design of the LFS in that it reinterviews the same
household, it does not follow households if they move from the property.
8The parition factors in the cross section UKLFS are chosen given the equivalent popu-
lation estimates (which gures are aggregated to) in the UK Census.
9Using a logit function to minimise the distance implicitly implies the makro is con-
strained to always producing adjusted weights which are strictly positive.
10The design weight is equal to the inverse of the probability of being selection.
11The bounds applied are such that the 0:5 < gweight < 2:1.
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Table 5.1: UKLFS raking specication
Current cross section Current longitudinal
Partitions
Age Yes Yes
Gender Yes No
Region Yes Yes
Economic activity No Yes
Tenure No Yes
Whilst the partition variables are listed separately it is important to note
they may be specied independently or as a combination, for example it could
be region by broad age group by gender. The variables highlighted in Table
5.1 were those chosen following the work of Clarke and Tate (1999). In their
study they found that the longitudinal weights should control for the partitions
used in the cross section, in addition due to the sample design of the UKLFS (in
that it re-interviews at the same household) then longitudinal weights should
also control for tenure due to the fact that individuals who lived in rented
accommodation were much more likely to become non-responders.
5.4 Discrepancy cross section versus longitu-
dinal
The discrepancy between the cross section and net longitudinal ow can be
explained with reference to Figure 5.1. The Non Seasonally Adjusted (NSA)
net ow for each state should be equal (or very close) to the cross sectional esti-
mates reported every quarter. Figures 5.4-5.6 show this is not the case. Figures
5.4-5.6 chart the di¤erence between the NSA cross section estimate minus the
net ow (estimated using the existing longitudinal weights) for employment,
unemployment and inactivity between October 2001 and June 2012.12
12We use data from 2001 onwards as this has been updated with the 2001 Census gures.
At the time of writing the 2011 Census gures were not available.
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Figure 5.4: Discrepancy between stock and longitudinal estimates of employ-
ment.
Source: ONS.
Notes Scale (000s); 16-64 population.
Figure 5.5: Discrepancy between stock and longitudinal estimates of unem-
ployment.
Source: ONS.
Notes Scale (000s); 16-64 population; ILO denition.
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Figure 5.6: Discrepancy between stock and longitudinal estimates of inactivity.
Source: ONS.
Notes Scale (000s); 16-64 population.
Comparing Figures 5.4-5.6 shows that the smallest discrepancy is for the
employment series, whereby the NSA stock estimate is usually  20; 000 to
 30; 000 smaller than the NSA net ow estimate at each quarter. In the case
of the unemployment series the NSA stock estimate is consistently below the
NSA ow estimate (bar one exception), the magnitude of the discrepancy is
slightly bigger than that of the employment series, approximately  30; 000 at
any given quarter. Finally the most substantial discrepancies between the stock
and ow estimates is for the inactivity series, these are on average  160; 000
at any given quarter, moreover when these are broken down in to full time and
part time work this discrepancy is even more substantial (Cousins, 2012a).
Data: The UKLFS
To guide the specication of calibration groups in the weighting procedure,
we rst estimate logit models to understand which factors are correlated to
survey attrition across two consecutive quarters of the UKLFS. To do this we
merge two separate cross sections (Q4 2011 and Q1 2012) and then construct
a dependent binary indicator which is equal to 1 if the individual is attrited
from the survey in the second wave, zero otherwise. We use a range of sociode-
mographic and economic controls, partially guided by the specication used
in Clarke and Tate (1999) and also by the survey methodology and economics
5. Accounting for Attrition in the two-quarter UK Labour Force Survey. 149
literature.
We construct an unbalanced panel and only drop individuals if they are (1)
In their nal wave of observation (i.e. wave 5) in the rst quarter observed or
(2) The interview outcome in the rst quarter of observation is not productive
or (3) Aged 70 or over in the rst quarter we observe them.13 The nal sample
size for estimation purposes comprised of approximately 50; 000 individuals for
any two consecutive quarters.
5.5 Estimation results
5.5.1 Logit model of attrition
Table 5.2 highlights the marginal e¤ect of each covariate on the likelihood of
attriting from the sample between the rst and second and wave of observa-
tion.14
Denition 5.1 Conditional on being in the eligible sample we dene attrition
as only observing an individual in the rst quarter of observation in any two
consecutive quarters.
That is to say if we take the two calendar quarters Q1 and Q2 2011, then we
would only observe the individual in Q1 but not Q2. In describing the e¤ect our
information set has on the probability of non-response we split our information
set into two groups. The rst focuses on sociodemographic covariates whilst
the latter economic.
Sociodemographic variables
Our estimation results indicate that only married respondents are more likely
to attrit relative to the base group of being widowed. Individuals who are
single or divorced are no more likely to non-respond. In addition to marital
13We drop individuals who described themselves as seperated and were previously in a
civil partnership. These individuals constituted less than 0.1% of our sample. Individuals
who are interviewed by proxy at both waves are treated as attriting. Thus our dependent
variable accounts for survey attrition and the likelihood of repeat proxy interviews for those
who were interviewed by proxy in the rst quarter of observation.
14Marginal e¤ects predicted at mean of covariates.
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Table 5.2: Marginal e¤ects: UKLFS Q4 2011-Q1 2012.
Variable dydx S:E Z P > z
Single .00 0.014 0.13 0.898
Married .048 0.013 3.61 0
Married not living with partner -0.01 0.017 -0.68 0.496
Divorced .008 0.014 0.58 0.564
Civil partnership .056 0.040 1.39 0.164
Age 16-19 -.06 0.011 -5.34 0
Age 20-24 -.028 0.012 -2.35 0.019
Age 25-29 .015 0.012 1.25 0.21
Age 30-34 .006 0.011 0.53 0.598
Age 35-39 .013 0.011 1.17 0.243
Age 40-44 .013 0.011 1.14 0.253
Age 45-49 .001 0.011 0.14 0.891
Age 50-54 .005 0.011 0.51 0.607
Age 55-59 .020 0.011 1.83 0.067
Age 60-64 -.001 0.009 -0.18 0.856
Proxy respondent .059 0.004 13.2 0
Employee -.002 0.005 -0.36 0.719
Self Employed -.012 0.007 -1.58 0.115
Government trainee -.019 0.044 -0.44 0.662
Family worker .021 0.042 0.51 0.608
Unemployed .013 0.010 1.3 0.192
Retired .011 0.009 1.17 0.242
Free rent .034 0.023 1.48 0.14
Mortgage -.001 0.005 -0.11 0.912
Part rent .012 0.029 0.42 0.672
Fully rent .012 0.006 2 0.045
North East -.003 0.013 -0.23 0.818
North West .006 0.011 0.53 0.593
Merseyside .005 0.016 0.31 0.756
Yorkshire & Humberside .001 0.011 0.1 0.918
East Midlands .008 0.012 0.7 0.481
West Midlands -.007 0.011 -0.67 0.503
Eastern .016 0.011 1.38 0.166
London 0 0.011 0.03 0.975
South East .008 0.011 0.76 0.445
South West .010 0.011 0.91 0.362
Wales -.001 0.012 -0.06 0.953
Scotland .008 0.011 0.76 0.45
For the purposes of estimation the base (reference) group to which estimates should be
compared to are: Northern Ireland; Age 65-69; Inactive (excluding retired); Own property
outright; Widowed and Full interview.
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status we included controls for age, using dummy variables with 4 year bands
(base group individuals aged 65-69).Our results show those in the 16-19 and
20-24 age group are signicantly less likely to attrit, and those in the 55-59
age groups more likely to attrit relative to individuals aged 65 and over. This
is in stark contrast to the results found in Clarke and Tate (1999) who found
younger groups were more likely to attrit.15
Clarke and Tate (1999) note the importance of housing tenure on non-
response, the survey design of the UKLFS is such that it re-interviews the same
postal address. Therefore those who live in rented accommodation are much
more likely to non-respond given that the likelihood that they will move at a
given quarter is substantially higher than someone who permanently resides
at an address. Our results indicate that relative to those who own their own
house, individuals who fully rent are more likely to non-respond, which is
intuitive given that it is easier for this group to move address.
We also include geography variables to capture any regional e¤ects. We
do not any evidence of respondents in a particular region being more likely to
attrit than those in Northern Ireland (base group).
Economic variables
In terms of economic variables we control for economic status and for the
type of interview conducted. Relative to the base group of inactive (exclud-
ing retired) being in another economic state had no signicant e¤ect on the
likelihood of attriting.
We control for whether the interview in the rst wave of observation was
by proxy or otherwise, in order to capture e¤ects of the survey design of the
UKLFS itself. Our estimation results suggest those individuals who were rst
interviewed via a proxy, were early 6 percentage points more likely to non-
respond in the following quarter.
Summary and implications of estimation results. The estimation re-
sults indicate there are four factors which raise the probability of attriting
15It is important to remember we include those are proxy interviewed at both waves
as attriting, and if indiviuals are in work then it might be more likey another household
respondents answers questions on their behalf. We do however control for economic status.
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(relative to the appropriate base group). These are: Age; Tenure; Marital
Status and Type of interview. Broadly speaking these results are similar to
the ndings of Clarke and Tate (1999). However there are some di¤erences,
in particular the previous study found younger individuals aged between 16
and 24, were more likely to attrit our results indicate this is no longer the
case respondents in younger age groups are in fact less likely to attrit. Also
of importance is whether the rst interview was carried out via proxy which
seems to increase the probability of non-response in the following quarter.
At present the weighting procedure in CALMAR uses a raking engine us-
ing a logit distance function with ve partitions, that is to say ve sets of
constraints (applied iteratively) on the data cells which allow weights to be
constructed for the two-quarter longitudinal datasets. The models of non-
response indicate that in addition to the existing ve partitions, the weighting
specication should also calibrate on aggregate totals of the type of individual
interview and account for the non random sample retention in terms of age.
However placing a greater number of constraints on the data implies more
stringent conditions on each of the cells of data. Therefore in order to ensure
weights can be estimated we have to aggregate the data from local authority to
region level. In e¤ect we have to balance the number of partitions versus aggre-
gation, otherwise the raking engine will nd empty cells, or estimate weights
which are in the tails of the distribution and create skewed distributions, this
in turn will have implications for the bounding on G weights (Silva, 2003).
Diagnostics
In order to test the robustness of the empirical specication in Section 5.3, we
apply a range of diagnostic measures for consecutive two-quarter samples of
the UKLFS, covering the period between Q1 2011 and Q1 2012.
Predicted versus actual attrition We estimate the predicted rate of at-
trition as the percentage of individuals not observed in the second of two
consecutive quarters, assuming the covariates in Table 5.2 are equal to their
mean value.
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Table 5.3: Predicted versus actual attrition rate.
Sample period (P)redicted (A)ctual Di¤erence (P-A)
Q4 2011 Q1 2012 0:249 0:2523  0:0033
In the two-quarter panel covering the period between Q4 2011 and Q1 2012,
the predicted rate of attrition was very close to the actual rate of attrition. In-
dicating on average our information was doing a satisfactory job of predicting
attrition.
Specication tests. The Wald Statistic indicates that our information set
has substantial explanatory and covariates are jointly signicant. The R2 is
low however this is not unexpected given we estimate across two waves and
the information set contains relatively few explanatory variables.
A link test for misspecication (Table 5.4) found the null hypothesis of no
misspecication could not be rejected at conventional levels of signicance.
Table 5.4: Specication test.
Sample period Null Hypothesis Test result
Q4 2011 Q1 2012 H0 : No misspecification Cannot reject H0
Classication test A classication test makes it is possible to estimate
the predicted probability of non-responding or otherwise, conditional on the
information set (X 0).16 Results are presented in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Classication test.
Sample period Correctly classied (%) Incorrectly classied (%)
Q42011 Q12012 74:77 25:23
16The cutpoint used for the classication was p=0.5.
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Table 5.5 indicates that the model predicts roughly three quarters of the
cases correctly. Given the relatively low number of covariates this specication
seems to correctly classify a substantial proportion of the cases.
Adding additional covariates would imply adding more partitions in the
weighting procedure and cause convergence issues. Therefore building on the
results of Clarke and Tate (1999) and the new results highlighted in the pre-
vious section we chose to proceed the with specication described in Table
5.6.
5.6 Weighting
The second part of this investigation is to implement the ndings from the
model of non-response in the calibration used to estimate longitudinal weights
using GES. The strategy we implement is a two stage weighting process sum-
marised in Section 5.3.17
Partition variables. We specify our sample data to sum to population to-
tals using information available in the UKLFS 2011 cross section data.18 In
order to do this we create auxiliary groups from our sample conditional on
certain characteristics, known as partitions. The current longitudinal datasets
estimated in CALMAR have 4 partitions. We implement a revised feasible
specication with 6 partitions described in Table 5.6.19
17An alternative to estimating longitudinal weights using raking software is to use an
Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) estimator. The ONS prefers to use raking software
given that it makes use of the inverse of the probability of selection and can also adjust
weights optimally to aggregate to known population totals, moreover the GSS is aiming
to align software used by its departments such as that used for estimating survey weights.
One would expect raking software and IPW to produce similar results, given an identical
specication of non response.
18The cross section UKLFS is calibrated itself by the ONS population department, to
ensure the labour force estimate is equal to the population estimate using information derived
from the 2001 Census and is updated each year (mid-year estimates) to account for net
population growth.
19Final spec: p1=(northerni*22)+(sex-1)*11+agemid; p2=govtorr+sex+agewide;
p3=marsta; p4=ten1; p5=ioutcome; p6=economicact1.
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Table 5.6: Feasible specication.
Partition variable Denition
P1 Adjustment for NI by gender and age group
P2 Government region by gender and age group
P3 Marital status
P4 Tenure
P5 First interview outcome
P6 Economic Activity
The revised specication is estimated using GES and G weights are auto-
matically bounded to ensure they are positive.20 The most important changes
relative to the specication in Table 5.1 is the introduction of the agemid
and ioutcomevariables. In particular the agemidplaces greater focus on
younger age groups which from Table 5.2 were less likely to non-respond. We
also explicitly account for the type of (rst) interview in particular whether it
was via proxy. Finally, we also controlled for gender within partition P1 and
P2. The revised specication places greater constraints on the sample data,
ensuring there are no empty cells and at least 20 respondents for each auxiliary
constraint. In terms of feasibility and productionconvergence was achieved
for all panels over the sample period.
G weights.
Denition 5.2 G weight : The G-weight is dened as the modication factor
, which when multiplied by the initial design weight
 
N
n

(to give the nal F
weight), reduces the calibration error to zero.
The design weight itself is calculated as the inverse of the probability of
selection, so individuals with a lower probability of selection receive a higher
20GES runs P1-P6 in an iterative manner and not simultaneously. The bounding is un-
dertaken by CALMAR automatically and pre-sets the bounds on the design weight to be
between 0.4 and 1.2. The optimal g-weight is that which leads to the smallest adjustments
to the initial design weight whilst satisfying the population totals which are being summed
to. If the pre-set bounds are not satised they can be adjusted manually by the user, for
more information see Silva (2003).
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design weight (ONS, 2011c pp.63). Thus the design weight will vary by indi-
vidual and geographic region. An optimal G weight should have mean equal
to one, and look approximately normally distributed. The next section graph-
ically depicts the estimated G weights under the revised specication, unfor-
tunately we were unable to obtain the equivalent G weights for the current
weighting procedure in order to compare them. However the F weights were
available for both and we compare these in the next section.
It is important to note that since we are undertaking a two stage weighting
procedure, the initial set of weights we use (the person weights from the cross
section data) have already gone through this procedure once. In e¤ect the
strategy is to construct the longitudinal weights assuming the initial cross
section is the target population.
GES with 6 partitions under linear boundary constraint. Fig-
ures 5.7-5.10 depict the G weights estimated for four sample panels covering
the period Q1 2011-Q1 2012. The majority of the G weights lie close to 1
which indicates that each representative unit in the sample is appropriately
represented in the target population.21 There is some evidence of a fat right
hand tail, which could be reduced or eliminated by placing more partition con-
straints, however given the smaller sample size in the balanced panel (relative
to the cross section) we found GES was unable to converge (due to empty cells)
when additional constraints were added.22 The estimated G weights in Figures
5.7-5.10 and those depicting the estimated F weights in Figures 5.11-5.14 in-
dicate a bimodal distribution, this warrants attention in future work. Having
tested a number of di¤erent specications in terms constraint combination,
the specication in Table 5.6 was optimal in terms of smallest variance and
business practicality.23
21We estimated a range of post estimation diagnostic measures such as moments, ba-
sic statistical measures, tests for location, quantile ranges and reporting extreme values.
Detailed results can be found in Appendix 8.5.1.
22In each of the histograms it was rare to obtain G weights of greater than 2. See Silva
(2003) Section 4.3 for further details regarding G weight distributions.
23Business practicality in this context refers to the fact that the ONS is responsible for
the production of the UKLFS datasets and therefore is obliged to ensure that the datasets
are available by a certain (predened) date.
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Figure 5.7: G Weight Distribution: UKLFS Q1-Q2 2011.
Figure 5.8: G Weight Distribution: UKLFS Q2-Q3 2011.
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Figure 5.9: G Weight Distribution: UKLFS Q3-Q4 2011.
Figure 5.10: G Weight Distribution: UKLFS Q4 2011-Q1 2012.
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F weights.
Denition 5.3 F weight: G weight*design weight
The F weight is equal to the G weight multiplied by the design weight which
together gross up sample counts to give an estimated population count. In this
sense they represent the frequency of representative individuals, for example
if it happened to be the case that in the target population all respondents
from the South East responded, then they would have a relatively small F
weight. However if only one individual happened to respond from the North
East then conversely they would have a relatively large F weight. The aim of
all sample surveys is to have a distribution of weights which do not contain
extreme weights, that is to say where one individual is representing a very
large number of individuals in the population. For a number of reasons such
as di¤erential and severe attrition amongst particular subgroups it is possible
for extreme weights to be estimated.
CALMAR with 4 partitions using logit raking engine (Clarke
and Tate (1999) specication). Following the work by Clarke and Tate
(1999) Figures 5.11-5.14 plot the F weights which are included in the current
two-quarter longitudinal les produced by the ONS. The 4 partitions used for
construction of the longitudinal weights are detailed in Table 5.1. Under the
existing strategy when calibration takes place and convergence is not achieved
the bounds on the G weights are increased. The initial bounds for the G
weights are set between 0.4 and 2.1.
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Longitudinal weights.
Figure 5.11: F Weight Distribution: UKLFS Q1-Q2 2011.
Figure 5.12: F Weight Distribution: UKLFS Q2-Q3 2011.
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Figure 5.13: F Weight Distribution: UKLFS Q3-Q4 2011.
Figure 5.14: F Weight Distribution: UKLFS Q4 2011-Q1 2012.
Figures 5.11-5.14 show that average person weight is approximately 1500.
By comparison the cross section UKLFS weights are approximately 500. Fig-
ures 5.11-5.14 clearly show the presence of a heavy right hand tail, hence the
existence of outliers and large weights (in excess of 15,000 in some cases).
This is unattractive from a methodological and policy viewpoint, it is not
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good practice to produce data or rely on statistics (available to the research
community and general public) where one individual represents a very large
number of people in the population, particularly if researchers are to draw
policy implications from their analysis.24
GES with 6 partitions using linear raking engine. As shown in
Section 5.5 we extended the specication of Clarke and Tate (1999) to in-
clude additional controls for interview outcome, age and gender. Whilst we
experimented with di¤erent specications, varying the levels of disaggrega-
tion/aggregation for particular partitions, the over-arching aim was to provide
a specication which controlled for attrition and also converged.25 This led to
the specication as outlined in Table 5.6, the F weights estimated using this
specication are shown in Figures 5.15-5.18.
Longitudinal weights.
Figure 5.15: F Weight Distribution: UKLFS Q1-Q2 2011.
24For further adverse issues pertaining to extreme weights see Silva (2003).
25The calibration to the constraining variables is an interative procedure. The greatest
constraints placed on the data were by constraint 2.
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Figure 5.16: F Weight Distribution: UKLFS Q2-Q3 2011.
Figure 5.17: F Weight Distribution: UKLFS Q3-Q4 2011.
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Figure 5.18: F Weight Distribution: UKLFS Q4 2011-Q1 2012.
Figures 5.15-5.18 indicate the peak of the distribution was centred around
900, less than two thirds of the average F weight in the specication shown
in Figures 5.11-5.14.26 Importantly there is no evidence of extreme weights in
any of the sample periods. Part of the reason for our weights being smaller
than the current specication is due to the fact that our balanced panel sam-
ple size is bigger. After placing necessary sample restrictions (highlighted in
Section 5.2.1) we achieved a balanced sample in the order of 46,000-48,000,
whilst the existing two-quarter longitudinal sample les contain only around
34,000-39,000 individuals. After inspecting the syntax le for the existing lon-
gitudinal sample, it is not clear as to why this is the case and warrants further
investigation.27 The larger sample meant we had better coverage of the target
population and could estimate more accurate and hence smaller weights, and
were less likely to run into convergence issues such as empty cells in the con-
straining process. Therefore it is possible estimate a more detailed partition
specication i.e. constrain to a greater number of auxiliary population totals,
such as interview type, economic status and gender. This is important because
26We estimated a range of post estimation diagnostic measures such as moments, ba-
sic statistical measures, tests for location, quantile ranges and reporting extreme values.
Detailed results are available on request.
27ONS methodologists have been notied of this issue.
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the method used in the weighting procedure for both the existing and proposed
weights, meant that in both cases the target population size (the rst cross
section) was identical and so the population which was being aggregated to
was the same.28 The implication is that in Section 5.6 we are able to compare
the ow estimates under the current and proposed weighted estimates.
5.7 Discussion
Cousins (2012a) shows discrepancies exist between the cross section and longi-
tudinal estimate of a particular economic activity at any given quarter. Cousins
(2012a) denes two di¤erent longitudinal estimates:
1. Longitudinal denition 1: The two-quarter longitudinal dataset where
that quarter rst appears;
2. Longitudinal denition 2: The two-quarter longitudinal dataset where
that quarter appears for a second time.
Relative to the cross section estimate Cousins (2012a) shows that due to
attrition the Longitudinal 2denition consistently estimates more individuals
in full time work than the Longitudinal 1estimate (see Figure 5.19). This
order reverses in the case of part time work, due to individuals who ow into
full time work becoming less likely to respond in the following quarter. Overall
the estimated gure in total employment under denitions 1 and 2 is roughly
equal as the di¤erences essentially cancel each other out. Cousins (2012a)
shows the estimated stock of individuals in part time work at a given quarter,
is estimated to be greater using either longitudinal denition versus the cross
section estimate. Whereas the estimated stock of individuals in full time work
is greater in the cross section data than in the longitudinal data.
From Table 5.1 it is clear the current weighting regime is unable to appro-
priately control for the di¤erential e¤ect of employment type in the rst wave,
which contributes to the di¤erential attrition e¤ect and impacts the weighted
longitudinal ows. The revised specication outlined in Table 5.6 goes some
28The di¤erences in the balanced samples took place in the merging process. We can
only assume the existing methodology dropped certain cases whilst we did not, however it
is unclear where this was.
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Figure 5.19: Di¤erence between rst and second longitudinal estimate of the
same quarter.
Source: Cousins (2012a)
way to control for this. In the calibration process we account for whether
the individual is in employment, self employment, government trainee scheme,
unemployed, family worker or inactive. We did not include the full time and
part time categories in the models of non-response reported in STATA, due to
multicollinearity issues with certain economic status variables. However we do
control for whether the outcome of the rst interview was either a full interview
or via proxy, which is likely to be related to whether an individual is in full time
work. Whilst we do not explicitly control for whether the individual is in part
time work or full time work in the rst wave we observe them, given the early
stage of this research it would be possible to alter the calibration specication
to accommodate this. However it may mean that if this additional constraint
is combined with another partition that GES does not converge, therefore the
level of disaggregation at which it is possible to control for this factor requires
further investigation and is left for future research.
Cousins (2012b) notes that due to this di¤erential attrition e¤ect the cases
rolled forward are more likely to be full time workers, due to these respondents
being less likely to respond in their rst interview. Identical to the strategy
used in the current longitudinal methodology, in the revised specication we
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drop those individuals prior to carrying out the weighting process and therefore
do not consider the e¤ect these individuals have on weighted estimates explic-
itly. However as noted in the new specication we do control for the interview
outcome in the rst quarter and therefore if it is the case that full time workers
are more likely to be initially interviewed by proxy this will be accounted for.
The new specication could be amended to control for cases carried forward,
the full time and part time employment variable would need to be interacted
with the outcome variable, additionally all those who non-respond in the tar-
get population (cross section) would also need to be included, in order for GES
to have population totals to sum to.
Cousins (2012b) reconciles the longitudinal versus cross section stock es-
timate of individuals within particular sections of the inactive population.
Cousins (2012b) shows the current longitudinal denitions underestimate the
number of individuals in Full Time Education (FTE), and over estimate the
magnitude who are inactive but not retired. The current weighting methodol-
ogy does account for economic status, as does the revised specication, however
as previously noted due to the large number of categories within the inactive
group, it is likely that by breaking this down further would lead to GES not
converging. It may be possible to include a partition at an aggregate level,
which conditions on activity status within the inactive group however addi-
tional aggregation of other partition variables may be necessary, again we leave
this for future research. It also worth noting that the attrition behaviour of
retired individuals was not signicantly di¤erent to that of the inactive group,
as shown in Table 5.2.
Figure 5.20 shows the cumulative attrition bias per quarter (dened be-
low) is roughly constant and positive for the othergroup, whilst for those
in full time education it is constant and negative. Finally for the retired
group the cumulative attrition bias is negative and increasing over the sample
period. This indicates that whilst there is attrition, the magnitude and direc-
tion varies depending on the particular subgroup and future revisions to the
weighting strategy should try to account for this. Cousins (2012b) also shows
the longitudinal estimates underestimate the stock of individuals in the eco-
nomically active segment of the population. Whilst the current cross section
weighting methodology does not control for economic status in the partition
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Figure 5.20: Cumulative attrition bias.
Source: Cousins (2012b)
Notes: units in millions I(FTE) = Inactive and in full-time education I(retired) = Inactive,
not in FTE and reporting that they are retired I(other) = Inactive and neither in FTE or
retired
Attrition bias: Measured by the change in estimated stock for a given quarter, between the
second time it is estimated in a longitudinal dataset (as the originof any ows) and the
rst time it is estimated (in the previous longitudinal dataset as the destinationof any
ows).
Cumulative attrition bias: Sum the bias for each quarter since Q3 2005, in order to show
whether the bias is systematic and builds up over time, or random and uctuates around
zero.
Cumulative attrition bias per quarter: Gives the average quarterly bias since Q3 2005.
This shows whether the size of the bias is stable over the long term.
variables, the current and revised methodology does. Therefore future research
should reconcile this by considering whether it is feasible to calibrate the main
cross section UKLFS to population totals of employment, unemployment and
inactivity.
In summary, the revised specication is able to address some of the poten-
tial drivers which may be causing a discrepancy to exist between the existing
longitudinal and cross section estimates of labour force activity, as highlighted
by Cousins (2012a, 2012b) but not all. Additional partitions could be intro-
duced to help overcome this, however may require aggregating other partitions
depending on the calibration specication. It is beyond the scope of this chap-
ter to formally compare the revised longitudinal estimates under denitions 1
and 2 and compare these to the cross section estimate, nonetheless this should
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be done in future work. We can however compare the ow estimates under the
existing and revised weights, we do this next.
Comparison of ows
To understand the implications of the revised specication we compare the
labour market ows between Q1 2011- Q2 2011 and Q4 2011-Q1 2012 under the
existing and revised longitudinal weights. If the revised weights are superior
in terms of being able to control for longitudinal attrition they should be
able to reconcile part of the discrepancy between the longitudinal and cross
section estimates of economic activity reported in Section 5.3. By construction
our longitudinal samples contains 16-69 year olds (in order to compare them
to the existing longitudinal dataset) whilst the cross section data includes
individuals aged 16-64. Therefore without constraining the current and revised
specication to 16-64 year olds we cannot directly compare the longitudinal
estimates with the cross section. Moreover the data is held securely at the
ONS and at the time of writing we did not have the necessary permissions
to access it. Therefore it is not possible to provide an accurate response to
the discrepancy highlighted in Section 5.3 nonetheless we try to give some
indication of what estimated ows imply. Clearly this would also be desirable
in order to provide a response to the issues highlighted by Cousins (2012a,
2012b). We leave this for future work.
Nonetheless it is still possible to analyse the magnitude and direction of
ows estimated between the proposed and existing longitudinal les for the
16-69 sample using the current and revised F weights. These are described in
Tables 5.8-5.11 and can be interpreted using the two-quarter ow matrix in
Table 5.7.
5. Accounting for Attrition in the two-quarter UK Labour Force Survey. 170
Table 5.7: Two quarter transition matrix.
Quarter Qt+1
Economic state E U I
E XEE XEU XEI
Qt U XUE XUU XUI
I XIE XIU XII
Notes: The diagonal elements of the matrix correspond to individuals who do not ow into
a di¤erent economic state between two consecutive quarters, for example they report being
in employment in two consecutive quarters.
Table 5.8: Q1 2011-Q2 2011.
Flow Existing Weights (EW ) Revised Weights (RW ) D i¤erence: EW -RW ( jDi¤jEW %)
Aged 15 at both qtrs 553,197 472,165 81,032 (14.6)
Becomes of working age 212,886 166,064 46,822 (22)
Employed!Employed 27,893,264 28,187,609 -294,345 (1.05)
Employed!Unemployed 438,299 293,274 145,025 (33.08)
Employed!Inactive 483,757 324,275 159,482 (32.96)
Unemployed!Employed 520,199 352,612 167,587 (32.21)
Unemployed!Unemployed 1,502,984 1,818,684 -315,700 (21.00)
Unemployed!Inactive 416,283 267,565 148,718 (35.73)
Inactive!Employed 436,830 347,440 89,390 (20.46)
Inactive!Unemployed 502,551 386,181 116,370 (23.15)
Inactive!Inactive 10,756,694 11,081,790 -325,096 (3.02)
Reached retirem ent age by nal qtr 131,178 132,676 -1,498 (1.14)
Total 43,848,122 43,830,336 -17,786 (0.04)
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Table 5.9: Q2 2011-Q3 2011.
Flow Existing Weights (EW ) Revised Weights (RW ) D i¤erence (EW -RW )( jDi¤jEW %)
Aged 15 at both qtrs 523,272 459,945 63,327 (12.67)
Becomes of working age 192,154 147,452 44,702 (23.26)
Employed!Employed 27,869,305 28,166,217 -296,912 (1.06)
Employed!Unemployed 395,523 274,224 121,299 (30.66)
Employed!Inactive 580,077 402,984 177,093 (30.52)
Unemployed!Employed 523,059 371,621 151,438 (28.95)
Unemployed!Unemployed 1,620,132 1,879,671 -259,539 (16.02)
Unemployed!Inactive 323,519 213,164 110,355 (34.11)
Inactive!Employed 472,791 394,967 77,824 (16.46)
Inactive!Unemployed 662,649 507,153 155,496 (23.46)
Inactive!Inactive 10,584,332 10,938,857 -354,525 (3.35)
Reached retirem ent age by nal qtr 137,167 138,982 -1,815 (1.32)
Total 43,883,980 43,895,236 11,256 (0.026)
Table 5.10: Q3 2011-Q4 2011.
Flow Existing Weights (EW ) Revised Weights (RW ) D i¤erence (EW -RW )( jDi¤jEW %)
Aged 15 at both qtrs 518,168 435,286 82,882 (16)
Becomes of working age 190,330 151,461 38,869 (20.42)
Employed!Employed 27,801,715 28,113,331 -311,616 (1.12)
Employed!Unemployed 439,476 325,911 113,565 (0.128)
Employed!Inactive 641,592 442,889 198,703 (30.97)
Unemployed!Employed 616,496 446,210 170,286 (27.62)
Unemployed!Unemployed 1,718,306 2,007,525 -289,219 (16.83)
Unemployed!Inactive 374,842 253,798 121,044 (32.29)
Inactive!Employed 485,892 413,742 72,150 (14.84)
Inactive!Unemployed 446,155 395,847 50,308 (11.27)
Inactive!Inactive 10,578,377 10,810,012 -231,635 (2.19)
Reached retirem ent age by nal qtr 130,051 125,911 4,140 (3.18)
Total 43,941,400 43,921,923 19,477 (0.04)
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Table 5.11: Q4 2011-Q1 2012.
Flow Existing Weights (EW ) Revised Weights (RW ) D i¤erence (EW -RW )( jDi¤jEW %)
Aged 15 at both qtrs 538,888 477,018 61,870 (11.48)
Becomes of working age 157,119 125,660 31,459 (20.02)
Employed!Employed 27,942,481 28,262,777 -320,296 (1.14)
Employed!Unemployed 443,843 300,835 143,008 (32.22)
Employed!Inactive 527,000 351,334 175,666 (33.33)
Unemployed!Employed 533,401 446,254 87,147 (16.33)
Unemployed!Unemployed 1,694,728 1,894,948 -200,220 (11.81)
Unemployed!Inactive 390,698 273,912 116,786 (29.89)
Inactive!Employed 363,427 344,712 18,715 (5.14)
Inactive!Unemployed 445,202 357,979 87,223 (19.59)
Inactive!Inactive 10,864,929 11,016,987 -152,058 (1.39)
Reached retirem ent age by nal qtr 127,327 128,599 -1,272 (1)
Total 44,029,043 43,981,016 48,027 (0.109)
Tables 5.8-5.11 show that under the proposed weighting the estimated mag-
nitude of the ows into identical states across two consecutive waves is signif-
icantly higher than under the existing weighting. This can be seen clearly
in the third column of Tables 5.8-5.11 which includes the di¤erence between
the ows under existing and proposed weights as a proportion of the existing
ows, some of the di¤erences are in excess of 30%. To compensate for this
(given the population totals are roughly the same) the estimated magnitude
of ows which involve a transition into a di¤erent economic state (under the
proposed weights) is lower. By taking into account additional factors which
are correlated with attrition and estimating revised weights using GES, the
impact on estimated ows is signicant. Clarke and Tate (1999) note that
gross ows between two di¤erent economic states based on existing weights
may be biased upwards due to response error; such as proxy interview and
survey mode. Their ndings suggest it is particularly severe amongst certain
subgroups such as the inactive. The revised weighting does account for certain
types of non-response error (although not by economic state) and the esti-
mated ows from one economic state to another are lower compared to the
existing weights, therefore this may partially be correcting for response error
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in the UKLFS.
In terms of the discrepancies reported by Cousins (2012a), the ows re-
ported in Tables 5.8-5.11 cannot o¤er any tentative suggestions as to whether
the revised weights o¤er an improvement in dealing with di¤erential initial
non-response and attrition depending on whether an individual is in part time
or full time work. For this to be possible one should estimate revised ows
for an identical population (aged 16-64) and compare existing, revised and
cross section labour force estimates under each denition reported in section
5.6. Similarly, the main nding of Cousins (2012b) is that there exists attri-
tion bias within particular subgroups of the inactive. We do not break down
ows for the inactive group and therefore future work should condition on eco-
nomic state (retired, in full time education or other) and estimate ows from
these states and compare them under denition 1 and 2 using the longitudinal
estimates to determine the magnitude and trend of the bias.
Tables 5.8-5.11 suggest the existing weights signicantly overestimate the
gross ows between di¤erent states over two consecutive quarters.29 Alter-
natively it could be that the revised weights are not fully accounting for the
magnitude of the ows between di¤erent states, although they do take into
account all the existing partitions used in the current weighting procedure. In
relation to the discrepancy highlighted in Section 5.3 between the cross section
and existing longitudinal dataset in relation to the stock estimate for a given
quarter, there is no clear pattern in Tables 5.8-5.11 as to whether the revised
weights consistently estimate more or less individuals in employment, unem-
ployment or inactivity at a given quarter. Therefore future work should inves-
tigate why such a discrepancy exists building on the work of Cousins(2012a,b)
and combining this with the revised calibration specication in this chapter.
The fact that the balanced panel used in deriving the revised longitudinal
weights is signicantly larger than that used in the current procedure, implies
we are able to derive a more comprehensive picture of the ows between eco-
nomic states due to improved sample coverage. This is supported by the fact
the F weights estimates under the revised specication are two thirds the size
of those currently estimated.
29See Bell and Smith (2002) for evidence on the magnitude of worker ows using the
longitudinal UKLFS datasets.
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It is clear the di¤erence between the existing and revised calibration spec-
ication signicantly e¤ects the longitudinal ow estimates, and given their
importance in understanding labour market dynamics underlines the impor-
tance of future research in this area.
5.8 Future work
Future research looks to test alternative specications for the model of non-
response, to ensure the optimal combination of covariates guides the choice of
constraints used in the calibration of longitudinal weights. Cousins (2012a)
highlights that attrition patterns for UKLFS sample members is di¤erent in
magnitude and direction, depending on whether the individual was in full time
or part time work in their rst interview, future work should incorporate such
factors in the calibration specication. We have ignored duration dependence
which may e¤ect the likelihood of response (Zabel, 1998); a simple way to
control for this is to include the wave number of the survey, future research
should test for the direction and magnitude of duration dependence.
Cousins (2012b) highlights the discrepancy in the estimated ows into and
out of inactivity using the existing two quarter UKLFS compared to the cross
section UKLFS for a given quarter. The e¤ect is particularly severe amongst
those in full time education or inactive (but not retired). Future research
should incorporate a more detailed specication of the initial economic state
in the calibration specication. Similar to Cousins (2012b) in order to judge
the accuracy of the revised longitudinal weights, these should be compared to
the cross section estimates for each quarter.30
The revised specication only constrains to rst quarter marginal totals.
Existing weights constrain to Q1 and Q2. If the revised weights do not satis-
factorily reproduce the Q2 cross section then this could be source for the large
discrepancy found in estimated ows. In future work one should reproduce the
revised weights using information from Q1 and Q2 using pseudo-control totals
to ensure weighted estimates account for the economic activity distribution
30Whilst the revised weights indicate a higher a number of individuals in each state at a
given quarter, this does not necessarily mean the discrepancy will be larger than that which
already exists, as the ows into other states will be lower for a given quarter, given that
under the exisiting and revised weights the population total is very similar.
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at Q1 and Q2. However it is worth noting that if the Q1 and Q2 economic
activity marginal distributions are correlated then this will distort estimated
gross ows (Clarke and Tate, 1999).
A note of caution is that whilst it is desirable to place more constraints in
the calibration specication, this in turn places more demands on the data.
Depending on how these constraints are specied may cause the raking engine
to nd empty or very low cell sizes, which would inhibit the estimation of es-
timate longitudinal weights. This may be overcome by additional aggregation
in other constraining factors such as geographical locality or age, however this
would have to be justied. Moreover given the productionnature of the ONS
it should be the case that longitudinal weights should be estimable as required.
Finally the procedure requires automation through a user written SAS macro
for business use.
5.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we have proposed a revised specication for the estimation of
longitudinal weights for the two-quarter longitudinal UKLFS. We model non-
response using a binary framework and use the results to guide the choice of
the auxiliary variables in the weighting specication. In addition to the exist-
ing partitions following the work of Clarke and Tate (1999), we additionally
account for interview outcome, age and gender in the calibration. We also show
it is feasible to weight the two-quarter longitudinal les using the GES raking
engine, and show the subsequent weights are a signicant improvement from a
statistical and analytical perspective compared those currently estimated. The
specication of the partition and logit variables is driven by existing research,
economic theory and business practicality. This is to ensure the correct balance
is struck between enriching the number of partition variables to improve the
accuracy of the weights and ensuring a parsimonious specication to ensure
GES converges on each run.
As highlighted in Section 5.2 there has been a substantial decline in re-
sponse rates by households in the UKLFS. This decline is likely to be more
severe amongst particular subgroups. Such di¤erential attrition underlines the
importance of having up-to-date longitudinal weights to account for this.
Chapter 6
Approaches to the Seasonal
Adjustment of Labour Market
Flows
6.1 Introduction
The United Kingdom Labour Force Survey (UKLFS) measures the stock of
employment, unemployment and inactivity at each quarter. In doing so it
helps researchers and policymakers understand the trends in labour market
transitions across consecutive quarters, for example to track changes in labour
force dynamics during a recessionary period or due to a policy intervention.
Data such as the UKLFS represent a quarterly time series of observations
and therefore may exhibit cyclic variation or seasonal factors. It is important to
seasonally adjust data in order to understand how calendar e¤ects can e¤ect the
trend component of a series, and thus aid interpretation between consecutive
time periods (ONS, 2007). Ignoring seasonal factors may lead to incorrect
inference about the underlying trend of the data, and makes it di¢ cult to
derive valid comparisons over time particularly for very recent periods (Atuk
and Ural, 2002).
The ONS currently publishes estimates of labour market ows using data
from the two-quarter longitudinal datasets; however at these are not season-
ally adjusted. The indirect approach to seasonal adjustment involves adjusting
subcomponent series to derive a seasonally adjusted aggregate, whilst the di-
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rect approach involves adjusting the aggregate itself. The aim of this chapter is
to investigate the extent of seasonality in the ows estimates derived from the
two-quarter longitudinal datasets. Conditional on seasonality being present we
then compare direct and indirect seasonally adjusted estimates of inows and
outows associated with labour market status in the UK; and subsequently
recommend a preferred approach to the seasonal adjustment of these ows.
The rest of this chapter is set out as follows; Section 6.2 describes the
UKLFS. Section 6.3 gives a description of labour market ows and estimates
of seasonally adjusted LFS data. Section 6.4 details results from a range
of diagnostic measures to access the relative performance of the direct and
indirect seasonal adjustment. Section 6.5 considers future work. Section 6.6
concludes.
6.2 Data
The UK Labour Force Survey (UKLFS) is a quarterly household survey which
interviews approximately 35,000 households, and is primarily concerned with
tracking labour market circumstances of households in the UK. The LFS is
a longitudinal survey such that it follows households for ve quarters, after
which they are rotated out.1 2 Therefore at any given quarter 20% of the
sample is new i.e. it is the rst time the household is observed in the sample.
The LFS is compiled by the ONS and in its current quarterly version format
has been running since 1992.
In addition to the cross section estimates the ONS produces two-quarter
and ve quarter longitudinal datasets, in order to track ows between di¤erent
labour market states. It is the two-quarter datasets which are the concern of
this chapter. These allow one to follow an individual from one quarter to the
next and therefore by denition constitute a panel.3 In order to eligible to be
part of this longitudinal study an individual should be present in each quarter,
1This only holds true if there is no attrition otherwise as a proportion of the sample the
refreshment will constitute more than one fth of the sample.
2For more detailed information see the ONS UKLFS methodology website:
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/method-quality/specic/labour-market/labour-
market-statistics/index.html
3The questions in the LFS mean it is not possible to determine transitions that occur
within these three month intervals.
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thus by construction panels are balanced.4 It is possible that an individual can
change economic status across the two-quarters and therefore this investigation
is related to ows between employment, unemployment and inactivity.
6.3 Labour Market Flows and approaches to
their Seasonal Adjustment
6.3.1 Description of the labour market
Conditional on being observed in two consecutive quarters in the two-quarter
longitudinal datasets, an individual can either stay or make a transition into
one of the following states: (E)mployed, (U)nemployed or (I)nactive. This
gives rise to nine possible transitions summarised in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Two quarter transition matrix.
Quarter Q+1
Status E U I
Q E XEE XEU XEI
U XUE XUU XUI
I XIE XIU XII
Each of the elements (Xij) in the matrix reects the magnitude of ows
between two consecutive quarters. From this information estimates of gross
inows and outows for each of the statuses can be obtained, as summarised
in Table 6.2.
4In some cases which are related to the age (75+) of the individual in their rst interview,
respondents information is only collected in the rst and last wave. In other cases informa-
tion may be rolled forward if individuals are not contactable in two consecutive quarters.
Cases such as these are not included in the longitudinal datasets.
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Table 6.2: Denitions of ows across two consecutive quarters.
Denition
Inows to
Employment XUE+XIE
Unemployment XEU+XIU
Inactivity XEI+XUI
Outows from
Employment XEU+XEI
Unemployment XUE+XUI
Inactivity XIE+XIU
6.3.2 Seasonal adjustment in ONS
Seasonal adjustment aims to remove e¤ects associated with the time of year or
arrangement of the calendar, so that underlying movements within time series
may be more easily interpreted. An economic time series may be thought of
as an aggregation of a number of unobservable components, namely:
 A trend-cycle (C): the underlying long-term movement in the series, plus
cyclical movements about it
 A seasonal component (S): within-year movements about the trend-
cycle that remain roughly constant in magnitude and direction, and in
the same month/quarter, from year to year
 An irregular component (I): residual variation after the trend-cycle and
seasonal component (plus calendar-related e¤ects) have been removed
from the series, for example short-term shocks
The way in which the components are aggregated may be additive (whereby
the components are summed i.e. Y = C + S + I) or multiplicative (whereby
the components are multiplied together i.e. Y = C  S  I). Series that have
a multiplicative pattern are typically log transformed to enforce additivity in
order to estimate the components.
Seasonal adjustment aims to estimate the seasonal component and remove
it (as well as calendar-related e¤ects), from the observed time series to leave
the trend-cycle and irregular component unchanged. Throughout ONS, the
primary method for seasonal adjustment is the X-11 algorithm, as detailed in
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Ladiray and Quenneville (2001). The method is based on the iterative ap-
plication of moving averages, which are used to decompose a time series into
its unobserved components. However, due to the symmetrical nature of such
moving averages, decomposed values for the most recent periods are obtained
after the series is extended with forecasts. The forecasts are appended to re-
gARIMA(regression with Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average errors)
models, which are also used to derive adjustments for additive outliers and
level shifts. These adjustments are known as prior adjustments, because
they are made prior to the application of the X-11 algorithm (if prior adjust-
ments were not made for such e¤ects, seasonally adjusted estimates might be
distorted). More information on ARIMA and regARIMA models can be found
in Box et al. (2008), Findley et al. (1998) and US Census Bureau (2011).
6.3.3 Approaches to seasonally adjusting labour market
ows
Seasonal adjustment of each of the six aggregate ows series as listed in Table
6.2 can be done in two ways:
1. Direct estimation: seasonally adjust each of the six aggregate ows series
for example seasonally adjust the inows to employment as the sum of
XUE+XIE
2. Indirect estimation: seasonally adjust each of subcomponents for exam-
ple seasonally adjust XUE and XIE separately and then sum these to
derive the indirect seasonal adjustment of inows to employment.
Seasonal adjustment of net inows to a particular labour force status also
leads to a choice between direct and indirect estimation. For example should
one seasonally adjust aggregate inows and outows to derive net inows,
or seasonally adjust net inows itself? However, the analysis reported here
focused solely on seasonal adjustment of the six aggregate ows series.
It is worth noting that these are not equivalent and will not give exactly
the same estimates. The direct approach is conceptually appealing, as seasonal
adjustment is performed directly on the series of interest. However, the indirect
approach guarantees that the sum of the seasonally adjusted subcomponents
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is equal to the seasonally adjusted aggregate, which is not the case for direct
estimation. For more information and discussion on the two approaches see
Eurostat (2009) and Ladiray and Mazzi (2003).
In order to obtain directly and indirectly seasonally adjusted estimates,
each of the six transition series and six aggregate ows series was seasonally
adjusted using the X-12-ARIMA software package (US Census Bureau, 2011).
The X-12-ARIMA process is described in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: The X-12 ARIMA method.
Source: ONS (2007).
Regression-ARIMA is used by X-12 ARIMA to identify and quantify factors
which will impact on the seasonal factor estimation (ONS, 2007).5 This is
described in more detail next.
Regression-ARIMA model time series in such a way that prior adjustments
are estimated prior to seasonal adjustment. A regression-ARIMA model can
be dened as:
log(Yt) = 
0Xt + Zt
Where the dependent variable Yt has been log transformed, Zt is an ARIMA
process and Xt are regressors for trading day, holiday or calender e¤ect, ad-
ditive temporary changes, level shift, ramps or other e¤ects. Diagnostic tests
5The following exposition of X-12-ARIMA draws heavily on the ONS Guide to Seasonal
Adjustment (2007).
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are included in X-12-ARIMA to evaluate the t of the model.
As noted a time series is made of a trend (Ct), seasonal (St) and irregular
(It) component. Each of these is dened above. The X-12-ARIMA method
makes use of the X-11 process (Moore et al. 1967). The labour market ows
examined below were found to demonstrate a multiplicative relationship be-
tween the components. X-11 performs the following procedure on the series:
1. A preliminary trend cycle C 0t is derived by applying a trend moving
average to the original series Yt
This can smooth a series or estimate and remove seasonality. Weights are
symmetrical for months either side of the month of interest, the e¤ect is to
remove any stable annual variation and reduce the variance of a purely random
component (leaving the linear trend unchanged).
2. The initial estimate of trend is removed from the original series to give
a detrended time series: St  It = YtC0t
The `SI 0t ratio can be plotted to determine whether they are below or above
trend. They also depict any breaks in the series.
3. It is here outliers are detected automatically and replaced in the SIt
series
Outliers reduce distortion in the series. Outliers are replaced in such a
way that progressively better estimates of the outliers are derived. Outliers
are identied by calculating the standard deviation for each ve year moving
span of the irregular component, if the irregular component is 1.5 away from
0 then it is replaced. The modied SIt ratio is used to estimate the seasonal
component.
4. The preliminary estimate of the seasonal component
^
Stis derived by ap-
plying a seasonal moving average to the modied SIt ratio for each quar-
ter.
If the estimated moving averages represent the seasonal factor then the
irregular component is the deviation from each point from the moving averages.
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5. Divide Y by S to give the preliminary seasonally adjusted series
This provides an estimate of C  I.
The process described in 1-5 is then repeated but instead of using the
original detrended series one starts with the seasonally adjusted series derived
in 5 to give improved estimates of the trend component (by using Henderson
moving averages).
Finally the entire process is repeated twice more, each time using the mod-
ied series with extreme values removed or reduced.
Many of X-12-ARIMAs automatic modelling and selection capabilities
were utilised during this process, including:
 A test for the need for a log transformation
 Selection of the ARIMA model orders
 Additive outlier and level shift detection and correction
 Selection of the trend and seasonal moving average lengths
In particular, the selection of the ARIMA part of the model is chosen by
selecting the order such that the most simplest model (smallest number of
parameters) which gives a satisfactory t is used. The method used by X-12-
ARIMA is to check the model ts the data in a satisfactory manner i.e. to
check the autocorrelation of the residuals: any signicant correlation in the
residuals suggest a potentially misspecied model. X-12-ARIMA automates
two procedures: (1) use a predetermined list of candidate models and choose
the model which best ts the data or (2) start with simple model and make
it increasingly complex until it meets a goodness of t criterion.6 For the
purposes of this work relatively simple models (in terms of lag order) were
chosen using the automatic X-12-ARIMA in built selection method described
above.
6Other tests include testing whether the moving average part of the model for evidence
of overdi¤erencing or estimating within-sample forecasts: the absolute average percentage
error of within sample forecasts in the the last three years should be less than 15% (ONS,
2007). We did not need to resort to manual selection in which the use of AIC and BIC tests
are used to compare alternative specications.
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Where necessary X-12-ARIMAs automatic selections were amended via
manual intervention following, for example, visual inspection of the plotted
original and seasonally adjusted data however this was rare in practice.
Figures 6.1 to 6.6 illustrate directly and indirectly seasonally adjusted esti-
mates for each of the six aggregate ows series. The sample used for estimation
is all individuals aged 16-64.7 All of the series exhibit a clear seasonal pattern.
Some series are more volatile than others for example outows to employment,
and some contain abrupt changes in level for example inows to and outows
from unemployment, which are related macroeconomic shocks such as recent
recessionary period.
Figure 6.2: Inows to employment: UKLFS Q4 2001-Q2 2012.
7Figures 6.1-6.6 are quoted in 000s.
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Figure 6.3: Inows to unemployment: UKLFS Q4 2001-Q2 2012.
Figure 6.4: Inows to inactivity: UKLFS Q4 2001- Q2 2012.
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Figure 6.5: Outows to employment: UKLFS Q4 2001-Q2 2012.
Figure 6.6: Outows to unemployment: UKLFS Q4 2001-Q2 2012.
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Figure 6.7: Outows to inactivity: UKLFS Q4 2001-Q2 2012.
Table 6.3 summarises mean and maximum absolute percentage di¤erences
(MeAPD and MxAPD respectively) between directly and indirectly seasonally
adjusted estimates for each series, calculated over the sample period 2001Q4
to 2012Q2 (43 observations) as:
MeAPD =
1
43
43X
t=1
DSAt   ISAtISAt

 100
 (6.1)
MxAPD = max
DSAt   ISAtISAt

 100
 t = 1; 2; ::::; 43 (6.2)
There are clearly di¤erences between the direct and indirect estimates, and
these di¤erences are typically larger for some series and for some time periods
than others.8 Table 6.3 indicates that the largest MeAPD for inows is into
unemployment, whilst for outows it is from inactivity. In terms of MxAPD,
8The aim of this chapter is to determine which adustment produces the more stable
seasonally adjusted estimates in general. Thus, we should focus on the entire span of data
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Table 6.3: Magnitudes of di¤erences between directly and indirectly seasonally
adjusted estimates.
MeAPD MxAPD
Inows to
Employment 0.77 1.89
Unemployment 0.91 5.04
Inactivity 0.76 3.36
Outows from
Employment 0.43 1.22
Unemployment 0.62 3.27
Inactivity 0.75 3.16
Source: O¢ ce for National Statistics
the pattern is similar for both inows and outows; the di¤erence is relatively
large for unemployment and  to a lesser extent  inactivity, and relatively
small for employment.
The nancial recession between 2007 and 2009 had a clear impact on inows
to employment. If the downturn had a particular e¤ect on specic subcompo-
nents of total inows into unemployment (XEU+XIU) in Table 6.2 this would
lead to a discrepancy in the direct and indirect estimate of the seasonal adjust-
ment of the time series. For example if the recession a¤ected the ows (and
hence potentially the seasonal component in the time series) from employment
to unemployment (XEU) in a di¤erent way to ows from inactivity to unem-
ployment (XIU) then this would be accounted for in the indirect estimate but
not the direct estimate which adjusts the total of the two subcomponents.9
that we would be looking to publish. The other consideration when choosing a span to
analyse is how many periods are included in the span. If we focus on just the recession
period, we would be limiting ourselves to a small sample of periods to base our comparison
on (particularly as we are dealing with quarterly rather than monthly data). Giving some
periods more weight than others but comparing the series over the whole span gets round
this problem, but the problem then becomes choosing the weights in some non-arbitrary
way.
9Part of the work for this project included estimating the seasonally adjusted sub compo-
nents of the series including their trend, seasonal and irregular. A plot of these would show
the nancial recession a¤ected particular series di¤erently to others. As the main point of
this chaper is to discern whether seasonality exists and not the e¤ect of the recession on
seasonal adjustment estimates of labour market ows (some work has been done in this area
for labour market ows in the US see Greenaway-McCrevy, 2013) we leave this for future
work.
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If the direct and indirect estimates yielded only marginal di¤erences for
all six series, there would be little motivation to formally assess which of the
two approaches is preferred; one might opt to use the indirect approach as it
has the property of its constituent components being additive. However, as
some of the di¤erences are quite substantial, a formal comparison involving
quantitative measures is required.
6.4 Quality Comparison of the Direct and In-
direct Approaches to Seasonal Adjustment
For each of the six aggregate ow series, three dimensions of seasonal adjust-
ment quality were used to compare the direct and indirect approaches. These
dimensions are:
1. Residual seasonality
2. Revisions
3. Roughness
The measures associated with each of these three dimensions were produced
using X-12-ARIMA, and are described in detail in Findley et al. (1998), ONS
(2007) and US Census Bureau (2011).
6.4.1 Residual seasonality
Residual seasonality can be dened as seasonality present in a time series
after seasonal adjustment has been performed. By denition this makes it
an obvious indicator of seasonality adjustment quality, because a completely
seasonally adjusted series should be free of seasonality.
Residual seasonality was tested for in two ways. The rst was an F-test for
stable seasonality, performed on the seasonally adjusted data (after taking dif-
ferences between successive values, in order to remove the trend in the series).
This test is obtained from the classical one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA)
approach, whereby total variance is broken down into a variance of the four
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quarterly mean levels, due to seasonality, and a residual variance (Ladiray and
Quenneville, 2001).
For each of the six aggregate ows series, two null hypotheses were tested:
 H1: no residual seasonality in the entire series
 H2: no residual seasonality in the last three years of the series (reecting
the relative importance generally placed on more recent observations)
Neither of these null hypotheses was rejected for any of the six series at the
1% signicance level.
The second test for residual seasonality was visual inspection of the spectral
plot for the seasonally adjusted data. If a quarterly time series is seasonal, one
would expect the observation in the current time period to be related to that
four periods ago, the observation in the previous time period to be related
to that ve periods ago, and so on. Such a series is said to exhibit cyclical
variation with a periodof four quarters, or a frequencyof 0:25 cycles per
quarter (so that the cycle repeats itself every four quarters). The estimated
spectrum is a plot of intensity by frequency. The total area under the curve
represents the variance of the series, so a peak at a certain frequency marks
an important contribution to the variance by a cyclical component of that
frequency. Hence one would expect to see a peak in the estimated spectrum
of a seasonal quarterly series at the frequency 0:25, but no such peak in the
estimated spectrum of the corresponding seasonally adjusted data if the series
has been completely seasonally adjusted. For more details on spectral analysis
of time series see Nerlove (1964).
Figure 6.7 illustrates the estimated spectrum for non-seasonally adjusted
inows to employment. As expected, there is an obvious peak at the frequency
0:25 cycles per quarter, indicating the presence of seasonality. Figures 6.8
and 6.9 illustrate the estimated spectra for directly and indirectly seasonally
adjusted inows to employment respectively. Neither of the estimated spectra
have a peak at the seasonal frequency, corroborating the result obtained from
the F-tests: that there is no evidence of residual seasonality in either of the
seasonally adjusted estimates. Spectra for the inows to employment series
have been arbitrarily selected for illustration, as the results are representative
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of seasonal adjustments for the other ve aggregate ows series (whose spectra
are not shown here).
Figure 6.8: Estimated spectrum for non-seasonally adjusted inows to employ-
ment.
Source: O¢ ce for National Statistics
Notes: 1. The spectrum has been estimated from the rst di¤erenced, log transformed,
prior adjusted data.
2. Intensity is presented on the decibel (10xlog10) scale
Figure 6.9: Estimated spectrum for directly seasonally adjusted inows to
employment.
Source: O¢ ce for National Statistics
Notes: 1. The spectrum has been estimated from the rst di¤erenced, log transformed,
prior adjusted data.
2. Intensity is presented on the decibel (10xlog10) scale
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Figure 6.10: Estimated spectrum for indirectly seasonally adjusted inows to
employment.
Source: O¢ ce for National Statistics
Notes: 1. The spectrum has been estimated from the rst di¤erenced, log transformed,
prior adjusted data.
2. Intensity is presented on the decibel (10xlog10) scale
6.4.2 Revisions: Stability of UKLFS time series
A desirable characteristic of a seasonally adjusted series is stability. When-
ever a new observation is added to the current end of a time series, and the
series is then seasonally adjusted, there will be revisions to seasonally adjusted
estimates, particularly in the most recent time periods. Seasonally adjusted
estimates that are subject to relatively small revisions over time are said to
be stable. On the other hand, seasonally adjusted estimates that are subject
to relatively large revisions over time are said to be unstable. In the latter
case, seasonally adjusted estimates may not be a reliable source of informa-
tion for users, particularly if revisions result in changes in direction as well as
magnitude.
An analysis of revisions history was performed for each of the six aggregate
ows series in order to assess the stability of the directly and indirectly sea-
sonally adjusted estimates. The process for each series is summarised below
and described visually in Figure 6.10.
1. 2006 Q4 was selected as the start date for the span to be analysed
2. The series was seasonally adjusted up to and including the start date
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3. The start date was moved forward one time period and the series was
seasonally adjusted again; this process continued until the end of the
series was reached
4. The percentage revision between rst and nal seasonally adjusted esti-
mates was calculated for each time period included in the analysed span
(excluding the most recent period, for which only one seasonally adjusted
estimate is available)
5. The mean and maximum absolute percentage revisions (MeAPR and
MxAPR respectively) across all 22 time periods included in the analysed
span were calculated as:
MeAPD =
1
22
21X
t=1
Finalt   FirsttFirstt

 100
 (6.3)
MxAPD = max
Finalt   FirsttFirstt

 100
 t = 1; 2; ::::; 22 (6.4)
Where:
Firstt = rst seasonally adjusted estimate at time t
F inalt = nal seasonally adjusted estimate at time t
Figure 6.11: Overview of the process used for the revisions history analysis.
6. Approaches to the Seasonal Adjustment of Labour Market Flows 194
Table 6.4 summarises MeAPR and MxAPR values for the direct and indi-
rect approaches for each of the six aggregate ows series. The results show nei-
ther of the approaches is superior to the other. Whether considering MeAPR
or MxAPR, each approach is preferred for exactly half of the series.
Table 6.4: Mean and maximum absolute percentage revisions between rst
and nal seasonally adjusted estimates.
MeAPR MxAPR
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
Inows to
Employment 1.21 1.29 3.57 3.08
Unemployment 0.43 0.83 1.26 2.18
Inactivity 1.13 0.90 3.71 2.73
Outows from
Employment 1.00 0.72 2.25 1.74
Unemployment 1.34 1.14 2.75 3.88
Inactivity 0.69 0.82 1.82 2.12
Source: O¢ ce for National Statistics.
6.4.3 Roughness of a seasonally adjusted time series
In general, there is no requirement for a seasonally adjusted time series to
be smooth. If the non-seasonally adjusted data are relatively volatile, then
one should expect the seasonally adjusted data to also be volatile, as seasonal
adjustment aims to remove the seasonal component, but not the irregular
component, from the time series. However, smoothness (or roughness) can be
a useful criterion for comparing competing seasonal adjustments.
For each of the six aggregate ows series, roughness is measured as the
Root mean Square Di¤erence (RMSD) between the seasonally adjusted data
and a smooth trend estimate, where the latter is obtained via a di¤erencing
operation. This measure is reported for the entire series and for the latest three
years. A relatively large RMSD value indicates a relatively rough seasonally
adjusted series, whilst a relatively small RMSD value indicates a relatively
smooth seasonally adjusted series.
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Table 6.5 summarises RMSD values for the direct and indirect approaches
for each of the six aggregate ows series. The results are again mixed and
neither of the approaches can be said to be superior.
Table 6.5: Root mean square di¤erences between seasonally adjusted and trend
estimates.
RMSD RMSD Percentage
(Entire series) (Last 3 years) Change
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Entire Series Last 3 years
Inows to
Employment 66537 66222 74145 73686 0.47 0.62
Unemployment 37116 40069 29107 32302 -7.96 -10.98
Inactivity 61800 61027 77935 77343 1.25 0.76
Outows from
Employment 78377 77990 90559 89069 0.49 1.64
Unemployment 47798 49004 55131 56619 -2.52 -2.70
Inactivity 45088 46845 41322 42824 -3.90 -3.64
Source: O¢ ce for National Statistics.
Note: positive percentage changes indicate that the indirect seasonally adjusted composite
is smoother than the direct seasonally adjusted composite.
6.5 Future work
Future research should investigate seasonality in the UKLFS using an alter-
native software package such as "Time Series Regression with ARIMA Noise,
Missing Observations and Outliers" and "Signal Extraction in ARIMA Time
Series" (TRAMO/SEATS). This has a broader range in ARIMA model se-
lection criteria as compared to X-12-ARIMA.10 Conrmation of an identical
model specication would provide further evidence the correct specication
was chosen.
We show there is no evidence of residual seasonality conditional on adjust-
ment, however Atuk and Ural (2002) formally test ARIMA versus TRAMO/
SEATS on Turkish monetary data, and nd some evidence to suggest that
10There is also an abridged version known as X-13-ARIMA-SEATS.
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TRAMO/ SEATS removes the seasonal component from a series more e¤ec-
tively than X-12-ARIMA.11 However the US Census Bureau nds contradic-
tory evidence which suggests TRAMO/SEATS can induce seasonality into a
series when the underlying NSA series exhibits no seasonality (Hood, 2002).
Nonetheless in all other respects Atuk and Ural (2002) show the two software
perform very similarly, and conclude that due to the additivity property the
indirect method of seasonal adjustment is preferred.
More recently Greenaway-McCrevy (2013) proposes a semi-parametric ap-
proach to seasonal adjustment, which he argues captures the e¤ects of eco-
nomic recessions more adequately than existing methods. The 2008-2009 -
nancial crisis is easily distinguishable in the UKLFS data in terms of inows
into unemployment and inactivity during the sample period. Given such an
approach has only recently been applied to the area of seasonal adjustment,
further research needs to be done; nonetheless such an approach clearly o¤ers
desirable features (Greenaway-McCrevy, 2013).
Finally, the results of chapter ve show that existing longitudinal weights
(which are used to estimate labour force ows used in chapter six) do not
capture attrition appropriately. Therefore future research should carry out a
similar investigation, but instead using labour force ows estimates derived
from revised longitudinal weights.
6.6 Conclusion
It has been shown that labour force ows measured from the UKLFS data
exhibit seasonality. Two approaches to seasonal adjustment have been inves-
tigated direct and indirect estimation and have been shown to produce
di¤erent estimates. The two approaches have been compared in terms of three
dimensions of seasonal adjustment quality: residual seasonality, revisions and
roughness. On balance neither of the approaches is superior. There is no
evidence of residual seasonality in any of the six aggregate ows series for ei-
ther adjustment, and the results for the revisions and roughness dimensions
are mixed. It is therefore recommended that the six aggregate ows series
11Atuk and Ural (2002) also nd X-12-ARIMA can in certain instances further adjust a
series when there is no signicant evidence of seasonality, however our results suggest there
is clear evidence of a seasonal pattern.
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be seasonally adjusted via indirect estimation. This approach does not ap-
pear to produce seasonally adjusted estimates that are inferior to those of
the direct approach, and guarantees that the sum of seasonally adjusted sub-
components is equal to the corresponding seasonally adjusted aggregate. This
additivity property is potentially valuable from a user viewpoint, as it allows,
for example, contributions to unusually large quarter-on-quarter changes in an
aggregate series to easily be attributed to changes in its subcomponents.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In order to summarise the contribution of this thesis we highlight the main
contribution of each chapter in turn. We also discuss substantive issues which
have arisen as a consequence of our work; these issues provide us with an
agenda for future research.
7.0.1 Chapter one: Work and Play Pave the Way: The
Importance of Part TimeWork in a Lifecycle Model
Chapter one presented a structural lifecycle model à la Gustman and Stein-
meier (2002). Using backward induction and a isoelastic/quasilinear speci-
cation for utility, we show that with perfect foresight it is possible to derive
closed form solutions for labour supply, consumption and savings.
We nd a number of striking results. In particular, we establish the value
function takes the same functional form as the within period utility function.
This holds even with two decision variables per period, one of which is isoe-
lastic and the other which is quasilinear, and there is the possibility of corner
solutions.
Another dening feature of the model is the particularly simple expressions
which emerge for the value function when an individual experiences a period
of part time work. Our results show that in these cases optimal within period
labour supply is only dependent on adjacent period variables, and the value
function is linear in assets. The specication of the model implies that the
form of consumption crucially depends on current and previous labour supply.
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Analytical solutions provide a complete understanding of the general prop-
erties of the framework presented in chapter one. Our ndings highlight the
importance of the future on optimal within period labour supply, consump-
tion and savings decisions. This provides guidance for specifying an empirical
application, which we leave for future work.
7.0.2 Chapter two: To Defer or Not Defer: State Pen-
sion in a Lifecycle Model
Chapter two modelled the decision to defer State Pension within a lifecycle
framework. Given the context of the decision we restrict attention to a two
period framework, in which the rst period can be thought of as reaching the
age at which an individual is eligible to claim SP. In a general framework we
show in the absence of credit constraints, the decision to defer ones SP depends
only on the net present value of non-labour income.
We show the decision to defer ones SP may impact labour supply in one
or both periods. The exact e¤ect depends on exogenous factors such as the
wage rate and the marginal utility of leisure. In order to show this explicitly
we assume a quasilinear specication for utility à la Gustman and Steinmeier
(2002), commonly used in the lifecycle literature. A recent DWP report (Cole-
man et al., 2008) concluded that the UK government should aim to increase
public awareness regarding SP deferral, in light of survey evidence which (con-
trary to legislation) suggested that the decision to defer and continue working
was not treated independently.
We also formally compare the two deferral options available under the exist-
ing UK SP system. Our results show that under most simulations the deferred
higher weekly income option (versus the lump sum option) is preferred, in line
with previous studies (Farrar et al., 2012).
Such research helps inform policymakers which factors are important in
the SP deferral decision from a lifecycle perspective. By comparing the de-
ferral options available under current legislation it is possible to consider the
implications of our theoretical results in a policy context, and highlight the
potential disparities between particular options currently available.
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7.0.3 Chapter three: Lifetime Labour Market Activity
and Retirement Decisions: Evidence from ELSA
Chapter three modelled the retirement and early retirement decision for a
representative sample of English men and women aged 50 and over using ELSA.
The sample data spans the period 2001-2011 and focuses on a sample of initially
employed individuals.
Previous research has shown lifetime labour market histories are an impor-
tant determinant of whether an individual experiences poverty in retirement
(Nicholls, 2010; Bozio et al., 2010, 2011). We show preretirement work life
histories play an important role in the timing of the retirement and early
retirement decision. Specically, they tend to reduce the retirement hazard.
There are a number of reasons why this may be the case, for example due to an
insu¢ cient number of National Insurance contributions paid during ones work-
ing career. Other important factors in the (early) retirement decision include;
pension wealth, lifetime and baseline health, spousal employment status, age
and quintile position in the income distribution. Of these, higher levels of
pension wealth act to raise the hazard of (early) retirement which is likely to
be due to the generous pension schemes (in particular occupations) available
to this cohort.
Our results indicate that the covariate set had a di¤erential e¤ect on the
hazard of retirement when we controlled for quintile position in the income
distribution. In shaping policies to extend working lives, policymakers should
be aware of the potential for di¤erential policy e¤ects depending on position
in the income distribution.
We show lifetime labour market history may not only have contempora-
neous a¤ects but also long term ramications which are visible at retirement.
A priori one may hypothesise periods of worklessness and inactivity raise the
hazard of early retirement however our results suggest otherwise. Nonetheless,
similar to Jones et al. (2010) we do nd evidence to suggest that higher levels
of pension wealth and poorer self-reported health do indeed raise the likelihood
of retirement.
To the best of our knowledge this is the rst study to incorporate the
ELSA work history information in modelling the retirement and early retire-
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ment decision. Understanding which factors a¤ect the decision to withdraw
(often permanently) from the labour market is important, particularly given
the changes in labour supply behaviour at older ages and the legislated rise in
the SPA.
7.0.4 Chapter four: Unretirement in England: An Em-
pirical Perspective
Chapter four modelled the unretirement decision for a sample of retired English
men aged 50 and over. The study utilises sample data from ELSA covering
the period 2001-2009.
Based on the date of labour market re-entry, we estimate an unretirement
rate of nearly ten percent. In terms of magnitude this is similar to recent
studies carried out for Sweden and Denmark (Pettersson, 2011; Larson and
Pederson, 2013); however it is signicantly lower than that reported in the
US (Maestas, 2010). Our results show the likelihood of unretirement is higher
amongst those with: a degree, a spouse in employment in 2002, higher levels
of pension wealth and a medium or long term nancial planning horizon. The
duration approach we follow suggests there is no clear evidence of a gradient
in the unretirement hazard.
Using the work history data available at wave 3 of ELSA, we estimate
annual salary income in the main preretirement job to be nearly £ 39,000 (2007
prices). Combined with our estimation results this suggests that unretirement
is unlikely to be related to low lifetime income or credit constraints.
This is the rst study to analyse unretirement in England. Understanding
the factors driving the unretirement decision is important, given the signicant
proportion of the UK population aged over SPA (ONS, 2013b). Our results
suggest certain sections of the retired population are more likely to exhibit
unretirement behaviour. Given the wider implications of increasing longevity
on scal revenues coupled with a focus by central government on extending
working lives, understanding the unretirement decision will help shape current
and future labour market policies aimed at retired individuals.
7. Conclusion 202
7.0.5 Chapter ve: Accounting for Attrition in the two-
quarter UK Labour Force Survey
Chapter ve investigated the determinants of non-response in the UKLFS. We
show it is feasible to incorporate the factors related to attrition in an alternative
calibration engine in order to estimate revised longitudinal weights.
Our results show in addition to the factors highlighted by Clarke and Tate
(1999), survey attrition is more likely to be concentrated amongst; individuals
in the 25-29 and 30-34 age categories, those whose rst interview was by proxy
and economic status. A recent ONS report (2012a) indicates survey response
rates have declined by around 25% between 2000-2010, our results indicate the
determinants of survey attrition have altered over this period. Controlling for
factors correlated to non-response helps inform the specication of longitudinal
weights used to correct for any resulting bias.
Using a revised specication, our results show the longitudinal weights are
on average two thirds the size of those currently estimated. Moreover, by
analysing the distribution of the revised weights it is clear the variance is
signicantly smaller and does not feature extreme weights.
We show the extent to which labour market ow estimates di¤er due to
alterations in the raking specication. The revised weights consistently esti-
mate a smaller magnitude of individuals moving into a di¤erent economic state
across two consecutive quarters and in some cases this di¤erence can be large.
Given the importance of understanding the dynamics of the UK labour mar-
ket, the ONS is currently investigating how best to incorporate the ndings of
this research into their production of quarterly labour force statistics.
7.0.6 Chapter six: Approaches to the Seasonal Adjust-
ment of Labour Market Flows
Chapter six investigated the existence and magnitude of seasonality in the
UKLFS covering the period 2001-2012. We show UK labour force ows exhibit
a seasonal pattern and warrant being adjusted. Comparing each adjustment
method using a broad range of diagnostic tests with quarterly UKLFS data
our results indicate neither direct or indirect seasonal adjustment is superior.
Therefore, we choose to indirectly seasonally adjust each ow. The latter
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method guarantees that the sum of seasonally adjusted subcomponents is equal
to the corresponding seasonally adjusted aggregate.
We also set up a le system in which seasonal adjustment is undertaken
automatically for future releases of the UKLFS. This will allow researchers to
directly compare the gross and adjusted series in order to understand the e¤ect
of seasonal factors. The impact of this research has been such that the ONS
now release seasonally adjusted estimates of labour force ows each quarter.
7.1 Substantive issues to be addressed in fu-
ture research
In answering the questions we rst set out to investigate, our analysis has
raised additional lines of inquiry which provide an agenda for future research
e¤orts. In chapter one we showed that for a particular set of preferences, it is
possible to derive closed form solutions. It would be worthwhile to investigate
whether a more general result could be established à la Merton (1971). That is
to say, when a utility function is composed of two variables and each assumes
a di¤erent power form is the optimisation problem analytically soluble? Can
the value function be derived? Such results help inform our understanding of
lifecycle models and guide empirical modelling.
In chapter two we studied the e¤ect of state pension deferral in a lifecycle
model. Private and employer pensions are another important source of retire-
ment income. However, the heterogeneity in private and employer pensions
means there has been little academic research focused on deferral of these par-
ticular sources of retirement income. Nonetheless, it is true that these schemes
do share some common features; thus research into understanding how deferral
of these types of pensions depends on, and a¤ects, key economic characteris-
tics such as labour supply and savings would be valuable. This is particularly
relevant given: (a) The recent announcement of a workplace pension in the
UK and (b) The fact there exists a ten year gap (six for females) between the
age at which a male can claim his private/employer pension (age 55) versus
his state pension (age 65).
In order to better understand an individuals labour supply decision at
older ages (as was the aim of chapters three and four), more detailed infor-
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mation is needed regarding an individuals labour supply history. This would
be achievable through linked administrative data. Whilst some advancements
have been made, such as wave one of ELSA being linked to DWP administra-
tive records, future work should attempt to link additional waves of ELSA and
other datasets such as National Cohort Studies (1946 and 1958). This is the
focus of ongoing research being carried out by the Institute for Fiscal Stud-
ies and the Institute of Education. This will provide researchers with more
detailed and accurate information relating to an individuals labour market
history when modelling the retirement decision.
Underpinning all longitudinal analysis (such as the estimation of non-
response weights and the seasonal component in labour force ows) is the
quality of survey data. One aspect of quality assurance is sample size and how
this evolves over time due to attrition. Whilst longitudinal weights are able to
account for various survey specic characteristics, minimising non-response is
of paramount importance for statistical agencies. To this end, one avenue of
future research is to investigate non-response using experimental methods via
the Understanding Society Innovation Panel.
To conclude, population ageing is an important issue for the UK. One
in six individuals is aged over 65 and recent estimates indicate one in three
children born in 2013 will live to reach 100 (ONS, 2011a, 2013c). In light of
these statistics this thesis has sought to determine factors which determine
labour supply behaviour at older ages. Such timely research aids academics
and policymakers in their attempt to meet the labour market challenges of an
ageing population.
Chapter 8
Appendices
8.1 Appendix for Chapter one
8.1.1 Data and sample construction
The Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a representative longitudinal
survey of the US population administered by the University of Michigan. The
sample began in 1968 and contained 30; 000 households (McGonagle et al.,
2012). For the past four decades it has followed sample members and their
children, collecting a range of economic and sociodemographic variables at each
wave of the survey. The fact that the PSID has such a long panel dimension
makes it an ideal candidate to analyse key labour market characteristics such
as: weekly hours in paid employment, wages, non-labour income and assets
over the lifecycle.
Each sample is derived by retaining only those individuals who are in the
age bracket (in 2006) dened on the x-axis in Figures 1.1-1.3 and hence pro-
vides a cross section of individuals.1 We only consider lifecycle characteristics
of males since the number of female HOHs is much lower, however at the in-
dividual level females have similar distribution of work and wages to males
except during child bearing years (not shown).
Each of the key economic characteristics was derived using the following
formula:
1Given that one characteristic we are interested in is hours worked, for individuals to be
eligible for our sample they must be in employment.
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1. Assets = value of all car(s) in the residence + value of all family members
AMT balances + value of all bonds/insurance and excludes all residential
wealth.2
2. Annual non-labour income = HOH annual dividend income + HOH an-
nual interest income + HOH annual rental income.
3. The hourly wage rate = wage rate reported in main job (2006 $).
Individuals education level is collegeif they have spend at least 16 years
in full time education, high schoolif they spend between 12 and 15 years in
full time education, and below high schoolif they spend strictly less than 12
years in full time education.
8.1.2 M recursion
To show this take the three periods prior to the terminal period as an example,
starting from the end substitute back into the relevant expression at each
period to derive the expression for MT t:
MT 1 = [1 +QT (QT )1=( 1)]1 
= [1=( 1)(1=(1 ) +Q=( 1)T ]
1 
=  1[1=(1 ) +Q=( 1)T ]
1 
MT 2 = MT 1[1 +QT 1(QT 1MT 1)1=( 1)]1 
= MT 1[(MT 1)1=( 1)((MT 1)1=(1 ) +Q
=( 1)
T 1 )]
1 
= [(MT 1)1=(1 ) +Q
=( 1)
T 1 ]
1 
= [([1=(1 ) +Q=( 1)T ]
1 )1=(1 ) +Q=( 1)T 1 ]
1 
= [1=(1 )[1=(1 ) +Q=( 1)T ] +Q
=( 1)
T 1 ]
1 
= [2=(1 ) + 1=(1 )Q=( 1)T +Q
=( 1)
T 1 ]
1 
2We do not include individuals who report constituent asset component values in excess
of 2006 US $1 million.
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MT 3 = [(MT 2)1=(1 ) +Q
=( 1)
T 2 ]
1 
= [([2=(1 ) + 1=(1 )Q=( 1)T +Q
=( 1)
T 1 ]
1 )1=(1 ) +Q=( 1)T 2 ]
1 
= (1=(1 )[2=(1 ) + 1=(1 )Q=( 1)T +Q
=( 1)
T 1 ] +Q
=( 1)
T 2 ]
1 
= [3=(1 ) + 2=(1 )Q=( 1)T + 
1=(1 )Q=( 1)T 1 +Q
=( 1)
T 2 ]
1 
Thus for period T   t we have:
MT t = (
t=(1 ) + (t 1)=(1 )Q=(1 )T + 
(t 2)=(1 )Q=(1 )T 1 + 
(t 3)=(1 )Q=(1 )T 2
+:::Q
=(1 )
T t+1 )
1 
= (ts=0
(t s)=(1 )Q=(1 )T s+1 ) with QT+1 = 1
8.1.3 Proofs for proposition 1.1 (iii)
If the future value is isoelastic and optimal current participation is at a corner
then the current value is also isoelastic:
VtjLt = maxhtLt + c

t

+
Mt+1(N
i
t+1 +Qt+1(rtAt + yt   ct + wt(1  Lt))


@Vt
@ct
= c 1t   MtQt(N it +Qt(rtAt + yt   ct + wt(1  Lt)) 1 = 0
ct =
MtQ
1
 1
t (N
i
t +Qt (rtAt + yt + wt (1  Lt)))
1 +Qt (MtQt)
1
 1

This implies
At+1 = rtAt + yt   MtQ
1
 1
t (N
i
t +Qt (rtAt + yt + wt (1  Lt)))
1 +Qt (MtQt)
1
 1
 + wt(1  Lt)
and
VtjLt = Mt(N it +QtAt)=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8.1.4 Final period
At T choose LT to
max
[yT + wT (1  LT ) + rTAT ]

+ hTLT st LT  1
d
dLT
=  wT [yT + wT (1  LT ) + rTAT ] 1 + hT
If this is < 0 at LT = 1 have optimal LT < 1, if  0 have corner LT = 1; if
 0 at LT = 0 have corner LT = 0 i.e.
LT = 0 if
hT
wT
 (yT + wT + rTAT ) 1
= [yT + rTAT + wT   (hT
wT
)1=( 1)]=wT
if wT + yT + rTAT > (
hT
wT
)1=( 1) > yT + rTAT
= 1 if (
hT
wT
)1=( 1)  yT + rTAT
which gives
vT = (yT + wT + rTAT )
= if
hT
wT
 (yT + wT + rTAT ) 1(LT = 0)
= (
1

  1)(hT
wT
)1=( 1) + (
hT
wT
)(yT + rTAT + wT )
if wT + yT + rTAT > (
hT
wT
)1=( 1) > yT + rTAT (LT interior)
= (yT + rTAT )
= + hT if (
hT
wT
)1=( 1)  yT + rTAT (LT = 1)
Using this at T
vT (AT ) = max[P
i
T +M
i
T (N
i
T +Q
i
TATt)
=;RT + STAT ]
= P 2T +M
2
T (N
2
T +Q
2
TATt)
= if
hT
wT
 (yT + wT + rTAT ) 1
= RT + STAT if (wT + rTAT ) 1 <
hT
wT
< (yT + rTAT )
 1
= P 1T +M
1
T (N
1
T +Q
1
TATt)
= if
hT
wT
 (yT + rTAT ) 1
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where
P 1T = hT ; N
1
T = yT ; Q
1
T = rT ;M
1
T = 1
P 2T = 0; N
2
T = yT + wT ; Q
2
T = rT ;M
2
T = 1
RT = hT (1 +
yT
wT
) + (
1

  1)(hT
wT
)=( 1); ST = rT
hT
wT
(R1t ; R
2
t ,R
3
t and S
1
t ; S
2
t ,S
3
t coincide)
Then
vT = max[PT +
MT (NT +QTAT )


;RT + STAT ]
8.1.5 Epochs
Epochs Preceding an Epoch with a Power Function Value Function
Consider the epoch lasting for periods from t2 to t1 1 where the value function
at t1 is a power function.
vt1 1 = max
c;L
ct1 1= + ht1 1Lt1 1+
[P it1 +
Mt1(N
i
t1
+Qt1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1   ct1 + wt1(1  Lt1))

]
@
@ct1 1
= c 1t1 1 Mt1Qt1(N it1+Qt1(rt1At1 1+yt1 1 ct1 1+wt1 1(1 Lt1 1)) 1 = 0
Optimal consumption at t3 is then:
ct1 1 =
(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1)
1 +Qt1(Mtt1Qt1)
1=( 1) (N
i
t1
+Qt1(rt1 1At1 1+yt1 1 ct1 1+wt1 1(1 Lt1 1))
Substituting in back into the value function gives:
vt1 1 = max
L
ht1 1Lt1 1+
Mt1(N
i
t1
+Qt1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1(1  Lt1 1))
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1)) 1
@vt1 1
@Lt1 1
= ht1 1 
Mt1Qt1wt1 1(N
i
t1
+Qt1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1(1  Lt1 1)) 1
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1)) 1
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Optimal labour supply at t3 is either; full time work, part time work or zero
work according to the sign of the marginal value of leisure evaluated at Lt1 1 =
0; 1: In particular:
Lt1 1 = 0 if
@vt1 1
@Lt1 1
jLt1 1=0 < 0
i.e. if ht1 1  
Mt1Qt1wt1 1(N
i
t1
+Qt1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1)
 1
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1)) 1
< 0
Lt1 1 = 1 if
@vt1 1
@Lt1 1
jLt1 1=1 > 0
i.e. if ht1 1  
Mt1Qt1wt1 1(N
i
t1
+Qt1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1)
 1
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1)) 1
> 0
0 < Lt1 1 < 1 if
@vt1 1
@Lt1 1
jLt1 1=0 > 0;
@vt1 1
@Lt1 1
jLt1 1=1 < 0
i.e. if ht1 1  
Mt1Qt1wt1 1(N
i
t1
+Qt1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1)
 1
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1)) 1
< 0
and ht1 1  
Mt1Qt1wt1 1(N
i
t1
+Qt1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1)
 1
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1)) 1
> 0
The value function at t1   1 remains a power function if there is either full
time work or zero work at t1   1 but becomes linear if there is optimally part
time work at t1   1: Optimal part time work solves
ht1 1 =
Mt1Qt1wt1 1(N
i
t1
+Qt1   1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1(1  Lt1 1)) 1
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1)) 1
which gives 
ht1 1
Mt1Qt1wt1 1
1=( 1)
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1)) =
N it1 +Qt1 [rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1] +Qt1wt1 1(1  Lt1 1)
E¤ectively L is linear in wealth and labour income and this makes c linear in
wealth. Moreover the resources carried forward term N it1 + Qt1(rt1 1At1 1 +
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yt1 1 + wt1 1(1  Lt1 1) is independent of current wealth.
Qt1wt1 1Lt1 1 = N
i
t1
+Qit1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1) 
ht1 1
Mt1Qt1wt1 1
1=( 1)
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1))
Lt1 1 =

N it1 +Qt1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1)

Qt1wt1 1
 
ht1 1
Mt1Qt1wt1 1
1=( 1)
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1))

Qt1wt1 1
vt1 1 = ht1 1Lt1 1 +
Mt1(N
i
t1
+Qt1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1(1  Lt1 1))
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1)) 1
=
ht1 1
Qt1wt1 1
(N it1 +Qt1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1)
 

ht1 1
Mt1Qt1wt1 1
1=( 1)
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1)))
+
Mt1 1(

ht1 1
Mt1Qt1wt1 1
1=( 1)
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1))
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1)) 1
=
ht1 1
wt1 1
(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1)+
ht1 1
Qt1wt1 1
(N it1  

ht1 1
Mt1Qt1wt1 1
1=( 1)
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1)))+
Mt1

ht1 1
Mt1Qt1wt1 1
=( 1)
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1))
=
ht1 1
wt1 1
(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1) +
ht1 1
Qt1wt1 1
N it1
+Mt1

ht1 1
Mt1Qt1wt1 1
=( 1)
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1))
  ht1 1
Qt1wt1 1

ht1 1
Mt1Qt1wt1 1
1=( 1)
(1 +Qt1(Mt1Qt1)
1=( 1))
vt1 1 = Rt1 + St1At1
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Epochs Preceding an Epoch with a Linear Value Function
From proposition 1 we know the value function at t1 is linear in assets, substi-
tuting in the t1   1 budget constraint we have:
St1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1   ct1 1 + wt1 1(1  Lt1 1) +Rt1
This could be either the rst period of part time work or any period which
is followed at some point by a period of part time work. Optimal choice at
t1   1
maxu(ct1 1) + ht1 1Lt1 1
+[St1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1   ct1 1 + wt1 1(1  Lt1 1) +Rt1 ]
Optimal labour at t1  1 is then either; full time leisure, part time or full time
work:
Lt1 1 = 1 if ht1 1 > St1wt1 1
0 < Lt1 1 < 1 if ht1 1 = St1wt1 1
Lt1 1 = 0 if ht1 1 < St1wt1 1
Optimal consumption ct1 1 is equal to ct1 1 = 
1=( 1)S1=( 1)t1 :The value
function at t1   1 is then
(i) if Lt1 1 = 1
ct1 1

+ ht1 1Lt1 1 + [St1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1(1  Lt1 1)  ct1 1) +Rt1 ]
=
ct1 1

+ ht1 1 + [St1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1   ct1 1) +Rt1 ]
=
=( 1)S=( 1)t1

+ ht1 1 + St1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1)  St11=( 1)S1=( 1)t1 ) + Rt1
= ht1 1 + St1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1) + Rt1 + 
=( 1)S=( 1)t1 [1=  1]
vt1 1 = ht1 1 + St1 [rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1] + Rt1 = S
1
t1 1[rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1] +R
1
t1 1
where S1t1 1 = St1 and R
1
t1 1 = ht1 1 + Rt1 + 
=( 1)S=( 1)t1 [1=  1]
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(ii) if Lt1 1 = 0
ct1 1

+ [St1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1   ct1 1) +Rt1 ]
=
=( 1)S=( 1)t1

+ St1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1)  St11=( 1)S1=( 1)t1 ) + Rt1
= St1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1) + Rt1 + 
=( 1)S=( 1)t1 [
1

  1]
vt1 1 = S
0
t1 1[rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1] +R
0
t1 1
where S0t1 1 = St1 and R
0
t1 1 = ht1 1 + Rt1 + 
=( 1)S=( 1)t1 [
1

  1]
(iii) if Lt1 1 = interior
ct1 1

+ ht1 1(1  Lt1 1) + [St1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1(1  Lt1 1)  ct1 1) +Rt1 ]
=
ct1 1

+ [St1 (rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1)  ct1 1) +Rt1 ]
= St1(rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1) + Rt1 + 
=( 1)S=( 1)t1 [
1

  1]
vt1 1 = S
I
t1 1[rt1 1At1 1 + yt1 1 + wt1 1] +R
I
t1
where SIt1 1 = St1 and R
I
t1 1 = Rt1 + 
=( 1)S=( 1)t1 [
1

  1];since ht1 1 =
St1wt1 1 and the same equation for c holds.
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8.2 Appendix for Chapter two
8.2.1 Semi-indirect utility
Individuals optimally choose consumption in each period for xed values of
LT 1; LT : This gives semi-indirect utility v(LT 1; LT ; x) :
@v
@LT 1
=
@uT 1
@cT 1
@cT 1
@LT 1
+ 
@uT
@cT
@cT
@LT 1
+
@uT 1
@LT 1
= 
@uT
@cT
[r
@cT 1
@LT 1
+
@cT
@LT 1
] +
@uT 1
@LT 1
(8.3)
From 8.3 and the fact that rcT 1 + cT = x we know:
r
@cT 1
@LT 1
+
@cT
@LT 1
=
@x
@LT 1
=  rwT 1
so
@v
@LT 1
=  rwT 1@uT
@cT
+
@uT 1
@LT 1
Similarly
@v
@LT
= 
@uT
@cT
[r
@cT 1
@LT
+
@cT
@LT
] +
@uT
@LT
and
r
@cT 1
@LT
+
@cT
@LT
=
@x
@LT
=  wT
The remaining problem for the individual is to choose optimal labour supply
in each period:
max
LT ;LT 1
v(LT 1; LT ; x) st 0  Li  1
If each u() is concave due to time additivity then v() is also.
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8.2.2 The value function for quasilinear-isoelastic pref-
erences
Dening AT as the nancial wealth carried forward from period T 1 to period
T; we can substitute out the lifetime budget constraint to write cT 1 in terms
of initial wealth minus savings and leave the problem
U =
(rAT 1 + yT 1 + wT 1(1  LT 1)  AT )

+ hT 1LT 1
+(
(rAT + yT + wT (1  LT ))

+ hTLT )
Maximising U wrt AT gives
AT =
xT 1   (r)1=( 1)(yT + wT (1  LT )
1 + r(r)1=( 1)
where xT 1 = rAT 1 + yT 1 + wT 1(1   LT 1) and putting this back into U
gives
U =
(rAT 1 + yT 1 + wT 1(1  LT 1) 
h
xT 1 (r)1=( 1)(yT+wT (1 LT )
1+r(r)1=( 1)
i
)

+hT 1LT 1 + (
(r
h
xT 1 (r)1=( 1)(yT+wT (1 LT )
1+r(r)1=( 1)
i
+ yT + wT (1  LT ))

+ hTLT )
The value function is then
v =
(r(rAT 1 + yT 1 + wT 1(1  LT 1)) + yT + wT (1  LT ))

((r)=( 1) + )
+hT 1LT 1 + hTLT
which can be rewritten as
v =
(K + rwT 1(1  LT 1)) + wT (1  LT ))

D + hT 1LT 1 + hTLT
where:
K = r(rAT 1 + yT 1) + yT ; D = ((r)=( 1) + )
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8.2.3 The wage proles giving indi¤erent participation
proles
Each pairwise utility combinations is dened as follows:
(i) v00 = v01
(K + rwT 1 + wT ) = (K + rwT 1) +

D
hT
w1T =

(K + rw1T 1)
 +

D
hT
1=
 K   rw1T 1
(ii) v00 = v10
(K + rwT 1 + wT )

D =
(K + wT )


D + hT 1
rw2T 1 =

(K + w2T )
 +

D
hT 1
1=
 K   w2T
(iii) v00 = v11
(K + rwT 1 + wT )

D =
K

D + hT 1 + hT
K + rw3T 1 + w
3
T = (K
 +

D
(hT 1 + hT ))1=
(iv) v01 = v10
(K + rw4T 1)
 = (K + w4T )
 +

D
(hT 1   hT )
rw4T 1 = ((K + w
4
T )
 +

D
(hT 1   hT ))1=  K
(v) v01 = v11
rw5T 1 = (K
 +

D
hT 1)1=  K
(vi) v10 = v11
w6T = (K
 +

D
hT )
1=  K
For convenience we repeat the indi¤erence relations here, but setting wages
on the RHS to zero:
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(1) = V00   V01 : w1T =

K +

D
hT
1=
 K
(2) = V00   V10 : rw2T 1 =

K +

D
hT 1
1=
 K
(3) = V00   V11 : rw3T 1 + w3T = (K +

D
(hT 1 + hT ))1=  K
(4) = V10   V01 : rw4T 1 = (K +

D
(hT 1   hT ))1=  K (ref wT 1)
(5) = V11   V01 : rw5T 1 = (K +

D
hT 1)1=  K
(6) = V10   V11 : w6T = (K +

D
hT )
1=  K
Comparing the loci we see that for wages such that V10 = V01 and V00 = V01
we must also have V00 = V10; in terms of Figure 2.1 in chapter two the loci
(1),(2) must cross each other on the locus (4). Similarly the loci (5),(6) (V11 =
V01 and V11 = V10) must cross on the locus (4) (V01 = V10). For similar reasons
loci (1),(3),(5) must intersect at a common point; and so must loci (2),(3),(6).
The indi¤erence relations V11 = V01; V11 = V10 and V00 = V11 are all linear
in the wage rates with the last being negatively sloped and the other two
respectively horizontal and vertical. Relation (4), (1) and (2); V10 = V01,
V00 = V01 and V00 = V10 respectively are all positively sloped. For example
di¤erentiating v00   v01 implicitly
(K + rwT 1 + wT ) 1(rdwT 1 + dwT ) = (K + rwT 1) 1rdwT 1
dwT
dwT 1
= r
(K + rwT 1) 1   (K + rwT 1 + wT ) 1
(K + rwT 1 + wT ) 1
 < 1 so (K + rwT 1) 1 > (K + rwT 1 + wT ) 1 and the slope of locus (1)
is always positive at any w0s: The same logic applies to locus (2):
(K + rwT 1 + wT ) 1 (rdwT 1 + dwT ) = (K + wT ) 1 (rdwT )
dwT
dwT 1
= r
(k + rwT 1)
 1   (K + rwT 1 + wT ) 1
(K + rwT 1 + wT )
 1
Comparing the intercept of the loci: those of (1) and (6) are equal as are
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those of (2) and (5). But the intercept of locus (1) is below that of locus (3)
on the wT axis , and of locus (2) is below that of locus (3) on the wT 1 axis.
Combining this information gives Figure 2.1 in chapter two.
8.2.4 The intersections of the loci all exist
Assets, ys and hs may be such that not all the intersections happen at strictly
positive wages. But a nite positive solution must exist: both sides continuous
in wT ; at wT = 0 LHS greater than RHS
[K +
hT 1
DD
]1= > fK + (hT 1   hT )
DD
g1=
and as wT !1
lim
wT!1
f[(K +wT ) + hT 1
DD
]1=  [(K +wT ) + (hT 1   hT )
DD
]1= < lim
wT!1
wT
A possible problem is that wT 1 where v01 = v10 may not be positive: e.g.
looking above if hT is huge compared with hT 1 may give wT 1 < 0 where
they cross.
8.2.5 Comparative statics of the optimal lifecycle labour
participation regimes
In order to ascertain the e¤ect of pension deferral on participation one must
notice that the critical wage expressions (as a function ofK) with the exception
of w4 all take the form:
w = (K + z)1=  K
where z > 0: Di¤erentiate wrt K
dw
dK
= (K + z)(1 )=K 1   1
= (1 + zK )(1 )=   1 > 0 if z > 0
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In the case of w4 we have (hT 1  hT ) so if hT 1 > hT then dw=dK > 0 but
if hT 1 < hT then dw=dK < 0: So if hT 1 > hT the wage region with full
time work at T expands at the expense of the wage region with full time work
only in T   1, or vice versa if hT 1 < hT :
8. Appendices 220
8.3 Appendix for Chapter three
8.3.1 The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA)
The data utilised in chapter three is drawn from the English Longitudinal
Study of Ageing (ELSA). ELSA is a biennial longitudinal survey which is
representative of the English household population aged 50 and over. The rst
wave of data was collected between April 2002 and March 2003, and was drawn
from multiple samples (1998, 1999 and 2001) of the Health Survey for England
(HSE). HSE is a study conducted on behalf of the Department of Health by
the Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, UCL, and the National
Centre for Social Research. The wave 1 sample consisted of 12; 099 individuals
of which 11; 391 were core sample members, these comprised of 7,894 benet
units (i.e. an individual or couple with dependents). Due to non-response
and sample attrition refreshment samples of individuals aged between 50 and
74 were introduced to the main survey at wave 3 (2006/7), wave 4 (2008/9)
and wave 6 (2012/3). Similar to the initial sample these were drawn from
recent waves of the HSE. For the purpose of analysis we do not include any
refreshment sample members. At the time of writing there were ve waves of
ELSA available (in addition there is also a wave 0 le, however this contains
limited economic and sociodemographic information), chapter three makes use
of all ve waves of data to track changes in individuals retirement behaviour,
with the exception of wave 0.
ELSA collects a variety of information relating to an individuals circum-
stance at the time of survey. This ranges from detailed information regarding
income, assets, work and pensions through to information relating to an indi-
viduals health status and medical conditions. There is also a module relating
to subjective expectations regarding future expectancy regarding paid work,
health and life expectancy.
In terms of chapter three it is important to note how we derive the period
at risk, i.e. the length of time before rst retirement. The questions we use to
derive this measure come from the following survey questions:
1. Age at wave 1 survey question
2. Calendar year and month of interview in wave 1
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3. Calendar year and month of retirement
From 1. and 2. it is possible to derive the calendar year of birth of the
individual, we can subtract the calendar year of birth from the information in
3. to derive the number of years at risk i.e. the age at retirement. We then
round this number to the nearest whole integer to facilitate estimation in the
discrete time hazard model.
8.3.2 Pension wealth
Our sample consists of individuals aged 50 and 74 in wave 1 of ELSA. Therefore
we have mixture of individuals who are above and below SPA. Total pension
wealth is the sum of private and state pension. We use the pension wealth
variables derived by the IFS (for more information See Banks, Emmerson and
Tetlow, 2005).
In deriving the total pension wealth a number of assumptions are required.
First, it is important to note that pension wealth is only estimated for those
below SPA. For those who are above SPA a more accurate measure of pension
wealth is derived using actual income and then discounting (at a rate of 2.5%)
to derive a Net Present Value for the calendar year 2002 (assuming individuals
have not deferred their pension entitlements).
In calculating state pension wealth for those below SPA we assume indi-
viduals work until they reach SPA (which is an upper bound to true pension
wealth as it credits individuals with maximum future accrual of rights). Whilst
this is an extreme assumption it is worth noting the median age in our sample
is 69 and 75% of the sample is at or above SPA in wave 1. Therefore the total
state pension wealth is potentially overestimated for a maximum of 25% of the
sample.
It is assumed private pension wealth is the total of dened contribution
(DC), dened benet (DB), wealth from pensions that an individual no longer
contributes to (but has rights) and wealth from past pensions which an indi-
vidual is receiving income from. Income from these streams can be observed
for those over SPA and can be calculated in terms of 2002 net present value.
For those individuals below SPA total private pension is calculated given
respondents answers to pension questions such as value of their pension fund
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(which is assumed to receive an annual rate of return of 5%). We assume that
an individual carries on contributing to their private pension at the rate they
did in 2002. Again the amount calculated will be an upper bound (again this
will be for at most 25% of the sample). In the case of DB schemes ELSA asks
about length of time in scheme, accrual fraction and also has information on
gross income from main job (imputed for those where it is missing). We also
assume individual retires at normal retirement age from their occupational
pension scheme.
For past pensions yet to be received respondents are asked about schemes
to which they have rights but are not yet in receipt of income. For DB schemes
information is also collected on tenure in the scheme and accrual /contribution
rate. Combining this with ination gures and average earnings proles it is
possible to derive a net present value for such pensions. A similar method is
carried for DC schemes i.e. we assume that su¢ cient contributions were made
to produce a fund that, if annuitised at the SPA at its real value in the year
the individual left the scheme, would produce an income equal to that of a DB
scheme that had been contributed to over the same period. In other words,
the fund value upon leaving the scheme is calculated by taking the years in
the scheme, the accrual fraction and the nal salary, in the same way as was
done for the DB schemes(Banks et al., 2005).
For past pensions it is irrelevant whether an individual retires now or in
the future as they are no longer making additional contributions. For past
pensions already in receipt it is possible to calculate annual income received
in 2002 and derive a measure of NPV. Individuals are assumed to pay basic
tax rate on their pension income.
For spousal/widow pensions information is collected on level of pension
received in 2002 or the expected amount if not currently in receipt. This is
assumed to drawn on at SPA.
Banks et al. (2005) perform sensitivity analysis on their assumptions and
nd the value of pension wealth is sensitive to the discount rate and contracting
out histories but not sensitive to assumptions about future earnings growth,
future annuity rates and future asset returns.
Chapter three also makes use of the Financial Derived Variables (FDV) le
released with each wave of ELSA. Specically we use a measure of total non-
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pension household wealth by quintile derived by the IFS. Total non-pension
nancial wealth is the sum of total net housing wealth and total net non-
housing wealth, this then gives a distribution across all benets units (weighted
to include sample members only) in a given calendar year.
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8.3.3 Summary statistics for estimation sample
Table 8.1: Male summary statistics.
Variable
 
x  N
1st income quintile 0.07 0.26 787
2nd income quintile 0.18 0.38 787
3rd income quintile 0.24 0.43 787
4th income quintile 0.29 0.46 787
5th income quintile 0.21 0.41 787
Log household income 6.21 0.84 787
Log pension wealth 12.08 0.66 787
No episodes out of labour market 0.72 0.45 787
1 episode out of labour market 0.20 0.40 787
2+ episodes out of labour market 0.08 0.26 787
50-84% of potential labour market experience in work 0.02 0.15 787
85-99% of potential labour market experience in work 0.20 0.40 787
100% of potential labour market experience in work 0.78 0.42 787
Single 0.04 0.20 787
Married 0.82 0.38 787
Divorced 0.11 0.32 787
Widowed 0.02 0.15 787
Spouse in employment 0.43 0.50 787
Degree 0.22 0.42 787
Above A level/Below degree level 0.19 0.39 787
A level 0.12 0.32 787
O level and below 0.47 0.47 787
Baseline health: Excellent or good 0.84 0.36 787
Baseline health: Fair 0.14 0.35 787
Baseline health: Poor 0.01 0.12 787
Zero episodes of poor health before age 50 0.87 0.33 787
1 episode of poor health before age 50 0.11 0.31 787
2 episodes of poor health before age 50 0.01 0.12 787
3+ episodes of poor health before age 50 0.01 0.08 787
Owned outright 0.27 0.26 787
Mortgage 0.64 0.64 787
Rent 0.08 0.27 787
Free rent 0.01 0.11 787
Employer pension 0.55 0.55 787
Private pension 0.24 0.24 787
Self employment pension 0.01 0.01 787
State pension only 0.20 0.40 787
Professional or managerial occupation 0.46 0.49 787
Skilled manual or non manual occupation 0.42 0.32 787
Unskilled occupation 0.12 0.50 787
Long term nancial planning horizon 0.39 0.49 787
Medium term nancial planning horizon 0.39 0.49 787
Short term nancial planning horizon 0.22 0.41 787
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Table 8.2: Female summary statistics.
Variable
 
x  N
1st income quintile 0.09 0.29 567
2nd income quintile 0.22 0.41 567
3rd income quintile 0.22 0.41 567
4th income quintile 0.23 0.42 567
5th income quintile 0.24 0.42 567
Log household income 5.95 0.99 567
Log pension wealth 11.61 1.01 567
Zero episodes out of labour market 0.12 0.33 567
1 episode out of labour market 0.45 0.50 567
2+ episodes out of labour market 0.43 0.50 567
20-49% of potential labour market experience in work 0.04 0.19 567
50-65% of potential labour market experience in work 0.13 0.34 567
65-80% of potential labour market experience in work 0.29 0.45 567
80-95% of potential labour market experience in work 0.33 0.47 567
95-100% of potential labour market experience in work 0.21 0.41 567
Single 0.04 0.21 567
Married 0.72 0.45 567
Divorced 0.19 0.39 567
Widowed 0.04 0.20 567
Spouse in employment 0.41 0.49 567
Degree 0.16 0.37 567
Above A level/Below degree level 0.11 0.32 567
A level 0.095 0.29 567
O level and below 0.63 0.48 567
Baseline health: Excellent or good 0.83 0.37 567
Baseline health: Fair 0.15 0.35 567
Baseline health: Poor 0.02 0.14 567
Zero episodes of poor health before age 50 0.84 0.37 567
1 episode of poor health before age 50 0.12 0.32 567
2 episodes of poor health before age 50 0.03 0.17 567
3+ episodes of poor health before age 50 0.01 0.12 567
Owned outright 0.31 0.46 567
Mortgage 0.58 0.49 567
Rent 0.002 0.04 567
Free rent 0.10 0.30 567
Employer pension 0.58 0.49 567
Private pension 0.10 0.30 567
Self employment pension 0.001 0.04 567
State pension only 0.31 0.46 567
Professional or managerial occupation 0.04 0.18 567
Non manual or manual skilled occupation 0.33 0.47 567
Unskilled occupation 0.63 0.48 567
Long term nancial planning horizon 0.35 0.48 567
Medium term nancial planning horizon 0.39 0.49 567
Short term nancial planning horizon 0.26 0.44 567
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8.3.5 Wave 3 life history le
The lifetime history le available at wave 3 of ELSA contains a detailed record
of all labour market related activity (using calendar methods); from the time
individuals left full time education to their nal job in the labour market. For
each job the calendar year start and end date is recorded, as is whether the
job is part time, full time or a mixture of the two. Using this information it is
possible to compute the potential number of years an individual spent in the
labour market, dened as the period between the year they entered their rst
job and the year they left their nal job.
By summing the duration (in years) of each job, it is possible to compute
the total number of years spent in employment. Due to the questionnaire
design it is not possible to determine the length of any jobs which start and
end in the same year (for more information see Nicholls, 2010). However
we plot histograms for job spell length for each individual and nd only a
small number of male or females report a job spell length which is less than
a year. This is reected in the total number of lifetime jobs, which for males
and females was 5.6 and 5.9 respectively. Therefore we believe the potential
measurement error due to missing short-term employment spells is minimal.
Using this information it is possible to compute the proportion of time spent
in employment as:
Number of years spent in actual employment
Potential number of years in labour market
= Proportion of potential labour market experience spent in employment
We use this statistic in our regression specications. Eight individuals in
our sample had employment histories which had job start dates which predated
their previous job end date, we follow the method of Brendan (1997) who for
the BHPS data gives the rst/previous job precedence in terms of dictating
the next (chronological) consecutive job start date.
For the same reason as employment duration, it is not possible to detect the
length of any period of unemployment or inactivity which starts and ends in the
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same year. However it is still possible to detect if an episode of unemployment
or inactivity takes place (so long as it is at least three months in length) which is
less than one year in duration. Unlike the reasons highlighted for employment,
an episode (or perhaps many episodes) out of the labour market between 3 and
strictly less than twelve months due to inactivity or unemployment, could have
an e¤ect on labour market attachment. Hence we use the number of reported
counts of unemployment and inactivity in the regression specication.
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8.3.6 Male estimation results: Full sample with Heckman-
Signer frailty
Table 8.3: Male discrete time hazard model estimates (full sample).
Variab le  () Pr > jZj
Age  54 0.02(0:01) 0.00
55Age 56 0.80(0:03) 0.00
57Age 58 0.87(0:28) 0.67
59Age 60 3.49(0:89) 0.00
61Age 62 5.37(1:40) 0.00
63Age64 12.30(3:37) 0.00
65Age66 101.53(41:23) 0.00
67Age72 144.12(96:38) 0.00
2nd Household non-p ension wealth quintile 1 .15(0:43) 0.75
3rd Household non-p ension wealth quintile 0 .97(0:47) 0.95
4th Household non-p ension wealth quintile 1 .06(0:49) 0.88
5th Household non-p ension wealth quintile 1 .05(0:49) 0.90
Log household incom e 1.31(0:13) 0.01
Log p ension wealth 1.46(0:21) 0.01
1 ep isode out of lab our market 0.81(0:21) 0.42
2+ episodes out of lab our market 0.42(0:16) 0.03
50-84% of p otentia l lab our market exp erience in work 4.88(2:94) 0.01
85-99% of p otentia l lab our market exp erience in work 1.288(0:35) 0.36
Married 0.62(0:25) 0.24
D ivorced 0.45(0:20) 0.08
W idowed 0.68(0:50) 0.61
Spouse in employment 1.02(0:17) 0.87
Degree 1.59(0:39) 0.05
Above A level/ Below degree level 1 .02(0:26) 0.91
A level 0 .97(0:24) 0.91
Baseline health : Fair 1 .64(0:38) 0.03
Baseline health : Poor 4.26(2:00) 0.00
1 ep isode of p oor health b efore age 50 1.11(0:25) 0.61
2 ep isodes of p oor health b efore age 50 4.60(2:29) 0.01
3+ episodes of p oor health b efore age 50 0.09(0:11) 0.04
Mortgage 0.92 (0:16) 0.62
Rent 0.59 (0:25) 0.22
Free rent 2.11 (1:49) 0.29
Employer p ension 1.57 (0:35) 0.02
Private p ension 0.77 (0:21) 0.34
Self employment p ension 1.04 (1:19) 0.97
Professional or manageria l o ccupation 0.78 (0:22) 0.39
Technical non manual or manual o ccupation 0.81 (0:20) 0.39
Long term nancia l p lanning horizon 0.97 (0:20) 0.91
M edium term nancia l p lanning horizon 0.96 (0:20) 0.83
m2
_cons 12.80(6:64) 0.00
logit p2
_cons 1.53(0:36) 0.07
Probability typ e 1 0.40(0:05) 0.00
Probability typ e 2 0.6(0:05) 0.00
Number of p erson-years observations3 47530
Number of non retirem ent ep isodes4 47182
Number of retirem ent ep isodes5 348
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8.3.7 Male estimation results: Bottom three income
quintiles
Table 8.4: Male bottom three quintiles.
Variable  (robust ) Pr > jZj
Age  54 0.03 (0:03) 0.00
55Age 56 0.83 (0:06) 0.01
57Age 58 0.33 (0:38) 0.34
59Age 60 4.88 (3:18) 0.01
61Age 62 3.90 (2:78) 0.05
63Age64 11.71 (7:73) 0.00
65Age66 73.74 (47:19) 0.00
67Age72 47.85 (36:62) 0.00
Log household income 1.16 (0:25) 0.47
Log pension wealth 1.60 (0:50) 0.14
1 episode out of labour market 0.89 (0:42) 0.79
2+ episodes out of labour market 1.26 (0:96) 0.76
50-84% of potential labour market experience in work 0.67 (0:86) 0.76
85-99% of potential labour market experience in work 1.72 (0:78) 0.24
Married 0.44 (0:27) 0.17
Divorced 0.15 (0:15) 0.05
Widowed 0.49 (0:76) 0.65
Spouse in employment 0.85 (0:29) 0.63
Degree 0.30 (0:31) 0.24
Above A level/ Below degree level 0.65 (0:37) 0.45
A level 1.46 (0:84) 0.51
Baseline health: Fair 1.56(0:0:61) 0.25
Baseline health: Poor 1.32(1:49) 0.81
1 episode of poor health before age 50 1.18(0:66) 0.77
2 episodes of poor health before age 50 2.59(2:40) 0.31
3+ episodes of poor health before age 50 omitted
Mortgage 0.75(0:26) 0.41
Rent 1.08(0:50) 0.86
Free rent 14.34(19:55) 0.05
Employer pension 1.62(0:74) 0.28
Private pension 0.67(0:39) 0.49
Self employment pension omitted
Professional or managerial occupation 1.20(0:66) 0.74
Technical non manual or manual occupation 1.23(0:51) 0.63
Long term nancial planning horizon 1.32(0:54) 0.49
Medium term nancial planning horizon 0.47(0:19) 0.06
Number of person-years observations 11648
Zero outcomes 11575
Non zero outcomes 73
Wald chi2(40) 739.05 (p < 0.000)
Notes: Omitted indicates no respondents in relevant category.
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8.3.8 Male estimation results: Top two income quintiles
Table 8.5: Male top two quintiles.
Variable  (robust ) Pr > jZj
Age  54 0.09 (0:06) 0.00
55Age 56 0.83 (0:02) 0.00
57Age 58 0.52 (0:28) 0.23
59Age 60 2.27 (1:28) 0.15
61Age 62 4.27 (2:42) 0.01
63Age64 6.57 (3:66) 0.00
65Age66 18.77 (9:22) 0.00
67Age72 12.01 (6:12) 0.00
Log household income 1.28 (0:22) 0.14
Log pension wealth 1.44 (0:16) 0.00
1 episode out of labour market 0.83 (0:20) 0.43
2+ episodes out of labour market 0.50 (0:16) 0.03
50-84% of potential labour market experience in work 5.90 (3:29) 0.00
85-99% of potential labour market experience in work 0.88 (0:25) 0.67
Married 0.58 (0:20) 0.13
Divorced 0.69 (0:43) 0.56
Widowed 0.60 (0:28) 0.28
Spouse in employment 1.06 (0:20) 0.76
Degree 1.65 (0:56) 0.14
Above A level/ Below degree level 1.40 (0:47) 0.31
A level 1.40 (0:79) 0.55
Baseline health: Fair 1.10 (0:27) 0.71
Baseline health: Poor 4.27 (2:74) 0.02
1 episode of poor health before age 50 1.10 (0:25) 0.70
2 episodes of poor health before age 50 1.55 (0:82) 0.41
3+ episodes of poor health before age 50 0.23 (0:24) 0.15
Mortgage 1.08 (0:24) 0.74
Rent 0.67 (0:25) 0.28
Free rent 1.29 (0:77) 0.67
Employer pension 1.71 (0:52) 0.07
Private pension 1.02 (0:35) 0.95
Self employment pension 0.73 (0:83) 0.78
Professional or managerial occupation 0.84 (0:35) 0.68
Technical non manual or manual occupation 1.63 (0:50) 0.11
Long term nancial planning horizon 1.35 (0:31) 0.19
Medium term nancial planning horizon 1.46 (0:38) 0.15
Number of person-years observations 35821
Zero outcomes 35546
Non zero outcomes 275
Wald chi2(40) 2018.81
Pr > chi2 0.00
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8.3.9 Female estimation results: Bottom three income
quintiles
Table 8.6: Female bottom three income quintiles.
Variable  (robust ) Pr > jZj
Age 55 0.00 (0:00) 0.00
56Age 57 0.01 (0:01) 0.01
58Age 59 0.01 (0:01) 0.01
60Age 61 0.04 (0:01) 0.09
62Age 63 0.04 (0:07) 0.09
64Age 65 0.08 (0:07) 0.18
66Age 68 0.03 (0:06) 0.10
Log household income 1.40 (0:27) 0.06
Log pension wealth 0.94 (0:12) 0.58
1 episode out of labour market 1.96 (1:58) 0.32
2+ episodes out of labour market 1.79 (1:34) 0.42
20-49% of potential labour market experience in work 0.21 (0:16) 0.04
50-65% of potential labour market experience in work 0.57 (0:30) 0.28
65-80% of potential labour market experience in work 1.07 (0:40) 0.85
80-95% of potential labour market experience in work 0.69 (0:25) 0.32
Married 2.77 (2:23) 0.20
Divorced 2.21 (1:87) 0.34
Widowed 3.07 (2:93) 0.19
Spouse in employment 0.61 (0:24) 0.19
Degree 0.93 (0:50) 0.88
Above A level below degree level 0.38 (0:26) 0.17
A level 0.42 (0:29) 0.16
Baseline health: Fair 2.05(0:80) 0.06
Baseline health: Poor 6.32(4:85) 0.01
1 episode of poor health before age 50 0.60(0:32) 0.43
2 episodes of poor health before age 50 1.14(0:77) 0.85
3+ episodes of poor health before age 50 omitted
Mortgage 0.82(0:24) 0.49
Rent omitted
Free rent 0.29(0:15) 0.01
Employer pension 0.56(0:20) 0.07
Private pension 0.98(0:46) 0.97
Self employment pension omitted
Professional or managerial occupation omitted
Technical non manual or manual occupation 1.31(0:43) 0.40
Long term nancial planning horizon 0.67(0:28) 0.30
Medium term nancial planning horizon 1.20(0:37) 0.54
Number of person-years observations 9775
Zero outcomes 9696
Non zero outcomes 79
Wald chi2(40) 568.40
Pr > chi2 0.00
Notes: Omitted indicates no respondents in relevant category.
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8.3.10 Female estimation results: Top two income quin-
tiles
Table 8.7: Female top two income quintiles.
Variable  (robust ) Pr > jZj
Age 53 0.00(0:00) 0.00
54Age 55 0.01(0:01) 0.00
56Age 57 0.03(0:04) 0.01
58Age 59 0.07(0:09) 0.03
60Age 61 0.31(0:42) 0.39
62Age 63 0.28(0:36) 0.32
64Age 65 0.44(0:56) 0.52
66Age 68 0.59(0:79) 0.69
Log household income 0.85(0:12) 0.23
Log pension wealth 0.99(0:09) 0.86
1 episode out of labour market 0.56(0:20) 0.11
2+ episodes out of labour market 0.44(0:16) 0.02
20-49% of potential labour market experience in work 2.82(1:54) 0.07
50-65% of potential labour market experience in work 1.32(0:53) 0.48
65-80% of potential labour market experience in work 1.53(0:53) 0.21
80-95% of potential labour market experience in work 1.65(0:56) 0.14
Married 1.32(0:51) 0.47
Divorced 0.77(0:33) 0.55
Widowed 1.75(1:11) 0.37
Spouse in employment 1.49(0:27) 0.03
Degree 0.54(0:15) 0.02
Above A level/ Below degree level 1.42(0:35) 0.16
A level 1.25(0:31) 0.45
Baseline health: Fair 1.13(0:26) 0.47
Baseline health: Poor 1.01(0:47) 0.99
1 episode of poor health before age 50 1.21(0:30) 0.42
2 episodes of poor health before age 50 0.73(0:33) 0.48
3+ episodes of poor health before age 50 1.32(0:65) 0.58
Mortgage 1.02(0:19) 0.89
Rent omitted
Free rent 1.55(0:50) 0.17
Employer pension 1.87(0:40) 0.00
Private pension 1.08(0:34) 0.81
Self employment pension omitted
Professional or managerial occupation 2.71(1:07) 0.01
Technical non manual or manual occupation 1.58(0:35) 0.04
Long term nancial planning horizon 1.06(0:22) 0.76
Medium term nancial planning horizon 1.32(0:30) 0.17
Number of person-years observations 24009
Zero outcomes 23782
Non zero outcomes 227
Wald chi2(40) 1341.89
Pr > chi2 0.00
Notes: Omitted indicates no respondents in relevant category.
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8.3.11 Life history parameter estimates from a discrete
time hazard model applying test for attrition
bias proposed by Nijman and Verbeek (1992)
(full sample of ELSA respondents by gender).
Table 8.8: Test for attrition bias.
Male Female
Covariate  Pr > jZj  Pr > jZj
One episode out labour market 0.80 0.39 0.38 0.12
Two or more episodes out of the labour market 0.51 0.07 0.36 0.11
50-84% of potential labour market experience in work 3.82 0.01 N/A N/A
84-99% of potential labour market experience in work 1.28 0.37 N/A N/A
20-49% of potential labour market experience in work N/A N/A 1.06 0.92
50-65% of potential labour market experience in work N/A N/A 0.97 0.95
65-80% of potential labour market experience in work N/A N/A 1.20 0.62
80-95% of potential labour market experience in work N/A N/A 1.24 0.54
Notes: Parameter estimates highlighting the e¤ect of life history variables on the
retirement decision, controlling for the number of survey waves an individual responds to,
seperate for each gender . Results show that when one controls for this, the parameter
estimates remain very similar to those presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 which indicate that
this type of attrition bias does not a¤ect results.
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8.3.12 Models of non-response required to estimate In-
verse Probability Weights (IPW)
Men
Wave 4
Table 8.9: Wave 4 Non response equation (males).
Log pseudolikelihood =  165:3024 N = 787
Variable  (robust ) Pr > jzj
Work and pensions accuracy (fairly accurate) -0.40 (0:21) 0.05
Work and pensions accuracy (not very accurate) -0.05 (0:18) 0.80
Work and pensions accuracy (not accurate at all) -0.64 (0:46) 0.15
Income and assets accuracy (fairly accurate) -0.76 (0:23) 0.00
Income and assets accuracy (not very accurate) -0.67 (0:20) 0.00
Income and assets accuracy (not accurate at all) -0.80 (0:34) 0.01
2nd Household net nancial wealth quintile -0.49 (0:23) 0.03
3rd Household net nancial wealth quintile -0.94 (0:26) 0.00
4th Household net nancial wealth quintile -0.58 (0:22) 0.00
5th Household net nancial wealth quintile -0.45 (0:24) 0.06
Second third of calendar year -0.26 (0:23) 0.24
Final third of calendar year -0.58 (0:27) 0.03
Interview in 2002 0.22 (0:25) 0.39
Long-standing illness -0.04 (0:15) 0.81
25-50% chance health will a¤ect future work -0.30 (0:27) 0.26
51-75% chance health will a¤ect future work 0.17 (0:19) 0.36
76-100% chance health will a¤ect future work -0.31 (0:19) 0.10
Wald {2(17) =424.87 Pr > {2 = 0:00
Notes: Work and pensions/ income and assets accuracy refers to the interviewers
perception of how accurate they deemed the interviewees answers to the survey questions
relating to work and pensions, on a four point scale: very accurate (base group), fairly
accurate, not very accurate, not accurate at all.
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Wave 5
Table 8.10: Wave 5 Non response equation (males).
Log pseudolikelihood =-305:83569 N = 787
Variable  (robust ) Pr > jzj
Work and pensions accuracy (fairly accurate) 0.95(0:16) 0.56
Work and pensions accuracy (not very accurate) -0.10(0:15) 0.48
Work and pensions accuracy (not accurate at all) 0.14(0:30) 0.96
Income and assets accuracy (fairly accurate) 0.40(0:20) 0.04
Income and assets accuracy (not very accurate) 0.33(0:19) 0.07
Income and assets accuracy (not accurate at all) 0.51(0:28) 0.07
2nd Household net nancial wealth quintile 0.11(0:19) 0.57
3rd Household net nancial wealth quintile 0.62(0:20) 0.00
4th Household net nancial wealth quintile 0.61(0:18) 0.00
5th Household net nancial wealth quintile 0.37(0:20) 0.06
Second third of calendar year 0.15(0:18) 0.40
Final third of calendar year 0.56(0:21) 0.01
Interview year 2002 -0.08(0:21) 0.71
Long-standing illness 0.74(0:11) 0.52
25-50% chance health will a¤ect future work 0.16(0:20) 0.44
51-75% chance health will a¤ect future work 0.01(0:17) 0.94
76-100% chance health will a¤ect future work 0.32(0:16) 0.05
Wald {2(17) =348.07 Pr > {2 = 0:00
Notes: Work and pensions/ income and assets accuracy refers to the interviewers
perception of how accurate they deemed the interviewees answers to the survey questions
relating to work and pensions, on a four point scale: very accurate (base group), fairly
accurate, not very accurate, not accurate at all.
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Women
Wave 4
Table 8.11: Wave 4 Non response equation (females).
Log pseudolikelihood =-96.920537 N = 539
Variable  (robust ) Pr > jzj
Work and pensions accuracy (fairly accurate) -0.17(0:25) 0.49
Work and pensions accuracy (not very accurate) -0.04(0:21) 0.85
Work and pensions accuracy (not accurate at all) omitted
Income and assets accuracy (fairly accurate) omitted
Income and assets accuracy (not very accurate) -0.40(0:22) 0.07
Income and assets accuracy (not accurate at all) -0.46(0:21) 0.02
2nd Household non-pension wealth quintile -0.19(0:26) 0.47
3rd Household non-pension wealth quintile -0.34(0:27) 0.20
4th Household non-pension wealth quintile -1.16(0:38) 0.00
5th Household non-pension wealth quintile -0.06(0:29) 0.84
Second third of calendar year -0.212(0:33) 0.51
Final third of calendar year -0.20(0:37) 0.57
Interview in 2002 -0.45(0:36) 0.21
Long-standing illness 0.08(0:19) 0.67
25-50% chance health will a¤ect future work -1.10(0:41) 0.01
51-75% chance health will a¤ect future work -0.63(0:25) 0.01
76-100% chance health will a¤ect future work -0.22(0:21) 0.30
Wald {2(15) =273.46 Pr > {2 = 0:00
Work and pensions/ income and assets accuracy refers to the interviewers perception of
how accurate they deemed the interviewees answers to the survey questions relating to
work and pensions, on a four point scale: very accurate (base group), fairly accurate, not
very accurate, not accurate at all. Omitted indicates either an empty category or all
respondents in category did not respond.
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Wave 5
Table 8.12: Wave 5 Non response equation (females).
Log pseudolikelihood =-191.19507 N = 564
Variable  (robust ) Pr > jzj
Work and pensions accuracy (fairly accurate) 0.19(0:20) 0.34
Work and pensions accuracy (not very accurate) -0.07(0:16) 0.67
Work and pensions accuracy (not accurate at all) -0.13(0:34) 0.72
Income and assets accuracy (fairly accurate) omitted
Income and assets accuracy (not very accurate) 0.19(0:22) 0.38
Income and assets accuracy (not accurate at all) 0.24(0:19) 0.21
2nd Household non-pension wealth quintile -0.11(0:20) 0.58
3rd Household non-pension wealth quintile 0.07(0:21) 0.74
4th Household non-pension wealth quintile 1.27(0:31) 0.00
5th Household non-pension wealth quintile 0.29(0:23) 0.20
Second third of calendar year -0.05(0:26) 0.98
Final third of calendar year 0.09(0:27) 0.76
Interview in 2002 0.33(0:29) 0.25
Long-standing illness 0.12(0:15) 0.42
25-50% chance health will a¤ect future work 0.58(0:27) 0.01
51-75% chance health will a¤ect future work 0.48(0:20) 0.01
76-100% chance health will a¤ect future work 0.33(0:18) 0.07
Wald {2(16) =242.84 Pr > {2 = 0:00
Work and pensions/ income and assets accuracy refers to the interviewers perception of
how accurate they deemed the interviewees answers to the survey questions relating to
work and pensions, on a four point scale: very accurate (base group), fairly accurate, not
very accurate, not accurate at all. Omitted indicates either an empty category or all
respondents in category did not respond.
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8.4 Appendix for Chapter four
8.4.1 Data and sample construction: ELSA
For a detailed description of ELSA and the variables which are of importance
to the construction of the dataset used in Chapter four readers should refer
to Appendix 8.3.1. Chapter four uses waves 1-4 to track changes in labour
market behaviour for a sample of retired English men.
In terms of chapter four it is important to note how we derive the period
at risk, i.e. the length of time before unretirement. The questions we use to
measure this derive from the following survey questions:
1. Calendar year and month of labour market entry
2. Calendar year and month of retirement
From 1. and 2. it is possible to derive the exact period before an individual
unretired, conditional on them reporting being retirement. We then round this
number to the nearest whole integer to facilitate estimation of the discrete time
hazard model.
Our nal sample contains 857 individuals with a complete information set
suitable for estimation purposes, we detail their average characteristics in Table
8.12.
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Table 8.13: Sample characteristics.
Variable
 
x N
Age at wave 1 66.59 857
Married at wave 1 0.79 857
Whether rst retired between the age of 50 and 55 0.20 857
Whether rst retired between the age of 56 and 60 0.30 857
Spouse in employment at wave 1 0.11 857
Whether has private health insurance 0.16 857
Whether has a limiting illness 0.58 857
Whether holds a degree 0.18 857
Whether has a qualication below degree but above A level 0.21 857
Whether holds an O-level or CSE 0.23 857
No/foreign qualication (base group) 0.38 857
Bottom income quintile 0.15 857
2nd income quintile 0.20 857
3rd income quintile 0.23 857
4th income quintile 0.21 857
Top income quintile 0.21 857
Log present value of pension income in 2002 11.91 857
Bottom non-pension net nancial wealth 0.10 857
2nd non-pension net nancial wealth 0.15 857
3rd non-pension net nancial wealth 0.19 857
4th non-pension net nancial wealth 0.25 857
Top non-pension net nancial wealth 0.31 857
25% fall in net nancial wealth between two consecutive waves 0.66 857
25% increase in net nancial between two consecutive waves 0.11 857
Opportunity to work past retirement age 0.13 857
Whether respondent feels they do not have enough income 0.07 857
<3 years (short term) nancial planning horizon (base) 0.29 857
3-5 years (medium term) nancial planning horizon 0.40 857
5+ years (long term) nancial planning horizon 0.31 857
Self reported social class: professional 0.11 857
Self reported social class: managerial 0.36 857
Self reported social class: skilled non manual 0.12 857
Self reported social class: skilled manual 0.27 857
Self reported social class: non skilled/foreign qualication (base) 0.14 857
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8.4.3 Models of non-response
Wave 3
Table 8.14: Wave 3 Non response equation
Log pseudolikelihood = 314:86 N = 827
Variable  (robust ) Pr > jzj
Work and pensions accuracy:fairly accurate omitted
Work and pensions accuracy:not very accurate omitted
Work and pensions accuracy:not accurate at all 1.04(0:80) 0.19
Income and assets accuracy:fairly accurate 0.14(0:30) 0.63
Income and assets accuracy:not very accurate 0.25(0:30) 0.38
Income and assets accuracy:not accurate at all 0.29(0:39) 0.45
2nd Income quintile -0.09(0:19) 0.62
3rd Income quintile -0.07(0:18) 0.71
4th Income quintile -0.13(0:19) 0.49
5th Income quintile -0.20(0:19) 0.29
Second third of calendar year -0.28(0:16) 0.08
Final third of calendar year -0.23(0:19) 0.22
Interview in 2002 -0.04(0:20) 0.83
25-50% chance health will a¤ect future work -0.93(0:68) 0.17
51-75% chance health will a¤ect future work omitted
76-100% chance health will a¤ect future work 1.01(0:33) 0.00
Wald {2(13) =413.62 Pr > {2 = 0:00
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.
Work and pensions/ income and assets accuracy refers to the interviewers perception of
how accurate they deemed the interviewees answers to the survey questions relating to
work and pensions, on a four point scale: very accurate (base group), fairly accurate, not
very accurate, not accurate at all.
Omitted indicates either an empty category or all respondents in category did not respond.
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Wave 4
Table 8.15: Wave 4 Non response equation
Log pseudolikelihood = 341:50 N = 849
Variable  (robust ) Pr > jzj
Work and pensions accuracy:fairly accurate -0.05(0:54) 0.93
Work and pensions accuracy:not very accurate -0.31(0:56) 0.58
Work and pensions accuracy:not accurate at all 1.22(0:97) 0.21
Income and assets accuracy:fairly accurate -0.05(0:24) 0.85
Income and assets accuracy:not very accurate -0.04(0:24) 0.86
Income and assets accuracy:not accurate at all -0.36(0:39) 0.35
2nd Income quintile -0.21(0:17) 0.21
3rd Income quintile -0.14(0:17) 0.41
4th Income quintile -0.21(0:18) 0.24
5th Income quintile -0.37(0:19) 0.04
Second third of calendar year -0.02(0:17) 0.92
Final third of calendar year -0.16(0:19) 0.39
Interview in 2002 -0.31(0:21) 0.14
25-50% chance health will a¤ect future work omitted
51-75% chance health will a¤ect future work 0.078(0:57) 0.89
76-100% chance health will a¤ect future work -0.67(0:28) 0.01
Wald {2(15) =391.74 Pr > {2 = 0:00
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.
Work and pensions/ income and assets accuracy refers to the interviewers perception of
how accurate they deemed the interviewees answers to the survey questions relating to
work and pensions, on a four point scale: very accurate (base group), fairly accurate, not
very accurate, not accurate at all.
Omitted indicates either an empty category or all respondents in category did not respond.
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8.5 Appendix for Chapter ve
8.5.1 Summary statistics
Diagnostic measures
For each consecutive two-quarter panel constructed the estimated coe¢ cients
from the models of non-response were very similar. Therefore we choose to
report only one set of results relating to the period Q1-Q2 2011.
G weight.
Table 8.16: G weight: Sample moments.
N 46999 Sum weights 46999
 
x 1 Sum observations 46999
x 0:334966 
2
x 0:11220222
 0:6773533 Kurtosis  0:0143484
Uncorrected SS 52272:2801 Corrected SS 5273:28006
Coe¢ cient variation 33:496 Std error mean 0:0015451
Table 8.17: G weight: Statistical measures.
Location Variability
 
x 1:00 x 0:334966
~
x 0:939821 2x 0:11220222
Mo 0:847220 Range 1:91955
Interquartile range 0:50159
Table 8.18: G weight:Tests for location 0 = 0
Tests for location H0 : 0 = 0
Test Statistic P value Test result
Students t = 647:2076 Pr > jtj < 0:0001 Reject H0
Sign M = 23499:5 Pr >= jM j < 0:0001 Reject H0
Signed Rank S = 5:5224E8 Pr >= jSj < 0:001 Reject H0
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Table 8.19: G weights: By quantile.
Quantiles
Quantile Estimate
100% Max 2:30E + 00
99% 1:92E + 00
95% 1:61E + 00
90% 1:45E + 00
75% Q3 1:23E + 00
50% Median 9:40E   01
25% Q1 7:31E   01
10% 6:15E   01
5% 5:65E   01
1% 4:77E   01
0% Min 3:76E   01
Table 8.20: G weight: extreme observations.
Lowest Highest
Value Observations Value Observations
3:76E   01 40231 2:28638 342
3:76E   01 39354 2:28638 1938
3:76E   01 39106 2:29553 493
3:85E   01 38902 2:29553 1404
4:15E   01 46813 2:29553 2372
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F weight.
Table 8.21: F weight: Sample moments.
N 46999 Sum weights 46999
 
x 932:580183 Sum observations 43; 830; 336
x 320:101589 
2
x 102465:027
 0:67480387 Kurtosis 0:00775405
Uncorrected SS 4:5671E10 Corrected SS 4815651346
Coe¢ cient variation 34:3242967 Std error mean 1:47653423
Table 8.22: G weight: Statistical measures
Location Variability
 
x 932:5802 x 320:10159
~
x 867:5711 2x 102465
Mo 801:7706 Range 1937
Interquartile range 476:18341
Table 8.23: F weight:Tests for location 0 = 0
Tests for location H0 : 0 = 0
Test Statistic P value Test result
Students t = 631:6008 Pr > jtj < 0:0001 Reject H0
Sign M = 23499:5 Pr >= jM j < 0:0001 Reject H0
Signed Rank S = 5:5224E8 Pr >= jSj < 0:001 Reject H0
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Table 8.24: F weights: By quantile.
Quantiles
Quantile Estimate
100% Max 2:17E + 03
99% 1:82E + 03
95% 1:51E + 03
90% 1:36E + 03
75% Q3 1:16E + 03
50% Median 8:68E + 02
25% Q1 6:82E + 02
10% 5:69E + 02
5% 5:13E + 02
1% 4:29E + 02
0% Min 2:35E + 02
Table 8.25: F weight: extreme observations.
Extreme observations
Lowest Highest
Value Observations Value Observations
2:4E + 02 40231 2163:72 342
2:4E + 02 39354 2163:72 1938
2:4E + 02 39106 2172:39 493
2:4E + 02 38902 2172:39 1404
2:6E + 02 40674 2172:39 2372
Chapter 9
Denitions
248
9. Denitions 249
Table 9.1: Denitions.
Abbreviation Description
AIC Akaike Information Criterion
ANOVA ANalysis Of VAriance
ARIMA Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average
BIC Berkake Information Criterion
BHPS British Household Panel Survey
BSP Basic State Pension
DWP Department for Work and Pensions
ELSA English Longitudinal Study for Ageing
GSS Government Statistical Service
HOH Head of Household
HRS Health and Retirement Survey
HSE Health Survey for England
IFS Institute for Fiscal Studies
Insee National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies
MeAPR Mean Absolute Percentage Revisions
MRS Marginal Rate of Substitution
MxAPR Maximum Absolute Percentage Revisions
NCDS National Child Development Survey
NCSR National Centre for Social Research
NEET Not Employed in Education or Training
NHS National Health Service
NI National Insurance
NSRA Normal State Retirement Age
NSL National Longitudinal Survey
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONS O¢ ce for National Statistics
PSID Panel Survey of Income Dynamics
PV Present Value
RHS Retirement and Health Survey
RMSD Root Mean Square Di¤erence
SP State Pension
SPA State Pension Age
SRA State Retirement Age
TRAMO Time series Regression with ARIMA noise,
Missing observations and Outliers
SEATS Signal Extraction in ARIMA Time Series
UK United Kingdom
UKHLS United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Survey
UKLFS United Kingdom Labour Force Survey
Chapter 10
Glossary
Table 10.1: Glossary
Term Description
CALMAR SAS raking macro (uses exponential distance metric)
CPI Consumer Price Index: ination metric
Earnings Rule Tax on post retirement labour market income abolished in 1989
FDV See Appendix 8.3.1 and 8.4.1
GES SAS raking macro (uses linear distance metric)
IPW Inverse Probability Weight (accounts for attrition)
NMW Legal minimum hourly wage rate for individuals aged 21+
NSA Non-Seasonally Adjusted (data unadjusted for calendar e¤ects)
X-12-ARIMA O¢ cial Seasonal Adjustment software of US Census Bureau
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